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SELF-CONTROL;

OR,

Life Without a Master.

A SHORT TREATISE

ON

THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF MEN.

BY

J. WILSON, Ph. D.

AUTHOR OF "PHRASIS," "PRACTICAL LIFE AND STUDY OF MAN,"
"RADICAL WRONGS," ETC., ETC.

*In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that
which was right in his own eyes.—Judges.*

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INTRODUCTORY.

This book is published for the purpose, mainly, of inducing men to open their eyes and see where they stand in their relations with their fellow men. In other words, its object is to lead men to think. The author does not propose to tell men what they do not know, but what they do know, when they take the trouble to think. One man knows more than other ordinary men only so far as he thinks and inquires more than they do. The germ of all thought lies in every man's bosom, even in the bosom of every child. In too many cases this germ remains neglected, and so it continues to be undeveloped and unproductive; in others, it is carefully nursed and cultivated, till it grows and finally bears fruit. A man may have a thought for a lifetime, and still not dream that he has such a possession. Thoughts neglected are as thoughts that do not exist. No thought thrives, no thought ever amounts to anything, unless it receives attention: it may come to the surface to-day, and never appear afterward. The lower animals think, but they do not know that they think, and the lower orders of the human race are precisely like them in that respect. An intelligent man not only thinks, but holds on to his thoughts; he treasures them up and puts them out at interest, and they sometimes produce ten and sometimes a hundredfold.

In this book the author is concerned chiefly with thoughts that all men have, but which few men recognize. The ideas that he proposes to publish are new only because men generally have given this subject no attention. If he suspected that no man before him ever had such thoughts as he is about to present, he would despair of ever making himself understood, even by the most learned and most intelligent members of the human family. But he knows very well that such is not the case. His task is not to tell people what they do not know, but what they do know, and what is indeed a part of their every-day experience. His constant appeal will be to the common sense and judgment of just such men as we meet in the every-day walks of life. Very much as St. Paul did, the author will "become as a Jew that he may gain the Jews." He will speak to the masses in the plain and simple dialect that prevails among the masses. His aim is not to confound or surprise, but to convince; and having that end in view, he has no use for any "unknown tongue." He makes no attempt at display, in the way either of learning or wit. He has not studied to be odd, but he never avoids homely phrases, when by the use of such phrases he might make himself better understood.

Perhaps the work may be said to lack system, or to be wanting in completeness, but it must be borne in mind that a complete and comprehensive work has never yet been published. Even Humboldt's *Cosmos*, or Adelung's *Mithridates*, or Bayle's voluminous dictionary, pretentious as they were in their day, covered but an extremely small patch of the vast territory over which the learning of this world extends. The best that could be said of these works, and of all others like them, is that they contained a great number of valuable and suggestive remarks. That is the most that the author expects to have said of this work. As to hypothesis, theory or scheme, he has none. Indeed, he has a horror for schemes that are deeply laid, and for platforms that are profoundly planned. Where is the scheme that was ever

found to be a working success to any appreciable extent? Where is the constitution or code of laws studiously elaborated in some philosopher's chamber that ever worked well in practice? It is a well known fact that men who undertake to do many things, do nothing well. It is given to no man to know more than a few things, and even those few things he rarely knows perfectly. A writer who starts out with a plan, a theory, a scheme, and seeks to make everything square up to it, can never arrive at even an approximation of the truth. Instead of occupying his time in picking up whatever is valuable that he happens to find by the way, he is constantly on the lookout for some block, or square or triangle that will exactly fit into some corner of his wonderful discovery. No, the author of this book has no scheme, no theory that he wishes to have the public endorse or the government copyright. He merely presents, in as orderly a manner as he finds practicable, a certain number of important truths, and he asks his readers if the statements made are not in accordance with their experience and with what they themselves know to be true—and, indeed, with what they have known all along, but never gave any attention to or made any use of before. Many statements in the work may appear repeated; they are repeated. In order that the reader may be induced to adopt or accept a truth that he has discarded or neglected for a lifetime, that truth must be presented to his mind frequently and in new forms, so that he may finally become alive to its importance and form some estimate of its value.

The author does not expect that the ordinary reader will take up this book and read it with the readiness and avidity that he would devour an interesting romance. The one who takes up a work of this character to read for the first time, must make its acquaintance slowly and master its pages with study and effort. He, perhaps, will have to take up the book and lay it down, and if he is really anxious to know what it contains, he must take it up again and again. Every student knows that that is the way, and the only way, to become acquainted with a new book, having

new thoughts, on a subject that is itself practically new. A man may be amused without any great amount of effort, but if he wishes to acquire knowledge, he will at least have to make a certain amount of exertion himself. The author cannot create an interest in his works. That must come from other sources; the effort must be made by the reader himself, or at least it must be the result of slow and uncertain growth, in his mind or his soul. Besides, in every case, in order to get a new idea into a man's head, he must make room for it in the first place by ridding himself of some of his old notions. The difficult part in all such cases is not so much to get the new idea in as to get the old idea out. If a man really believes in God and the Bible, he will not accept as true a statement that denies the existence of one or the authenticity or inspiration of the other. What few ideas people have they usually part with very unwillingly, especially if those ideas have been pets of the possessor for a number of years.

No one appreciates more fully than the author himself how utterly impossible it is for any writer to make people see what they do not and perhaps will not see—for seeing is one of those things that is largely subject to the will. Seeing mentally may be said to be wholly subject to the will. But it is well to remember that the will itself is not subject to the control of the one who wills. Hence both seeing and willing are dependent upon circumstances entirely outside of the control of men. Would that the author had the power to make men open their eyes and see how monstrously wicked and unjust people sometimes are, even when they imagine they are pursuing a strictly legitimate and proper line of business! They do not see it now, but they are sure to see it, or their descendants will, some day or other.

Unfortunately for the author, the thoughts presented in this work are not only new, but they are entirely out of harmony, perhaps, with all that the reader has heretofore read, heard or thought in this connexion. Perhaps he has never thought anything on the subject and has never taken any trouble to inquire into the matter. No doubt most readers would as soon think of

calling the Bible in question, or of criticising God himself, as to call in question the justice and uprightness of their government, their state, the legislature, the courts, and the constitution. These have always been objects of worship on the part of the masses. Why should they turn their faces from them now? From infallibility to fallibility is a very long distance, and those who, from the cradle up, have been taught to believe in the former, are not going to face about at once and accept a belief in the latter without a struggle. This change, this transformation, if it comes at all, must take time and come very gradually. For a man to cast aside the belief he has cherished for a lifetime and embrace another which is not only new but antagonistic to what he has always accepted before, it is necessary that he should be regenerated—he must become a new man. The preachers are entirely correct when they say that a man before he can embrace the new faith must be born anew. Consider how slow was the growth of Christianity, how long it has been undergoing a development which is far from completion even to-day. Consider how many centuries it took before the civilized nations of Europe consented to discard paganism and accept the new faith in its stead. For a long time Christianity was believed in by few, and even as we have it at present, it is far from being free from paganistic features.

No one appreciates more fully than the author what a radical, what a revolutionary proceeding it is for a man to change his belief. No man adopts a new belief and retains his old belief at the same time. It is hardly practicable for him to have part of one and part of the other, and if he attempts it, his hold on both will necessarily be imperfect. When a man changes one part of his faith, he must necessarily have modified conceptions of all that remains of the old. When people cease to believe in hell and eternal punishment, they necessarily have new ideas of God and his heavenly host. Instead of being a vengeful master, a despot, as before, he becomes at once the merciful God, the Father. When a man ceases to believe in the inspiration of the Bible, or

of any one of its chapters, he has shown by that fact alone that he has lost his old faith and embraced one that is new. He is not, and he cannot be, the Christian he was before. When one stone of the perfect arch falls, the arch itself falls. Not the keystone alone, but every stone, fitting in its own particular place and doing its own particular work, is indispensable. If we take one, or even one-twentieth of one, from one hundred, it ceases to be a hundred after that. So it is with a man's faith; when he loses a part, he abandons the whole, and becomes a believer in a new doctrine.

The author's leading aim, in this work, is to bring the reader to a realization of this one fundamental fact: *that no man has a right, under any circumstances or under any conditions, to be the master of another man.* Whatever else is said in the work, is merely a secondary or subsidiary matter, coming along in connexion with this general proposition or being employed to make the leading truth more evident, or it is something following after it as a natural consequence. The proposition, expressed in other words, is, that force shall not be applied by one man to control the action of another man under any pretense or claim whatever. This is the principle, and it is unqualifiedly true, but as society is organized at present, and with the conditions that prevail at the present time, perhaps it cannot be carried out in practice successfully in all cases. The most that can be done under existing circumstances is to approximate this desired result as far as possible. Even the father should not be the master over his child—certainly he should never chastise the child in any manner. No teacher in school, no leader or director in any capacity, should ever presume to inflict punishment in any case. He should be a guide, a superintendent; he should teach, impress, direct, but never attempt to force his will upon others, even upon the most humble. The teacher or superintendent might make his own terms, and the pupils might decide either to follow them or depart, but that would be as far as anything like authority should extend. A few years ago it would have been necessary also to

put in a claim as strong as this for the wife in her relations with her husband, but fortunately, while she is still far from being emancipated, she is much less a slave now than she was fifty or even twenty-five years ago.

The author believes not only in an absence of legal restraint, but that there should be no moral or religious enforcement of any kind. He believes that the world can get along quite well without punishments, and even without rewards, *except what follows as the natural consequence of a man's action.* As he does not believe in masters or government in any form, he would not speak of rights, duties and obligations. No man could be bound by such fetters as these, unless he was under the authority of some one, and unless his position was that of a subject whose action might be controlled by another man's will.

The author wants to make plain to the ordinary reader just what laws and trials are, and what government and legislation are, with all the machinery connected with their operations, and he desires to show how they work in practice. He wants to remove the delusion that prevails everywhere, that the people make the laws, and that without laws and government they would have no protection. He wants people to see and appreciate the fact that no citizen, from the time he leaves the cradle till he finally reaches the grave, as society is at present constituted, has any other relations than those of a slave to his master. He is a slave to his nurse when he is young and helpless; he is a slave to his father until he is twenty-one years of age; and he is a slave to the state during the remainder of his earthly career. He is always under tutelage and guardianship, and under the most favorable circumstances he is never more than a mere tenant at will. Incidentally, the author also wishes to have people understand what moral and religious obligations are, and how they fetter the ordinary citizen and prevent anything like free movement or development on his part. The author champions the rights of the individual, as opposed to those of the public, in all cases. He does not believe that any man should be compelled to

make sacrifices for the public good. The rights and interests of any one man are as important to him as the rights and interests of any ten thousand men are to them. A man might love his neighbor, and he might not—surely, no law could or should compel him to love his neighbor. He might sacrifice and he might not, but whether he did or did not sacrifice, should be left wholly to the individual's own choice. The author would have a race of independent and noble men, as free at least in their action as the savages of the forest. He has no confidence in legislation as a reformatory power, and sees but little good in the restraining influence of government as it manifests itself at the present stage of civilization. He does not believe that law, even moral or religious law, ever makes people good or virtuous.

The author does not preach the doctrine of rebellion, and he does not believe in revolutions which are to be rendered effective only by the killing of a great number of men. He finds no place for revenge, nor for the brutalities that result from a spirit of revenge. *He has no faith in remedies that are obtained only through a resort to force. He is opposed to war at all times and under all conditions.* Force may change the relations of men and things, but it never changes character. The revolutions in which he would place his trust are those that come from enlightening the mind and changing the nature and convictions of men. When people can once be made to see how much better they could get along without written laws, without government, without punishment of any kind, and without intermeddling in the affairs of citizens, then all such agencies as these will be promptly dispensed with.

It is hardly necessary to add that the author does not claim to be orthodox on any subject; no man who does his thinking on his own account can long continue to be orthodox. The orthodox people are generally those who do their thinking by proxy, and who accept what other people say strictly as a matter of faith and confidence. But the author is neither an infidel, nor a socialist nor an anarchist, and he has no acquaintance or affiliation with any of these classes. He is simply, what every man

ought to be, an independent thinker. For a half century he has been a devoted student and a persistent inquirer; he has no interest or prejudice that is opposed to the truth, and he has ever been ready to accept any statement that seemed to him worthy of approval.

If the reader does not happen to agree with the author in the positions he takes, and if he does not see the matter as the author sees it, it does not necessarily follow that the reader is right and the author wrong. It means simply that his thoughts have run in entirely different channels, because he has had other associations, followed other teachings and yielded to other influences. Or perhaps it means that he has had no teachings or thoughts at all on the subject.

What is here presented is the result of long study and mature deliberation, and it can hardly be presumption in the author to claim some consideration for the result of his inquiries. Having passed the age of threescore years, and having been a student all his life, it would be strange if he had not discovered something that was worthy of the attention of thinking men in this connexion. If he did not feel that he had mastered the subject, so far as is possible to master it at this stage of the world, he would never have gone to the trouble and expense of presenting his conclusions, as he has, in the form of a book.

What does it mean when a man does not like a book that he happens to come across? It means just the same as it does when one man does not like another man, or this or that picture, or this or that piece of furniture that he sees. It does not follow that the man who is not liked is bad, or that the picture or piece of furniture is bad. It means merely that they do not strike his fancy or meet his taste or preference; they do not fit in with his wishes, interests, or preconceived notions—nothing more. They do not agree with the way he was taught and the way he was brought up. Perhaps instead of the discarded objects themselves being bad, or defective, it is the man himself who is bad or imperfect. Possibly his taste is perverted or he is lacking in the

information and the training that would enable him to form a correct judgment in the premises. No man should condemn without being able to explain why he condemns. If he does not believe what he reads, he should be ready to demonstrate wherein it is false. If the premises are not well founded, he should be willing to show that fact, and if the conclusions are unwarranted, he should not be unwilling to make that fact evident or intelligible. No person, of course, is obliged to accept the doctrines of this work, if they do not agree with his notions on the subject, but he should not declaim against the book, unless he is confident he knows more about the matter than the writer does whose statements or propositions are brought in question.

The work has been divided into numerous sections or articles, in order to make it more acceptable to the reader, there being no reading so tedious and uninteresting as long chapters, with an endless succession of involved and entangled sentences. It will be found that all these articles are closely related and have a direct bearing upon the main subject to which the book is devoted, namely, the right of self-control, as opposed to the right to supremacy on the part of some individuals over others.

The use of the pronoun "I," instead of "we," in a work of this kind, is unavoidable. In no other way is it possible to distinguish between what the author thinks and asserts, and what his readers are assumed to assert or accept.

In this work the author will rarely quote; he will not take the trouble to publish other people's thoughts. He proposes to give simply his thoughts, his views of the case. He will not quote to strengthen his position—it needs no strengthening. If the reader has not full confidence in his ability to discuss this question fully and fairly, and if he is not confident that the author knows just what he is saying and what he is talking about, he ought to select some other book for perusal. The author proposes to give the result of his own studies and inquiries, and he will simply report what he has found and what he knows to be true. He could name plenty of the ablest writers

of the day who affirm, in hundreds of cases, the very same things that are affirmed in this work, but, as already said, he has no occasion to quote what they have published. His case would be made neither clearer nor stronger by so doing. If he is not believed when he asserts that certain statements or assertions are facts, why should others be believed who assert merely the same thing? The question in which we are all concerned, is whether the author's positions are true or false, or whether they are well or ill founded, and not how many agree or disagree with him in what he claims to be true. Suppose, for instance, that he asserts that every subject in a state is a slave, how much stronger would he make his case by showing that Herbert Spencer, and scores of others, declare the same thing? Suppose he declares that right is simply an affair of the community, or is merely what is commanded by law, would he make the case any clearer or stronger by being able to add that Clifford, in his essay on Morals, takes the same ground? However, he does not pretend that the thoughts contained in this work are his thoughts exclusively. They are simply thoughts that have come to him, but he would not deny for a moment that such thoughts have come, or will hereafter come, to other men. No man thinks alone, and no man has certain thoughts alone. Others will assuredly have the same thoughts that we have, though they may be slow in reaching them, or they may not fully understand or appreciate them when they are reached.

After the introduction, the reader is advised to turn to the concluding pages of the work and read them carefully. In that way he will get a clearer idea of the positions taken by the author and of the doctrines which he advocates.

J. WILSON.

THE POWER OF THOUGHT.

The only possible way by which men can see, and see clearly, is by learning to think. All the revelation of which we have any account, even that of the prophets and the saints of old, must have been simply the result of study and meditation. For the infantile, or the unenlightened or uninstructed, there is no revelation. Such beings are not able to interpret what they hear or understand what they see, and hence they are in no condition to receive and utilize what is revealed to them. Their misfortune is, that they have not learned to think.

It is through the medium of thought, and thought alone, that the history of the world has thus far been shaped and determined. Without thought men would merely vegetate, and development would be, at least for them, a slow and uncertain process. The conceptions that men form of things are not of things as they really are, but as they think they are, and for that reason the same thing appears to no two people alike. If every man saw things as they are, all men would have the same thoughts and conceptions, but as a matter of fact, the commonest hill that we notice as we pass by appears to no two men alike. It is for this reason that the stories of no two men agree when they relate what they have seen, though they may have been witnesses of one and the same occurrence.

All the operations of the mind are carried on not with things, but our ideas of things—what is in ourselves, not what is

apart from ourselves, is what concerns us. No one can have any conception of that which is outside of himself, or of that which has no relation to himself. All the communion and intercourse that we have in this world is with ourselves. When we talk, we are merely giving utterance to our thoughts, and for all practical purposes, we are talking to ourselves. Things for us are merely as we regard them ; a hangman, for instance, is either a decent man or a monster, according as we view things. To me he appears in no better or brighter light than that of a devil or a monster ; to others he may appear under a more favorable aspect.

Every thinker knows that thoughts must be courted ; we must lie in ambush for them and catch them as they flit by. It is only occasionally that thoughts come to us unbidden, and when they happen to come in that easy way, they are rarely the ones we are looking for. If a man desires light, he must search for it ; if he wants knowledge, he must labor for it. But when the desired thought is finally secured, the experienced thinker is never at a loss to decide whether it is spurious or genuine ; he knows, or he ought to know, when he has solved the problem, and when the result is questionable or uncertain. If a man knows anything at all in this world, he ought to know what he knows, and as a usual thing, the sound and careful reasoner does know that much.

The more clearly we come to understand the nature and power of intellect, the better we shall perceive that if there is really any such thing as power in this world, there is more of it in the mind than in the body. Without the mind, the body would be like any other mass of inanimate matter ; life is not a matter of flesh and bones, but of spirit, or of the mind. The Latin *animus* and *anima* are the same word in different genders, and these words signify spirit, soul, life, and mind, showing that these ideas belong in the same category and arise from the same conception. Without the head to guide and impel the body, it would have no more power to move than a piece of wood would have. When the spirit departs and the mind ceases to act, the

body becomes simply a corpse, and we speak of it not as the man himself, but his remains. It is through intellect, study, investigation and meditation alone that this world is moved at the present day, and the less of these things there are in the world, the less it will move, and the less will be finally accomplished. Years since when there was relatively less intellect than there is now, the body counted for more than it does at present. Now a few rule the many, and they do so through the powerful advantage which the intellect affords them. Again, I would impress upon the reader that it is not physical power in any literal sense that rules and moves this world, but the mind, the intellect, the spirit.

It is well known that this world is now controlled chiefly by contrivances, discoveries, inventions—and the work is all done as the result of thought, prevision and prudence. Those who will not take the trouble to think and reflect, must be content to be the servants or slaves of those who will. Under the present condition of things, one man, with the help of his machine, counts as much as a thousand men without one. Numbers in this world are an insignificant factor; the really important question with regard to a man, is what can he accomplish and how much does he weigh. The man who can combine and utilize the most forces, who can bring to his aid the powers not only of man but nature, *is the one who counts the most*. Such men are always the rulers of the world. A man might be forty cubits high and ten cubits broad, and still he would be far from being a great man. Such a man would be a monster and entirely out of place; there would be no room in which to put him and he would not know what to do with himself. Napoleon, Cæsar and Alexander, the greatest heroes of at least three thousand years, were very far from being giants in form and body.

Great men, strong men, are those who utilize all forces, not only those that come within their reach, but those that have been brought within it; they bring into subjection not only men, but the wind, the waves and the powers of nature gener-

ally. What would an army of 500,000 men accomplish, if they did not have one head and a common end in view? Individuals do the work, *but alone they never count*. It is the *accumulation of forces*, not the multiplication of forces that makes men strong: alone, units never count more than one, no matter if there is a million of them, but taken in combination they may count any number that one may choose to name. It is in this simple way that a few shrewd, practical, persevering men who possess this great power of combination and utilization, over-reach and bring into subjection the multitude. The rich man, the practical business man, is always ready to avail himself of privileges, opportunities and advantages; but the poor and unfortunate man never bothers his head about looking either forward or backward; he never thinks, never minds, never studies, never works, at least never in a determined, sensible and effective way; and as one might expect, *he never prospers*. The rich are backed up in all they do by the overwhelming power of the state; such an ally as this not only encourages but strengthens them. The rich are wise and see things before they happen, and they often provide ways and means that render it certain that they will happen, but the poor and unfortunate never make a practice of looking ahead, and consequently they never see things till after they have happened, and then it is often too late to put forth efforts for any purpose or with any aim in view. It might be added that what the rich and the prosperous do is always done quietly, decently, legally. They never avail themselves of privileges that do not come to them by right. They accomplish the most, in the way of carrying out their plans, through the medium of law. Such laws look simple and harmless enough when they are being enacted, but the fulness of their effect is never realized till some time afterward. By that time the fetters have been riveted and resistance on the part of the poor and helpless is impossible or impracticable. The strongest giant in the world can be rendered, even by pygmies, as helpless as an infant, if he allows them to carefully,

slowly and firmly bind him hand and foot. *This binding, subjugating process is going on continually whenever and wherever laws are made.* But the time, if ever, for people to act, is before they are bound and while they are free; of course, after they have been rendered powerless, *efforts will be of no avail.*

The achievements of the intellect in the present generation are really amazing, but it is highly probable that they will be far surpassed by the achievements of the future. There seems to be no limit to what may be accomplished through inquiry and reflection. For centuries we have been passing through the infantile and youthful stages of judgment and thought, but now we seem to be approaching a stage that is characterized by features that indicate maturity. With the help of the press, the results of mental effort are not only registered and preserved, but they are accumulated, and the consequence is that each generation does not begin anew, but takes up the work where the preceding generation left off. At the present time men do miracles every day, but they are miracles that come in the natural course of things, and there is nothing about them that is in any way providential. By understanding and remembering the past, we decide with astonishing certainty what will happen in the future. Any man may be a prophet who has the ability to learn and who can put into practice the lessons taught by experience. The soothsayers and prophets which they had in olden times were very much such soothsayers and prophets as they have at the present day—men who have learned in some way a great many important facts and who have the talent and the skill to use these facts to the highest advantage. The feats of legerdemain are simple and easy enough, like all other feats, when you know just how the trick is played. There is no question that in the past, as at present, there was always much delusion connected with all the performances that were claimed to be miraculous. The replies sent out by the oracles in pagan times were usually ambiguous, and almost any turn that affairs might take could be considered as a fulfilment of the prophecy.

It is evident enough that civilized men are passing now into an entirely new phase of development. When people were young and in the infantile stage they needed a God to serve as a master, a leader and a champion for them ; they needed a Bible, a religion and a code of morals in which every step necessary to be taken, even the most insignificant, was fully explained and clearly prescribed. The case is different now ; men have minds, intellect and experience and they receive instruction from a multitude of new sources. They have no use at present for either a God or a Bible ; even religious observances they might dispense with, if they chose to do so, and as to a code of morals, they could get along very well without any such restrictions as those. To sum up the whole matter, man, civilized man, is at last nearly of age, and he can now dispense with all guardians, tutors and preceptors of every name and description. Sink or swim, live or die, he will at least be his own master. He does not imagine that he will be dependent upon any one for assistance, but if he happens to fall or faint by the way, it will be time enough to lend him a helping hand when he calls for it.

We have been noticing a few things that thought, inquiry and knowledge can accomplish, but it would take a great many more pages to enable the writer to give a fair view of the evils and miseries which inattention, want of reflection, and ignorance bring to the people of this world. It is well known by all that one of the leading difficulties experienced at the present day, lies in the people's repugnance to anything like inquiry, or to anything that requires study and reflection. Men usually know enough, but, as a general thing, they persistently refuse to put what they know into practice. People know very well, for instance, that what is called the government or state is merely the men who happen to be in power—just such men as we meet in our walks every day. There is no other kind of state to be found on this planet, and when we speak of the state, we always mean simply the men who happen to be placed in control of the ordinary affairs of state. This fact being conceded, as it must be,

does it not seem strange that men should still believe in the infallibility of the state, just as a century ago men believed in the infallibility of the king? It is a very serious mistake to assume, as most men do, that what the state does must necessarily be right. The fact is that the state would do a villainous act sooner than an individual would, because in the state so many are usually involved that one can easily escape by casting the blame upon others. If people would only take the trouble to examine and consider, they would be sure to get new views of state infallibility and state sanctity.

Edward Carpenter says, in "Civilization—its Cause and Cure :" "The institution of government is in fact the evidence in social life that man has lost his inner and central control, and therefore must resort to an outward one. Losing touch with the inward man who is his true guide, he leans upon an external law, which must always be false." This is exactly the truth as it is and it indicates just where the fundamental error lies. We do not wish to do anything ourselves—we leave everything to be done by the government. The state as it is now takes precisely the place that the church held in the 15th century. The state even does most of our thinking for us, and so we do not have occasion to bother ourselves with such trifling matters. The state decides what is right and what is wrong, and we are never obliged to stop to ask any questions on such subjects. We are all so busy making money, collecting our interest and cutting off coupons, that we really have no time to consider other matters. The state is our banker ; it receives our money, in the form of taxes, and it disburses it according to its own judgment or fancy. When we are sick, the state provides hospitals, nurses and doctors for us, and the expense to us is nothing, or merely a nominal sum. The state furnishes a liberal education for our children, with magnificent schoolhouses and handsomely illustrated school books, and the cost to the people is hardly worth mentioning. The state takes care of our deaf mutes, our idiots, our crazy people, and harbors them in most hospitable fashion—

for all of which, apparently, the people have little or nothing to pay. The state also looks after our mails, and in some countries after railroads, telegraphs and insurance, the apparent cost of which to the public is a mere trifle. The state has policemen and soldiers for our protection ; it has prisons and courts and jails, all these things being as free as air. The state, likewise, sends around factory inspectors, butter inspectors, railroad inspectors, the design being to see that we make no mistakes in the way that we do business—for all which, of course, no charge is made. The state governs both ourselves and our families, thus relieving us of a wonderful amount of responsibility, and not a cent is charged for the services thus rendered. Why in the world should not everybody be happy? What is to hinder people from enjoying themselves all the day long, where everything, as I have indicated, is done by the state?

Here is, seemingly, one case where people can dance and yet they do not have to pay the fiddler. But here, as in so many other cases, people are laboring under a delusion. They will find at last that they have to pay very dear for the help of the state. They have simply sold their birthright for a mess of pottage. They have sold their freedom and become merely the *government's slaves*. It is hard, we know, to make people accept this unpalatable truth, but they are sure to appreciate it later on—or at least their sons will, most assuredly. When a man finally gets into such a condition that he does not want to take care of himself, he will always come across some one in the end who will be ready to undertake the job for him. But he will also find sooner or later, what every man finds, *that protection is both dangerous and expensive*. The people who are enjoying so many delightful things at the expense of the state, ought to be able to see that the cost of these things must come out of somebody's pocket. Quite certain it is that the state itself does not bear the expense. The state resembles the officers of our loan associations, who never pay out a cent of their own money, but who are adepts at handling the money of other folks. To sum the matter all up in a very few words :

Every dollar that the state pays out under any circumstances, or for any purpose, comes from the pockets of the people in some form. The people have to pay very dearly for everything they get from the state.

Strange as it may seem to be, one of the last things that the people of this country ever come to consider, is the management of the affairs of their government. And yet, is it not the government that settles our destiny, and determines, to a large extent, the course of life which we are compelled to pursue? It is the government that makes the laws that absolutely control the affairs of society, and the power that makes the laws, controls everything. But are governments known to be so honest and so unselfish, that they never need either supervision or attention? It is well understood that those who are in control of governmental affairs always resent propositions that involve inquiry and investigation into their conduct, but it often happens, when such investigations cannot be avoided, that disclosures are made which are at the same time surprising to the public and discreditable to the parties implicated.

If history gives us any reliable information at all, it is this, that governments have always been selfish and unprincipled, and so far as their power would enable them to go, they have uniformly been despotic and domineering. Without a single exception, the foundations of government are laid upon conquest, or in other words, upon robbery on a grand scale. The ambition of Rome was satisfied only by aggression and pillage. The career of ancient Greece was on a more limited scale, but the practices of its different states had precisely the same character as those of Rome. There is not a people in Europe to-day that does not live upon land that either they themselves or their ancestors secured by conquest. And how do the Americans come to occupy this continent to-day? They are here simply and solely because they had more men, better arms and better discipline than the poor savages had whom they either killed or put to flight. The only possible way of acquiring land is by getting rid of the original

occupants in some manner and, with powerful nations, the most direct and most expeditious method of doing this, is through that destruction and devastation which comes from war.

THIS GODLESS AGE.

It has seemed important, in this place, to call the reader's attention to the godlessness of the age in which we live. It is a noticeable fact that the power of the state increases as the power and prestige of God wane, and as mortals are seen to come more and more to the front, the Almighty himself gradually withdraws from view, and it is to be feared that ere long he will disappear entirely. It is not Phoebus but Phaeton who is now driving the chariot of the sun. It is men, not God, who direct the affairs of earth.

So far as Europe and America are concerned, this is emphatically a godless age. Such enlightened countries as France and Germany make scarcely any pretensions in the way of Christianity, and as far as America is concerned, her efforts in the same department are largely made up either of pretense or show. The Christian people, so-called, of the present century have only one day to devote to religion—and only a small portion of the day at that. Business takes precedence over everything of a devotional character, and what little there is done in that line is left chiefly to women and children. Grown-up men have no time to waste for such purposes—unless it be when they have retired from business pursuits, or when, on account of failing health, they expect to survive but a short time. Business men seldom have time even to pray, especially so long as matters go along prosperously with them. They might call upon God for help in case of a cyclone or some other desperate emergency, but except under such rare conditions as these, they feel that they have no occasion for the intercession even of the Supreme Being. People have gradually drifted, for a hundred years or more, into a very worldly way. Indeed, ever since the advent of that valiant and noble defender

of the cross, Martin Luther, religious sentiment has been more or less on the decline. Martin meant it all right enough—no better Christian man than him has ever lived, provided we measure his conduct entirely by his own standard. Martin only intended to introduce some improvements in theology, but as a direct result of his teaching, Christianity was cut loose from its moorings and it has been drifting ever since. As long as the Pope and the priests were allowed to decide what the people should believe and what not, things went along smoothly and pleasantly enough, but when people were given the Bible to read, and they were allowed to construe its passages according to their own individual interests or fancy, confusion followed, and matters have been growing worse ever since—or in other words, faith in the Bible and its teachings has been growing weaker and weaker from that day down to the present time.

But this godlessness of our age is decidedly phenomenal. In the history of this world, going back not only hundreds but thousands of years, there is no record of anything like it. Even to-day, outside of Europe and America, the case is entirely different. The Mohammedans who are spread over Asia and Africa in such immense numbers, are emphatically a devotional people. They believe in God, and therefore they worship him—they worship him not only daily but hourly. The same is true of the Chinese and of the native people of India—though, of course, their idea of God is not like ours. But it is well to bear in mind that when the quantity of religion is so excessive, the quality is apt to be inferior.

In ancient times, so far as history informs us, religion was the chief pursuit of man. It was uppermost in the hearts of every man, woman and child—it was the first thing to receive their attention at all times. We know this to be the case with the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the Persians and Egyptians. But the Greeks and Romans are nearer to us, and we know more about their belief and practices. With them religion entered into all the affairs of life. Every head of a family had an altar in his

own house where he worshiped his household gods. Like the Chinese and Hindoos, they worshiped their ancestors. When they began a city, they founded it as a divine institution. Even when they went to war, it was to engage in a religious enterprise. They could not even fight without gods to aid them. They honored their gods with feasts—they had many sacred days in a year. Their calendar was only a succession of religious festivals. The days of the week were named after their leading gods. To quote the words of a recent French writer: “In time of peace and in time of war, religion intervened in all the acts of life. It was everywhere present—it enveloped the man. The soul, the body, the private life, the public life, the repasts, the feasts, the assemblies, the tribunals, the combats, everything was under the empire of the religion of the city. Religion controlled all the actions of man, disposed of all the concerns of his life.” How different things are with us! Instead of many gods, we have but one—and that one is shamefully neglected. We do not allow him to meddle with our affairs at all. We actually have no use for him—so it seems at least. We have located him away off in heaven—some distant place, we hardly know where. Certain it is, we never hear from him, and it must be a very rare thing that he ever hears from us.

It is plain indeed that we cannot accept the Bible as our guide and instructor, when we come to conduct an inquiry similar to that which we have now undertaken. We have no Book of Life; our Bible is certainly not accepted as such by intelligent men at the present day. Men do not consult the Bible to know what to do and how to manage their affairs. We cannot appeal to God when there is any question of importance to be decided, for there is no mediator or interpreter through whom we can reach God.

It is evident enough that the great want of the present day is a New Religion, which of course implies a new Bible also. Our present Bible is like a code of fundamental laws, made over 2,000 years ago, with a view to be used by a people who live to-day,

and who are blessed with all the modern improvements of the present century. Of course such a Bible is a misfit, and, as might be expected, it does not work successfully. A constitution, being from the people, can be amended by the people, but a Bible, originating in God, as is supposed, must remain unchanged and unchangeable to the end. No religion lasts forever, and ours certainly will not. We want a religion that is elastic, we want a Bible that suits the people and the times. We want a Bible that does not endorse on one page what it condemns on another, and one that does not teach one thing in one verse, while it teaches quite another thing in some other. We want a Bible that any one can read and understand without the aid of an interpreter—we want a Bible that is direct in its statements and unequivocal in its commands. We want a Bible that teaches men how to live, as well as how to die. We want a Bible that is good and true for ourselves in this age of the world, and that is not necessarily good and true for every other people, in every other part of the world. We must not expect a Bible, any more than we should expect a code of laws, to be desirable or acceptable for all the world, or even for any single people for an unlimited number of years. Such a book has never yet been written, and it is certain that it never will be. It is absolutely impossible to produce such a volume.

We want a practical religion, one for every day in the week, and for every week in the year. We want a religion without fear—a religion that is not perpetually threatening and thundering, while its blows are rained down in every direction. We want a religion that is not based upon a theory of rewards and punishments—a religion where a man is not hired to be good, and where he is not tortured and tormented because he happens to be bad. We want a religion without greed, without hate, without envy, without revenge, without selfishness—*in short, we want such a religion as Christ taught.* We want an honest religion, for honest men and women to follow in every-day life. We want a religion with its roots extending down to the heart, and not a

religion that a man simply pins on his sleeves and wears at church for an hour or so on the Sabbath. We want a religion without pomp and show—we want a religion that costs nothing, that is as free as the water we drink and the air we breathe, and of which every man, woman and child who wishes may partake without price and without conditions. We want a religion for free women as well as for free men; in our Bible, woman has but feeble recognition, and her rights are limited. We want a religion that appeals to the manhood of men—our religion as we have it now seems to imply that men are destitute of manhood. From the beginning of the Bible to the end, outside of the narrative portions, about all that we find is orders and commands: “you must do this,” and “you mustn’t do that.” Everywhere we find signs put up to indicate that we must “keep off the grass.” Could a family be well brought up or could an institution be successfully managed on a system of “reward and punishments” such as is set forth in our Bible? Suffice it to say, our best families and our best institutions are not managed on any such plan at the present day. Our Bible is a book for the rich and not for the poor, for the master or governor, and not for the subject or slave. The good things of this world are reserved for those who have the most power; for the poor and unfortunate, nothing remains but an inheritance in heaven, and the Lord only knows whether they will not be cheated out of that legacy in the end. It is true that Christ taught a belief in the common brotherhood of mankind, but his followers do not seem to have accepted the doctrine. The nations of Europe, with one exception, are all Christians, and yet the masses in every country are kept in the most abject slavery—and what is worse, is the fact that their rulers have good Bible authority to quote for keeping them in subjection as they are doing.

Finally, we want a religion that is in harmony with nature, instead of being, like ours, opposed to it; we want a religion of hope, of cheerfulness, and of healthful and sensible enjoyment—a religion under which every man may walk upright in the sight

of the Lord and be as good as his neighbor, if not as good as his Maker. We want a religion that appeals to the common sense and intelligence of people, and that is not opposed to their honest convictions and their experience in every-day life. As it is now, our Bible teaches us one thing, while our school books, our newspapers and our legislative enactments teach us something entirely different.

But it must be borne in mind that wanting a new religion, is quite a different thing from wanting no religion at all. It is well to bear in mind that without religion there can be no government, and without government, society would cease to exist. Not to believe in God, is to be an anarchist. But one may believe in God, in his power, his wisdom and his goodness, without necessarily worshiping him or offering sacrifices after the manner of idolaters. One may even believe in man's accountability to God for all he does, without also believing that matters can be mended by long prayers at intervals, or by devotional offerings of any kind. It is a mistake to suppose that God can be made to change his methods by any ceremonies of that character.

It is also well to bear in mind that without religion, without a belief in a Supreme Being, man would have no duties, no morals, no obligations to observe of any kind. We should have no marriage, no legitimate children, and no family in a proper sense. Without religion there would be no fatherland, and such a feeling as patriotism would be unknown. A man's native land is where his household gods are found. Without religion we should not even have such a thing as property, for there could be no rights, no obligations, no laws. Society itself would disappear, and all would be chaos. A man who believes in no God, no accountability on the part of man for his acts in this life, believes in himself alone, as Alexander did, and as Cæsar and Napoleon did in later times.

In this connexion, I beg to add that we need a new kind of preaching even more than we need a new religion. Men at the

present day preach, but do not practice, or rather they preach one thing and practice another ; they pretend to be, but are not ; they profess to be, but their faith is not shown by their works. “Circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God.” And yet how few there are, even in this enlightened age of ours, that keep these commandments ! In the days of Paul, they had just such people as we have now. The Corinthians were a fair sample—enlightened, but corrupt, wealthy but wicked, wise in their own estimation, but in the ways of righteousness and truth without any knowledge whatever. Would that we had a St. Paul with us to-day, a free talker, as well as a free thinker—a man who was not afraid to speak the truth at all times, and who uniformly made it a practice to call things by their right names. He said, “I speak to your shame,” and then he went on to tell what sort of people they had in Corinth and what they were doing. Unfortunately they have just such people in this country now, only they are perhaps a little more so.

Suppose St. Paul had never written and such men as Martin Luther, John Knox and Charles Spurgeon had never spoken. The world is bad enough now, but without the efforts of some one, nay, without the combined efforts of many good people, its condition would be infinitely worse than it is. We have teachers and preachers enough now—that everybody knows : we have lawyers and doctors, too, in great plenty, and yet our people are in an alarming state, mentally, morally, physically. We have an abundance of education, and yet crime and rascality increases ; we have schoolhouses with flags on and churches with bass horns and accompaniments of that kind, and yet the most hopeful optimist admits that the world is getting worse every day. It is not the quantity of our teaching and preaching at the present day—the Lord knows we have an abundance of it, such as it is. It is the quality that we are inclined to complain about. It is work done by the job, for so much money when the work is done, and everybody knows what kind of results you get with

work done under such circumstances. The preachers in St. Paul's day did not work on a salary, and so they were never troubled with the fear of losing their pay; they had no furnished parsonage, and such things as a vacation in summer, in that stage of the world, had never been thought of. The preachers of that age went about preaching the gospel truth, and if they struck a crowd that did not care to listen to what they had to say, what did they do? Did they shorten their discourse, did they soften their remarks, did they leave out an objectionable paragraph here and an offensive epithet there? Did they diminish the dose or sweeten it in any way? Did they give the patient soothing syrup, when it was Epsom salts perhaps that he needed, in doses big enough for a man? No, they did not do anything of the kind. They simply shook the dust from their feet and went to another place, just as Christ told them they should. The preachers in those days always kept themselves in light marching order. They had no debts to collect; their laundry bills were extremely light, and all the property they had they might tie up in their pocket handkerchief—if they had one. As might be expected, such men went about preaching the truth, and they had many followers. The modern Evangelist who uniformly closes up with a prodigious collection at the end of his job, was not known in those days. In St. Paul's time saving souls was the biggest part of the business; with the modern Evangelist, I sometimes think, the collection is a more important item than the mere matter of bringing sinners to repentance.

Finally, is there a God? This question is pertinent in this place, because it is identical with the question whether men must have a master, a sovereign, a judge, a guide, in their ordinary, every-day affairs of life. If we do not need the one, we do not need the other, and when we believe in the one, it is only because we believe in the other. If we had no God, we would have no king, no master, no slaves. State rule and God rule proceed always along parallel lines, and when one declines, the

other is certain to be affected. No worldly ruler could exist for a moment without founding his claims on the authority of some Supreme Being. He might be a robber, or a pirate with followers, but he would be far from being a lawful sovereign.

Is there a God? That question is the same as asking if there is a first cause, or really any cause at all. The answer to the question depends upon what is meant by the term God. If it is meant that some mysterious, incomprehensible being sits upon a throne somewhere outside of the universe and governs the affairs of men, turning this great globe first in this direction and then in that, according to the circumstances of the case, as the pilot directs the boat which he controls, I should say there is not, and never was, the slightest evidence of the existence of such a being. Theoretically there is no God, no Providence, no Ruler of the Universe, but practically there is a Supreme Being. Theoretically there is no such thing in existence as sound, heat, light or electricity, but practically they certainly exist. They have no separate, individualized existence, and yet they are powers or principles that manifest themselves in connexion with matter. They have no forms, no limits, no dimensions, they cannot manifest themselves except in connexion with matter, but it is equally true that matter cannot manifest itself except in connexion with these essential principles. There are no such independent, self-existent things as beauty and sweetness, and yet their existence is as real as the things to which the terms beautiful and sweet apply. Just so it is with God: he is a power, a principle, without which neither the universe nor any creature in it could exist for a moment. But God is not a being, and certainly he is not a creature.

It is well to understand in this advanced age that there is no Providence, no God who is either able or willing to help us, and if we wish to make sure that anything is done, we must do it ourselves. Hence it is that with all our churches, and all our praying and sacrifices, we still have poverty, misery, drouth, famine, sickness, and even death, just as the world has had

those things for thousands of years. No matter whether it is a Christian God or a pagan god that men worship—a God with a big G or a little g—they find that if they want to be helped, they must help themselves, for no God has yet been discovered that has been ready to help them in cases of emergency. Praying and circumcision certainly will not relieve them, and it is very unfortunate for any one to become possessed of the idea that praying and circumcision can. All the aid that comes from God, or gods, lies simply in the minds of men.

I see no need or propriety of worship in any case, and if people had not grown up with the habit of adoring God, they would not adore man or worship the state as they do. God, who is merely an essence or a principle, can hardly be influenced by adoration. In neither case, whether a man prays to God or to the state, would he receive assistance sooner than if he fell down and prayed before a stump or a stone. And yet men are exceedingly fond of telling others what God says, what God wants, what God does! Is it not clear to all that such expressions are pure figures of speech? It is clearly impossible to know what God does, or what God wants, or whether he does or wants anything at all. As to what God says, we know to a certainty that God has never said anything. I know it is stated that God wrote with his finger on a stone for Moses; and Joe Smith and Mohammed both claim that he wrote a few chapters for them and gave them his autograph, but we think, God, by this time, has gone out of that line of business, for we have not heard of his sending out any autographs for a long, long time. We know as well as we know anything that the only way that God can communicate with mortals is through men, through ordinary men, as his interpreters. Note well this fact, that God can do nothing, he cannot even write or talk, without the interposition of some of us common creatures of earth. Is it not plain enough that, in every case, what God says and what God does, is merely what men say and do in God's name? The sayings of God are uniformly the dreams of men. God speaks to man. Yes, all

nature speaks to man—the winds speak to him, the trees, the flowers, the heavens speak to him. So, and not otherwise, does God speak to man.

RIGHT, DUTY AND JUSTICE.

Our next step will be an inquiry into the true character of right, duty and justice. These are matters upon which very erroneous opinions prevail, and it is highly important that one should have a clear understanding on this subject before we proceed further.

It is well understood among thinking men that there is no such thing as eternal truth or universal truth. What is known to be true to-day, or rather what is believed to be true to-day, will not necessarily be true, or be believed to be true a hundred years hence—and when the speeding time reaches a thousand years, it is almost certain that some new conception will be received in place of what is considered to be unquestionably true at the present time. And so it is with the matters that we consider to be right and just, as well as with the things that we believe it to be our duty to do or to leave undone. Questions of right are like questions of truth or propriety. Their solution depends upon the point of view from which the observations are taken, and even somewhat upon the status or condition of the observer himself. What is right for one man is not necessarily right for every other man—and so it is with matters of justice and duty.

There are many things that affect a man's idea of what is right and just. His education, his past habits and associations, and finally his conception of his own interest, have all much to do with what he considers to be right or wrong, just or unjust. No man considers that to be right or just to himself which injures him and which is opposed to his interests, either directly or ultimately. He may, from necessity or from motives of policy, submit to such an injury, but in his heart he always protests against it as wrong. That is human nature—the nature of every

man and woman on this earth. Self-preservation is nature's first and highest law, and whatever injures the individual is opposed to this law of self-preservation. It is every man's duty, and his right, to look out for the interests of himself first. If men did not do that, the race would soon become extinct. Hence, we say, it is both natural and proper that men's ideas of right and duty should be shaped to a large extent by what they conceive to be their best interests, for the future, if not for the present.

Before we go further, I wish to impress upon the mind of the reader this important fact: that right, justice and lawfulness, as well as duty, are alike in character and they are derived from the same source. If men were free and had no master, they would have no laws; and if they had no laws, they would have no rights, duties or obligations. Savages have few if any laws, and hence they know very little about duties, and they hardly distinguish between what is right and what is wrong. The child in civilized life is very much in the same condition. It knows little about right or wrong or duties in its earlier years. Ideas of that character are almost wholly a matter of education.

Really, what is right or just and what is lawful, ought to be one and the same thing. Originally they were so, but they are not so now. When laws were made in accordance with the prevailing ideas of right and propriety, then to be right, or just, and to be lawful, meant one and the same thing. Then there was but one kind of a law, and that was divine law or scripture law, as they have now in Mohammedan and other Asiatic countries. Their scriptures were the law for them, and they recognized no other law as having any binding authority whatever. The Mohammedans study the Koran not only as their Bible, but as their law book. In the early centuries of Christianity, and especially during the Middle Ages, our scriptures were recognized in a similar manner. But latterly men are making statute laws without any regard to the Bible, and often in contravention of its plainest provisions, and thus the time has come when justice and right is one thing, and lawfulness is quite another. In German,

recht means right, and it also means law, for the Germans conceived right and lawful to be one and the same thing. We also use the term *rights* in the sense of legal rights, or lawful claims.

The basis of all law is scripture law—the law that comes from God. No man can have any right to rule other men and make laws for them, except so far as he assumes to be, and is believed to be, commissioned from God. And even to-day no monarch presumes to rule, save as the minister, messenger or servant of God. Every sovereign has to be crowned, consecrated, adopted by God, before he is a lawful ruler. Even in this godless country of ours, the chief executive is expected to at least take the oath of office, a strictly religious, divine step, before he begins his duties as the presiding officer and *quasi* ruler of this republic.

Moral law is only another name for scripture law. What we consider to be duties of a moral nature, are those that have their origin in God's commands. We feel that we ought to do certain things and leave certain other things undone, simply because God so orders or directs. Men know of no laws that are binding upon them except those that come from the Supreme Ruler. If we had no Supreme Ruler, we should have known no laws—certainly no binding laws. We might add here that all such laws are supposed to be for the good of the men to whom they apply—if they were intended for the good of some one else, they would not be binding upon those men. Moses published such laws as he believed to be for the advancement and prosperity of his people; Mohammed did the same thing for his people—and so did Solon, Lycurgus, Confucius and other law-givers.

It is assumed that moral law has its source in God, the creator and the ruler of us all, but as a matter of fact it is men that make moral laws. They enforce, they judge and decide, they execute. Every step that is taken in that connexion is taken by men and for men. But it must not be forgotten that all enforcement of moral law is, like that of religious or scripture law, down-

right persecution. It is compelling men to adopt a certain moral standard simply because it is our standard and because we want other men to do and believe as we do.

What ought a man to do at all times? His duty. And what is his duty? That is the question which every man must settle for himself—no other man has either the ability or the privilege to decide for him. If any man can determine for me what my duty is and what I must do, then he is my master and I am his slave. But, according to the ideas which I have, I am a free man, and no man has the power or the right to dictate to me what I ought to do (that is, must do) and what I ought not to do. I know very well that *duty* comes from *due*, as *ought* comes from *owe*, just as *pflicht*, the German word for duty, means *obliged*, *obligated*, *bound*, but the owing, the obligation which enters into the conception here means not what we owe to man, but to God. Duty on our part can have no other source than God. No man has any claim upon any other man, for, if he had, he would have authority over him, which is something that, as a right, I deny most emphatically.

A man is bound only so far as there are established laws, and those which are derived from competent authority. But all the laws that we know anything about are man-made. Even the scriptures are man-made, though of course great efforts are made to induce people to believe they are God-made. If they were really God-made, there would be no evading them, and men would have to obey them, whether they would or not. But we know that there are no such duties or obligations revealed to man. We know very well that man is not really obliged to do anything. He is not even obliged to obey what are called Nature's laws. He can obey them or not as he chooses; if he does not, he merely suffers the consequences. There is no law that keeps a man out of the fire, but if he gets in, he burns himself; there is no law that keeps him from tumbling down a precipice; but if he does go over, he usually suffers some serious injury as the result of his carelessness or indiscretion.

Justice is merely what is commanded, from the Latin *jus*,

jussus, and it has no other foundation than the law, and the will of the ruler. A man even now goes to law to get justice, that is, justice as the lawyers and the law-givers determine the matter. There is no criterion by which to decide what is just or right except the law. Whatever is lawful must be right, and whatever is right must of course also be just. Right and just are ideas that come entirely from man, and they concern him alone. They are matters that belong exclusively to the community in which a man lives. With God, everything is right, everything is just—he knows no wrong, no injustice of any kind, and he takes not the slightest cognizance of such matters. Can we speak of an unjust God? Can we think of a God that does wrong? Can we think of a perfect being that is at the same time imperfect and corrupt? If God made right, then it would be one and the same thing over all the world. But as it is, each people has its own notions of right, justice and propriety—its own Bible, its own peculiar code of laws. What a people accepts as law for itself, is law, and no common precept can be. Right is a matter of judgment, interest, authority, and so it must necessarily vary all over the world. All the right and justice of which we have any account, is merely that which men order or decide to be right and just.

It should not be forgotten that in practice, all right, so far as we meet with it in this world, is merely what somebody else seeks to force upon us. We are not left to decide for ourselves what is right, but some outside party, some ruler, some law-giver, or perhaps public opinion, decides for us the whole question of what we must do or leave undone. We are not allowed to consult our judgment, or even our interests, for they are never recognized or consulted. It is always the interests or judgment of some one else that is to be consulted—the one that happens to be in authority. Not what I think, but what others think, is always the measure of right. This leads me to ask, why was I put into this world at all? What am I good for? What am I to do? The answer is, and under the present dispensation must

continue to be, *nothing*. It is only when I rebel and oppose this monstrous doctrine, asserting that I am a free man and will be heard—it is only then that I amount to anything. After all, rebellion is the only thing that really counts.

No reason can be given why we consider this thing just and that unjust. Our ideas of justice and right do not come from reason—they are simply matters of feeling. We feel that it is right, we have always felt so, and therefore we have come to believe and know that it is right. That is all there is of it. To ascertain why we feel so, we must go back and back, till finally we are lost in infinity.

It is not at all strange that men living in different localities, under different conditions and with different surroundings, should have entirely different moral and religious laws. In some lands, as the Mohammedan, pork is eschewed as if it were poison ; and in other countries, as India, eating beef is a horrible thing. With some people, as in warlike countries, killing men, especially enemies, is a virtuous act; in other countries, more civilized, killing men, even enemies, is a capital crime—and so it is with rape, adultery, robbery, stealing, arson and other crimes. The rule of law in all such cases depends upon what men have been taught to consider their interests. In some civilized countries it is murder to kill infants ; in other countries, as in China, it is an excusable offence. In many countries, not by any means barbarous, children are sold as slaves. But we ourselves do almost as badly, as we drive them out of doors to perish or grow up for the gallows or prison. Among the Romans, enlightened as they were, the father had every right and the son none at all. He could kill the son or sell him as a slave. It is clear enough there is not in this world any true standard of morality and right. Education, interest and early association settle the question as a general thing. It should be remembered that what we consider a crime for other people to do, we do not always consider a crime for ourselves to do. The Bible says “*thou shalt not steal*,” “*thou shalt not commit adultery*,” “*thou*

shalt not bear false witness." But we nowhere find it stated that *we* must not do this or that. What affects or injures us we want forbidden; what affects or injures some one else, we are not so particular about. The whole question depends entirely upon whose ox was gored.

We might explain that rights, duties and justice are things that pertain only to slaves, those who are under the law. A ruler, a judge, a law-giver, while acting in that capacity, has no duties—he is under no obligations of any kind, because he is master and he is not under the law in any way. He does as he pleases. A ruler never asks for justice—he never asks for anything. He has everything without asking. Rulers, like God, are always just, always right, so long as they are rulers. Indeed, there is no tribunal above them to decide when they are wrong.

Law settles all justice and right. We judge and are judged, according to certain rules and principles which are found in the law and are established in the community as the standard. Other communities having different rules, or a different standard, reach entirely different results. The duties which the law enforces are not what I really owe to my neighbor, for he is my equal and I owe him nothing, but what I owe to my master, the state or the sovereign. One ordinary man has no authority over another, and he cannot force the latter to do anything. What I must do, is a matter wholly between me and the state. If it were not for the state, I could do as I pleased—just as every free man ought to be allowed to do, governing his action entirely by the circumstances of each individual case when a question arises. As we have said before, savages have no laws such as we have, and hence they have no duties such as we have. They have no masters. They do as they feel like doing about the matter. Indeed, what natural right has the state, or a monarch, to say what other men must do? *But men in civilized life are slaves in various ways. They are slaves to business, slaves to fashion, slaves to public opinion, as well as slaves to those who administer the law. They are simply atoms in society—they are the merest nonentities imaginable.*

The foundation of all ideas of duty to ourselves and others lies in our religion, for I assume that every man has religious notions of some kind. Some men deny a personal God, and others deny a plurality of gods, but no intelligent man with a sound mind denies that there is a supreme authority somewhere, a "destiny that shapes our ends," and a power that controls, moves and directs us quite aside from any ability of our own. That we are entirely powerless of our own might, that we are as feeble and helpless as infants, is a fact that must have become evident to the ignorant and intelligent alike. But such a feeling of utter helplessness as that with which we are impressed must lead to fear and awe, and these again to reverence and devotion. Our feelings may be quiet, or they may be demonstrative in character, but religious sentiments of some kind must find a place in every man's bosom. There may be individuals who have less reverence than others, but there is no people, nor does history record that there ever was a people, without any religious notions whatever.

If we turn back and read the pages of history, we shall find that the laws and customs of all civilized people take their rise in their religious belief, or they are co-existent with it, and if we could gain more reliable information in regard to savage races, I am confident the same would be found true of them also. We shall find that the religion of a nation and its philosophy are identical. Philosophy may go farther in its inquiries than religion, but so far as religion proceeds, in the depths of thought, it will uniformly be found to be in harmony with philosophy. There is scarcely any distinct dividing line between philosophy and religion. They uniformly take their rise at the same time, and the progress they make is made together. But if there be any difference in their order, it is philosophy that precedes religion. The religion of China is a philosophy, and the same is true of the religion of Buddha. Neither Confucius nor Buddha pretended to anything supernatural in their own character. They were men like other men. They had certain new thoughts,

a practical philosophy to which their lives were devoted—nothing more. Zoroaster was only a pious and devoted sage. Mohammed claimed, like Joe Smith, to be a divine messenger in a special sense, but we all know that he came no nearer to communing with God than hundreds of others did before him, or than others have since. He taught what he believed and what he was impressed to teach. His religion was his philosophy. Christ's teachings had the same basis, though, as all Christian people believe, he stood nearer to the Father than any one that has yet been born of earth.

It must be remembered that the religions of the East were all founded by wise men of devout tendencies. They were not necessarily divine men, nor men blessed with any extraordinary inspiration. Confucius merely spoke the sentiments of the better men of his time. He was a plain man who cared not for mysteries. He was not a vain speculator. He had living, practical thoughts, and these he sought to have accepted by the people of his time. Buddha, too, came to protest against Brahmanism, in the name of the thinking men of his day. So it was with Mohammed. He merely gave voice to sentiments that, in certain quarters at least, prevailed in his day. It is true that he claimed to be more than an ordinary man, but, I apprehend, that was done chiefly to heighten the effect.

A few words may finally be added with special reference to moral duties. Nothing is more variable than people's ideas of morality, and what is moral according to the conceptions of one man may be quite immoral according to the conceptions of another man. Uncultivated people and barbarous tribes have no idea of morality as we understand the term. Goguet says: "Wisdom, justice, probity, in a word, the greater part of the moral virtues, had not even names in the ancient language of the Greeks, as they still have not among the savages of America."

As already indicated, our ideas of morality are based largely upon what is taught in the Bible, and our duties are founded

upon our relations to God. If we did not believe in our Jewish God, we would know nothing of duties of any kind. We would act upon impulse and do what we wished whenever we found it possible. We would have to manage very much as the lower animals do and leave our actions to be controlled by circumstances and our surroundings. Morality as we have it is a sort of half-religion, and it hardly differs from religion in its character. Before we can have obligations of any kind, we must have a master to enforce the obligation. *Without a master there can be no law of any kind.*

It will be observed that animals and children have no well-defined notions of right and wrong—they have no morals. They do what they feel inclined to do, and very often they do what they see others do. They are somewhat governed by the unwritten law of custom. Like savages, they know little of the law of gratitude, patriotism and all such virtues. Whatever enables them to accomplish their ends, is to them lawful and right.

People make a great mistake in supposing that our morals, our ideas of right and wrong, prevail all over the earth, and that they are even recognized by the Supreme Being, while as a matter of fact our morals are not observed by any other people. Morals are entirely a local matter governed by the times and the circumstances. It must be remembered that God knows nothing about justice, about morals. God is always one, the same and unchangeable, but justice and morality vary according to the locality and the people. Before we ask God to side with us in our ideas of morality, justice and right, we ought to ascertain what his views on this subject are. But how can we know this? And how could God agree with us and with good people in other countries, whose ideas differ so much from ours? The fact should never be lost sight of that our morals are affected by the climate, and that not only our surroundings but our inherited natures have a powerful influence upon these things. Morals are merely customs. Custom is law everywhere, and in

its character it is akin to divine law. Without divine law, we should have no moral law, no morals properly called.

We cannot derive morality from statute law. The law never makes a man moral; such a thing could not possibly be done in such a way, even if it were tried. Slaves can never be made moral. Morality is for free men alone. A man to be truly just, moral and good must first of all be free. What a man is compelled to do, is really what others do, and it cannot be credited to his own account in any case.

Of course, I understand very well that as a matter of history morality cannot be derived from religion, and no man is moral simply because he is religious; as a matter of fact, in the estimation of most men, serving God and doing one's duty to his fellow men, are two essentially different things. And still it is a fact that a man's moral code depends largely upon his religious belief, or rather upon the doctrines and dogmas of the Bible he accepts. For proof of this claim, we need only to refer to the history of Europe during the Middle Ages, when people believed in the Bible as men never did before and as they never have since.

Duty is what we owe a man, but we cannot have any duty, we cannot owe a man, unless there is some one whom we acknowledge as our God and Judge, some one who is over us and whose authority we recognize. A duty is an obligation. But we cannot obligate ourselves: obligation and duty must come from some outside source. So that I am not able to see that any one can feel a duty of any kind, moral or otherwise, unless he acknowledges the existence of a Supreme Being. I understand very well that a man may be a good citizen without having any religious convictions of any kind. He may be kind, he may be considerate, he may be judicious, he may be honest, he may be sympathetic and hospitable—but not because he feels it a duty that he owes to any one, not because he feels obligated or realizes the necessity of doing as he does. What he does comes from the natural impulses of his heart, and not from any compulsion of a moral, religious or governmental character.

Morals are merely what the word indicates—they are customs, and customs arise from what people have come to believe and what they deem proper and necessary.

Good conduct consists mainly in a man's adapting himself to his surroundings, and especially to the feelings and wants of those with whom he finds himself associated. If a man lived entirely alone, then and then only would he find nothing to control his conduct or restrict his action, except his own inability. But even then he could not do as he pleased, since he would lack the power to do what he wished. However, he would have this advantage, that he would never have to consult some other human being as to what he had better do or leave undone. He would have no duties of any kind and no obligations to any one either moral, religious or otherwise.

The best rule of conduct for any man to follow, is to do what he feels he ought to do, and what a careful and intelligent review of the facts in the case leads him to believe it is his *best interest to do*. I know of no higher or better rule of conduct than that, and the one who follows it sensibly, considerately and judiciously, will be what the world considers an upright man and a good citizen. No sensible man will ever find it to his interest to do wrong and violate the better feelings of his fellow men ; no man will ever find it to his interest in the end to live upon the labors of others, to oppress them, to enslave them or to wrong them in any way. Such men the world may tolerate, but it never will pronounce them good in any sense. Such men can never be happy, for no man can be happy who does not enjoy the esteem and friendship of those with whom he is compelled to reside.

CAUSE AND EFFECT.

The true nature of cause and its relation to what is called effect, is not well understood even by those who are known as intelligent men, and as there is so much error and de-

ception on this subject in connexion with matters of government, I have deemed it well to give some space to its consideration in this work.

This question of cause and effect involves every other question; if we had clear notions of the nature and influence of cause, we would have clear ideas on all other questions. But as it is, the human mind is wholly adrift on this matter of cause and effect, and that is the reason why one asserts what another denies, and why one names one thing as the cause which produces a particular effect, and some one else assigns an entirely different cause for this same effect. What men believe in one age is discarded as false in the following age. A few hundred years ago people believed in an entirely different class of causes from those that people believe in now. The beliefs of the former ages we call superstitions, errors and delusions, and that is what posterity is certain to call the beliefs of the present time. A few centuries since, and, in some remote and unenlightened districts even at the present day, men believe in devils, in gods, angels, spirits, witches, demons; and they believe in the influence of the heavenly bodies, especially the moon, and they regard them as the source of certain effects upon the earth. If we had no false theories, or false beliefs, we would not be so much in error in regard to causes and effects, and when we know more about nature and its workings than we do now, we will have improved ideas of the causes of things, if, indeed, there are any such things, properly called, as causes.

Nothing is more common than to hear people speak of this thing as the cause of that result or of that event, when in fact there may be no connexion at all between the effect named and the assumed cause; or, if there is any connexion, it is one that is exceedingly remote. The subject thus far has probably received little attention on the part of our readers, but there is hardly one that exceeds it in importance to mankind. What is now published may at least aid in creating an interest in this question.

There is an immense number of causes which are assumed to produce effects—the things that we see are supposed to be causes, and so what we think, what we imagine and what we reflect upon may be said to be causes, just as an axe or a piece of wood may be a cause. But is there really any connexion between what we consider the cause and what we call the effect? Does the tail of the comet produce the comet, or even cause it to move, simply because they uniformly follow a certain order? It is time that we knew something about the real nature of cause; it is a term that appears in every-day use and it is intimately connected with all the affairs of life.

We are continually talking about what men do and the effects they produce. And what is it that any man has thus far accomplished, what is the single effect of which any man is the sole cause? It is a very common thing to assert that Luther was the cause of the reformation, when in fact he was simply its chief agent and, in a certain sense, merely one of its effects. The reformation began long before Luther was born, and lasted till long after his body had turned to ashes. The reformation was the revolt of the whole German nation. So we speak of Christ, uniformly, as the founder of the Christian religion, when, to be more accurate, he was merely the leading agitator of his day, and he taught, in a forcible and effective manner, doctrines that had been recognized and advocated centuries before his birth. Christ taught simply certain modifications of the Jewish religion, while the real founder of the Christian religion, if it can be said to have had a founder, was Paul. But even Paul was only a great teacher and advocate. He did not make Christianity what it is; Christianity is a growth, a development, and the process of transformation continues still.

It is certain that we must soon modify our notions of cause and its power, in order that they may correspond with our new views of Providence and the laws of nature. It begins to be evident to the thinking men that there is no real cause, any more than there is any real creation. What we declare to be the

cause of certain effects has merely some remote or some apparent connexion with that effect. It is certain enough that no one cause produces any particular effect. An effect is like the resultant line in forces, not the product or result of any one force, but of a combination of different forces coming from different directions, and all acting at the same time. The forces which produce results, if such things there be, have been in existence and in action from the time the universe was created.

To produce any result, the whole world must conspire. Every act, every event must be in harmony with all past history, and with all that is present now, with all that preceded it in the past or that will succeed it in time to come. No one cause produces any single effect. To send a ball in a certain direction, or to keep a planet in its orbit, how many different or independent forces must combine and co-operate! But a cause that is properly a cause, if such a thing could be, would need no assistance, no co-operation. There can be no half causes; a half cause would be no cause at all.

When the ball is set in motion, what causes it to move? Shall we say it is the bat with which the blow was struck? No, the bat alone could not be the cause, for we may have the bat, the arm and the ball and a score of other things in that connexion, and still the ball may not move. You may strike a ball ever so forcibly with ever so heavy a bat, and yet, if the conditions are not favorable, the ball will not move. So it is evident that it is neither the bat, the ball nor the hitting that alone does the business. Again, after the ball once begins to move, it continues in motion, but that continued motion cannot be attributed to the bat, for after the impact, the bat might be struck out of existence and the ball would nevertheless continue in motion. It is evident enough that the force that moves the ball resides in the ball, not outside of it. All that the bat or the batting does is, in some mysterious way, to set in motion the springs of action that belong in the ball.

Again, suppose a man walks to Albany, a distance of one

hundred miles. Is it the last step that brings him to that city? Certainly the last step has no more to do with bringing him to the end of the journey than the first step. Or suppose we have a weight that is to be raised on a pair of scales. We may put one hundred pounds or two hundred pounds on the opposite side of the scales, and still the weight will not rise. We add perhaps five pounds and even ten pounds, and that may not prove to be sufficient. In the end it is the extra ounce or a sheet of paper that turns the scale. Ordinarily we would say the extra ounce or the sheet of paper is what did the business, and is to be considered the final cause that made the weight rise. But, really, is the last feather the one that breaks the camel's back? We know very well that the last feather does not break the camel's back, and yet there is no doubt that it has as much to do with that business as any or all the rest of the feathers have. The same principle is illustrated when two men run for an office, and one of the candidates is elected by a majority of one. Out of the thousand or more votes that the victor may have secured, which is the one that may be said to have ensured his election? Which was the real cause of the triumph? Certainly none of them—each vote counted as much as every other vote, and so we could not properly ascribe any more value or power to one vote than to the other. The result accomplished was not that of one vote, but of a thousand votes, and so it is in all other cases where effects are supposed to be produced by certain causes.

So in the practice of medicine—we sometimes say it is the treatment or the nursing that cures the patient, and sometimes we assert that it is the pills or the powders that he swallowed that restored him to health. But we have so many kinds of cures, so many methods of treatment, so many schools of medicine, how shall we know which is reliable and sure to produce the cures promised? We have the faith cure, the science cure, or prayer cure, the Providential cure; we have the allopathic treatment with large doses, and the homeopathic treatment, with doses infinitesimally small; we have hot baths and cold

baths, we have calomel and quinine and opium and iron, and perhaps brass occasionally. Formerly we had a hundred things in the way of treatments that no one uses or thinks of using now. Bewildered with these thousand and one different things that are presented to us as a "sure cure for all diseases," which shall we take? Who shall presume to tell which? We do not believe that a man would be very far out of the way who should assert that any one remedy is as good as any other, and not any one of them could be said to be reliable.

Nothing gives us a better idea of what a cause is, or rather what it is not, than this same practice of medicine. People declare with the utmost assurance that a certain medicine will cure, or it has cured a particular disease, and still all the proof that could be had would be simply the assertion. Whether the medicine did or did not cure the disease, it is absolutely impossible to show. It should be borne in mind in this connexion that in ancient times medicine was something entirely different from what we have at present, and the causes of cures then were not at all like the causes in vogue now. In those times, and away back in the Middle Ages, the practice of medicine was a matter of divination, and people were cured by signs, reliques, ceremonies, prayers, and agencies of that character. Some of those remedies are still believed in, even in this enlightened age of ours. For instance, every one must know some little trick, or some little ceremony, by which warts can be removed. Almost every old woman has some recipe of that character, and she feels perfectly assured that her remedy never fails. It must be remembered that the ancients never pretended that they individually could cure diseases. They gave the whole credit to the gods, while our doctors at the present time take the whole credit to themselves and leave God out of consideration. Christ cured by the laying on of hands, but he was the son of God, and hence it was God's work, indirectly. A century ago or more, kings cured by mere touch, but this power they possessed merely because they were God's representatives. The

American Indians also make the practice of medicine a matter of divination. They believe that sickness is the work of demons or spirits. It might be added that it is evident enough that medicines do not cause the cures that are claimed for them, for in a large majority of cases, the medicine is a complete failure, and no cure is effected, and really we are never certain that medicine in any case is possessed of the curative properties claimed for it. The patient gets well on account of the strength of his constitution, and on account of the reserve forces stored up in his body which enables nature to master the disease. Nature does the whole work; medicine may aid or stimulate nature, but even that much is not known to a certainty. A disease that kills one man does not kill every other; the young master diseases much better than those who are older, whose treasury of reserve force is small.

As a further illustration of the confusion that prevails on the question of cause and effect, we might refer to cases of death by shooting. One man is shot and does not die; another is shot, and dies. In the case of the latter, was it the gun, the shooting, the lead, the powder, or was it the man who aimed the weapon and pulled the trigger that caused the death? Or was it the weakness of the man's constitution, or the lack of medicine, or improper treatment, that led to death in one case, while the other man who was injured, recovered? It must be evident enough that shooting alone does not kill a man, because so many men are shot that do not die. So gravity does not always draw bodies downward, for often it is the cause of their rising upward. A ball rolls down hill because of gravity, but a block does not roll, though gravity as a cause is still in operation. Is it not the roundness of the ball, or perhaps other conditions that make the ball roll? Gravity alone cannot produce such an effect. We speak of gravity as a power, but we do not know how it is or what it is, or whether there really is such a force in nature or not. We cannot demonstrate that anybody is moved in any case by a power outside of himself. We speak of bodies attracting other

bodies, and even of ourselves as being attracted by the beauty of this or that person, but where is the evidence that any power is exerted in any instance? We are continually making assertions and assuming things to be so, without a single item of proof to demonstrate what is claimed. We assume a man is guilty, and immediately proceed as if it were known and proved that he was guilty. We talk about things unknown and unknowable, as if we were familiar with all the facts of the case. Our thoughts are all a dream on our part; we dream and we continue to dream, even in our waking hours, and what we see in our dreams we naturally treat as realities. In this respect we are much like savages. We are beginning to see, however, that what we call causes are not causes at all. They are merely last links in a long chain of facts or events connected with certain results.

We say rain makes the grass grow. But does it? We often have rain when the grass does not grow at all. It all depends upon the season, the condition of the grass and other circumstances; and finally upon the question whether there is any grass or not. We say that the clouds disappearing make the sun come out, but we know very well that the sun remains just where it was.

The nature of what we denominate causes can be best understood by considering events. Take the case of the war of the late Rebellion. What brought on this rebellion? Was it the firing upon Fort Sumter, or was it the first battle of Bull Run? No, these were each single steps in a long process. There were hundreds and hundreds of causes still back of these operations. It might as well be said that the cause was the Nullification act, or the Fugitive Slave law, or the Wilmot Proviso, or John Brown's raid, or Lincoln's election. All these things had their effect, as we say, but they were only remotely connected with the final result. So, in the case of the American Revolution. Was the Declaration of Independence the cause, or was it the Boston riot or the tea thrown overboard in Boston harbor? No, these were only steps in a long series of steps that began, we

may say, when the world began. It may at least be said that the struggle that led to the Revolution began when the colonists first landed in America.

In connexion with this matter of cause and effect comes up the question of the value of ceremonies, sacrifices, prayer, preaching, worship. Where is the proof that they have the power and produce the effects that are claimed for them? The same may be asked in reference to the power of law and government. Do these things make people orderly and happy? What is the effect of the currency, the tariff and all such schemes? No one knows, no one ever can know. The problem is too deep, and the matter too intricate. It is at least certain that in these cases, as in all others, where one thing is assumed to be the cause, there are a thousand other things that are causes more or less remote, and these must all be taken into consideration, if we would fully or even partially understand the matter.

It must be evident to the most superficial inquirer that the time has come, when we must have new conceptions of the true nature and power of causes. They are not what we have all along imagined they were—they of themselves produce nothing. It is to be noticed that the world is continually changing its ideas of things in this direction, rejecting old causes and assigning new ones. For instance, the cures in Christ's time were effected through the direct interposition of Providence. The cure was a miracle then, as every cure is really a miracle with us to-day. Men believed in Christ and were healed by him. Later on, the healing ceremony took a little different form, but the work was still done by God through his instrumentalities—through charms, relics, saints, priests, kings. In fact, the practice of medicine has always been more or less intimately connected with religion. The first doctors that we read of were priests. With the savages, the medicine man and the prophet is usually one and the same person.

We are just as much bewildered over the nature and limits of causes as people were one thousand, or perhaps four thousand

years ago. Some men take medicine and some do not, and of those who believe in it, some take one thing and some another. Some still believe in the efficacy of prayer, in the power of relics, in charms, in the faith cure, in the science cure, some in the hot water bath, some in the cold water bath, and some in no bath at all ; some in medicine in large doses, some in small doses, and some in no dose at all. Now, all of these cannot be causes of cures ; they cannot all be reliable remedies. And, really, the difference in the system or method of cure does not seem to make any material difference in the safety of mankind. Men died in olden times and they die now—even the doctors themselves die—and the average length of life is probably not much greater now, when every family has its apothecary shop, than it was two thousand years ago when the use of drugs was almost if not wholly unknown. But whether we do or do not do, and no matter what we do or do not do, somebody seems to take care of us and we get along after all. What we have said of medicine will apply in all the other departments of life. Everywhere we are at a loss to ascertain the true cause, everywhere we are accustomed to imagine causes that do not exist, and we often attribute the wrong effect to the wrong cause.

We are continually telling about this cause and that cause, when everything we say in that connexion is the merest assumption. We pray, we weep, we laugh—we do ten thousand things either little or great, but who can ever know what their effects are, or whether they have any effects ? No doubt eclipses were just as much the cause of the calamities which sometimes followed their appearance, and which they were supposed to produce, as certain things are causes of certain effects in our every-day life. We say the law has its effect ; or the climate, the light, the heat, the microbes, etc., are the causes of certain diseases. Does the weather make the mercury rise or fall, or is it the rising or falling of the mercury that causes the change in the weather ? They are merely phenomena that come together —never one in advance of the other. How do we know that a

certain thing is an effect in any one case? We know that every effect, instead of being the result of one cause, is the product of a thousand little influences all combined. *No effect can happen that is not in harmony with everything else in the world.* So there can be no such thing as one effect from a single cause.

In matters of government, men are continually mistaking cause for effect and assigning some one thing as the cause, when in reality there are numerous other things that are equally potent in their influence in the same direction. Politics, as a rule, is built up largely upon unfounded assertions and assumptions. Each party puts forth its claims, without the slightest regard to evidence and the facts. If there is any good thing that has happened, the party in power is sure to claim that as a proof of the wisdom of its policy, while if something bad happens to occur, it is sure to be charged up to the account of the other party.

We are continually told what the Wilson or the Dingley tariff has done, and what free silver would do, if an opportunity were given, while the plain and unquestioned fact remains that the wisest statesman never knows what is or what will be the direct effect of any particular policy.

The question of cause is identical with the question of the existence of a God. We believe in the causes of things only because we believe in a Supreme Being, a first Great Cause. If we had no first cause, we could have no secondary causes. We believe in cause because we believe in Providence, and because we believe that everything that occurs is a matter of intellect and design. But men are beginning to lose faith in causes, because they cease to believe in a Great Contriver, Overseer and Provider. We find we have thus far been pinning our faith on something that is not fixed and substantial, and therefore our theory begins to dissipate, or rather it begins to assume a new form and another appearance.

However, men still believe, with some notable exceptions, in design; they still imagine there is a reason for every exist-

ence, a motive for every action, and an impulse for every movement.

They believe that the world was created for a purpose, though they are not able to state exactly what that purpose might be. They believe that one thing is made for another, is adapted to another, and that it must serve another. They still believe in the old Mosaic account of creation, that the world was made by the job, one piece at a time, that it took six days to complete it, and that the Great Contriver rested from fatigue on the seventh, having, according to all accounts, done no hard work of any moment since that time. They really believe that the sun and stars were not made for themselves, but for the earth, that the fowls and beasts were made for man to eat ; that God made man first, and then finding that man was lonely, he made him a companion from Adam's rib. That was the doctrine for many hundred years, and it was generally accepted, simply because men could think of nothing more plausible. But it is needless to say that such a belief is entirely groundless, and it is nothing but somebody's dream. All the assumptions in that connexion are gratuitous—the things assumed to be true, may be true, but there is not the slightest evidence that they are or ever were so. People are slowly becoming more and more enlightened, and the fictions that amused them in their youth now amuse them no more. They begin to lose their confidence in a First Great Cause, and if there is no First Cause, they begin to doubt whether there is a secondary cause, or any cause at all, in the ordinary sense of the term. They are inclined to look for some other explanation of the present condition of things. They begin to doubt that the leaves drop as a matter of self-sacrifice, in order that the tree may survive. Instead of believing that one thing was made for another and to serve another, they begin to realize the fact that all things were made at the same time, as parts of one whole, and that if they have any object or purpose at all, it is simply the continuance of their own individual existence as an atom in the universe.

Hartmann speaks of the objects, aims and purposes of nature, as if it were possible for nature to have aims! To have a purpose or an object, implies feeling and intelligence, and where these things do not exist, there can be no such things as aims and purposes. To speak of the purposes of nature, is the same as speaking of the purposes of a tree or a stone, or the purposes of electricity.

Fifty years ago Grove, in his Correlation of Forces, wrote: "Instead of regarding the proper object of physical science as a search after essential causes, I believe it ought to be, and must be, a search after facts and relations—that although the word cause may be used in a secondary or concrete sense, as meaning antecedent forces, yet in an abstract sense it is totally inapplicable: *We cannot predicate of any physical agency that it is abstractedly the cause of another.*"

To cause is to create—to bring forth what did not exist before. Is there any such cause, or has there been since the world was created? If God created all things in the beginning, there was nothing left to be created afterward. To cause is to produce, and the product cannot be different from the producer. The creator and the thing created must be identical, and the same is true of cause and effect. What the earth produces is merely a form or a part of the earth itself.

Finally, we have a right to expect that the cause and the effect should in all cases be commensurate. One pound cannot balance more than a pound; a twelve pound cannon cannot be used in firing a twenty pound ball; a man who can lift only one hundred pounds, evidently could not lift one hundred and fifty pounds. Still, we are everywhere confronted with effects that bear no comparison with the causes with which they are supposed to be connected. In every case, the cause is either too great for the effect, or the effect is too great for the cause, the latter dilemma being much the more frequent. The best illustration is the homeopathic dose, which, though infinitesimally small, is said to be able to produce effects that

are wonderfully large. The case of faith moving mountains, is another illustration. But the question that naturally arises is this: where is the proof that faith does move mountains, or that the homeopathic dose really does produce the effects claimed? The conclusion seems irresistible, that causes become so attenuated and so insignificant that they finally lose all claims to being considered as causes which produce effects.

THE MISSION OF MAN.

In deciding what a man should do, and what should be his career in life, much will depend upon the conception formed as to his true position in the world and his relations to the rest of creation. Indeed, the first question to decide before we undertake to ascertain what man should do is this: What is man, and what is his mission in life? That is the question to which we will now turn our attention.

Just how much conceit is possessed by the lower animals, is something that has never yet been clearly ascertained; but it is certain that the members of the human family are abundantly supplied with the article. The belief prevails universally among men that the members of the human race are the most perfectly organized specimens that God ever sent out. This absurd idea comes chiefly, if not wholly, from our Bible. We read in Genesis of the great amount of pains that the Creator took when he made man, bringing forth one individual at a time—Adam first, and Eve, his helpmeet, shortly afterward. But when he came to make the fowls, the whales and the beasts of the field, he sent them out in job lots. He made man after his own likeness, but what pattern he followed in getting up the rest of creation, is not clearly ascertained. He did even more than that for men. He said “let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowls of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing upon the earth.” Now, this being the account given of the origin of man

and of his relation to other creatures, an account received and accepted, until recently, as strictly true and authentic, is it any wonder that the human race should be the most arrogant and conceited of all created beings? According to this statement, the world and all that is in it was made for man; even God himself has seemingly no other business than to provide a home for men and superintend their affairs. With such a theory and such an inheritance as that, why should man not be proud and intractable? Again, when, later on, a Saviour came into the world, he came not to save animals, but man only, and even of men, to save merely "the lost sheep of the children of Israel." According to the Bible account, every object in the world save man is insignificant. But who knows what bears would say on this subject, if they could express their sentiments so as to be understood by men? No doubt they would say that the world was made for bears, and they are the ones that should have dominion over creation. And the lion, the eagle, the elephant, the whale, and perhaps the bee and the butterfly, would make precisely similar claims.

Unfortunately for this Bible story, no student at the present time looks upon this account as anything but a piece of innocent fiction. Outside of this account given in Genesis, there is not the slightest evidence to be found anywhere that man is "only a little lower than the angels." As to man's right to dominion over the things of the earth, there is no foundation for such a claim, and when it comes to the question of his being made in the image of God, there is no proof to establish that fact. The common house-fly is just as fearfully and wonderfully made, and no doubt has just as exalted a mission as man himself. The same Creator that made one made the other, and a perfect workman never sends out imperfect work. The humblest being in creation has its place to fill quite as well as man has, and so far as the plans of the Almighty are concerned, *one creature is just as indispensable to the world as any other creature.*

Then, what shall we say is the mission of man? Who shall

inform us? On what authority can we rely with safety in considering a question of such gravity and importance? We know of nothing but ordinary intelligence and reason that shall guide us to a sound conclusion on this subject. It has been seen that we cannot depend upon revelation, and when it comes to the opinions of men on any question, one man's opinions are apt to be as good as those of another man. In the first place, it seems to be perfectly well settled that men are not to rule over the earth, or over the creatures of the earth, or even over members of their own race. If there are any who still imagine that the mission of man lies in the direction of dominion and conquest, they should get rid of that illusion at their earliest opportunity. There is not a particle of evidence to be found anywhere to support such a proposition as that.

Again, what is the mission of man; what is the policy he should adopt, the plans he should follow, or the course he should pursue, in passing through this world on his way from the cradle to the grave? On this subject men differ, and doubtless they always will. The best of men on such a question as this can only give an opinion.

It seems clear enough that man's mission is not to subdue the earth. But can it be that it is man's mission to advance in what is called learning and wisdom? Can it be that God has hidden himself from man in order that the latter should busy himself in searching him out? Can it be that the works of nature should have been made designedly mysterious, so that mankind should spend a lifetime in the vain pursuit of knowledge? Doesn't the savage, and even the brute, without books, without study, without schools, without laws, without government, and even without a Bible, fill his place and carry out his purposes quite as well as the philosophers that are to be found among civilized men? The humblest creature that God ever made, even the weakest and most insignificant, appears to live and thrive just as well as beings made of finer fiber, and as well as those that have much loftier pretensions.

Is it the mission of man to make war, killing thousands of people and making tens of thousands helpless and miserable—is that man's mission? If we were to judge by the past history of the world, one would naturally assume that the answer to this question must be in the affirmative. Man is a destructive animal, it is claimed, and his proper avocation is to find somebody that deserves to be killed. That has been the theory, but Heaven forbid that it should be the theory of enlightened men at this late day, now the close of another century. We are glad to state that such a belief is being generally discarded.

Do man's efforts lie properly in the domain of art? Is it man's most worthy ambition to advance in this direction—to delineate, picture or paint, or to carve in stone or mould in bronze? What can art do for man, more than to amuse or divert him? The best productions to be found in the line of art, are mere attempts to imitate nature, and they are always very unsuccessful ones at that. Man does nothing, can do nothing, that nature does not do much easier and more perfectly every day. Men can make curious, even wonderful machines, but the human body, with all its organs working together in harmony, is a thousand times more wonderful than any machine that man has yet invented. All the thoughts that man has, his very best, owe their origin to suggestions or hints that nature has furnished.

Is it the mission of man to build great edifices, or to rear grand structures, such as temples, castles, palaces and pyramids? Is it the founding of great cities, or the establishing of empires, that constitute man's proper employment, and is that an achievement of which man may justly be proud? Such works at best endure only for a brief and uncertain period, and it must be remembered that the hills and mountains that nature has formed surpass the works of man, not only in durability, but in magnitude and grandeur.

In this country, as well as in Europe, it is generally considered to be man's chief mission to acquire wealth, and in va-

rious ways to surpass and surprise his fellow-man by the accumulations he makes. And yet the Bible, a book that all men affect to believe, condemns covetousness and wealth-getting in all its forms—even going so far as to declare over and over again that a rich man cannot enter the kingdom of heaven. It must be evident enough to any intelligent man that the acquiring of wealth for the mere sake of having it, and without any immediate demand or use for it, cannot be a worthy ambition or a desirable employment for any of God's creatures. The acquiring of a superabundance of means for the sake of simply shining or surpassing, or even for the mere purpose of enjoyment, is never the work of a sensible man.

No, it cannot be that it was God's purpose, or that it was in accordance with God's mandates, that men should pursue such an ambitious and harrassing career as that which they uniformly follow when they reach what is called a high stage of civilization. It cannot be that it is man's most appropriate mission either to gain wisdom or accumulate wealth; it cannot be his most worthy ambition to surpass or subdue some one who happens to be weaker or more unlucky than himself. What he considers his greatest, grandest achievements, are really only little things at best. No matter how eminent a man may be, nor how wealthy, how powerful, how prosperous or how splendid he may be, by reason of any gifts or qualities that he may possess, or through any good fortune that may have befallen him, he is still only a man, one among millions, and no higher, no holier, no worthier in any essential respect than any one of the humblest denizens of earth. With all his possessions, all his gifts and acquirements, he dies in the end like the beast of the field, and his body, like the commonest carcass, is finally covered with dust, to prevent it from polluting and poisoning the atmosphere of the neighborhood where it is finally placed.

Some believe that it is man's chief mission to enjoy himself, to make himself at all times as happy as possible. But there is not enough of this claim to justify any special consideration in

this place at this time. There is not the slightest evidence that such is the mission of man. Life at best is a serious business, and play and enjoyment must always be merely secondary matters.

We are not able to find any evidence, either in revelation or in nature, that should lead us to believe that man is higher, worthier, or better than any one of God's creatures. He is an animal, like any other animal, made after the same pattern, and undoubtedly with the same purpose or design in view, and it cannot be that his mission is anything more than simply this: *to live*—to live as long and as well as he may, and at last prepare to die. That being his only reasonable aim and proper business in life, he should live peacefully, quietly, unostentatiously, and be ready to depart when the time comes. *To be born, to live, to die—that is absolutely all there is of life.* His duties and labors are confined chiefly to getting something to eat and finding some suitable shelter to protect him when the wind, the rain and the storms come. For such a man, with no loftier aims and no higher ambition than this, no laws, no ruler, no government is needed. Such things as these are required only by men who have marked out an entirely different career from this—one where war and conflict prevail, and where the blessings of peace and contentment are never found.

THE PRESUMPTION OF MAN.

“God, I thank thee!” That is what the Pharisee said as he stood and prayed. He evidently wished God to understand that he was not ungrateful, and that he fully appreciated the fact that the Supreme Being had done a nice thing in creating such a man as himself and sending him out into the world to operate upon his own responsibility. He was so elated over his own exalted rank that he felt like giving God a sort of complimentary vote for what he had achieved.

It may not be amiss to remark that the world even to-day is

full of people just like this Pharisee, and they are found in all countries in all the ordinary walks of life. There are rich people who think they are really better than their neighbors who are poor; there are handsome people who think they are better than those who happen to be plain, and there are those who, being intellectually smart themselves, really imagine that they are more perfect creatures every way than those who intellectually are not so smart; and so there are people in the towns who have grown up with the idea that they are immeasurably better than those who are reared in the rural districts, and those who live in the old states flatter themselves that they are happier, and perhaps handsomer, than those who have the advantages only of the states in the far west. Indeed, it is well known that there have been Pharisees from the beginning of the world down to the present time, and the supreme conceit which Pharisees are known to possess, is a crop that flourishes in all climes and in all the countries of the globe.

Still another phase of this subject remains to be noticed. There are some men who work themselves into such a state of ecstasy or exaltation that they actually come to believe that by nature they are more or less divine. And if they do not really believe so themselves, they make every possible effort to induce people to believe that such is actually the case. Kings, conquerors and men of state are accustomed to array themselves in gorgeous attire, and then parade in public with the view of leaving an impression upon the common class of mortals that they are only a little lower than the gods! They affect divinity, and they seem anxious to have people believe that if they are not gods already, they undoubtedly will be such when they become a little older. Men with such pretensions, naturally enough, will not tolerate criticism in any form, and they will not consent that either their ability or their motives shall be questioned. To doubt the infallibility of such beings, is simply treason and nothing else. And priests as a class, are apt to have a little weakness in this direction. They are apt to imagine that,

either by descent or election, they are divine, and if they are not such, they wonder why people persist in calling them divines. To question for a moment the uprightness of their conduct or the purity of their motives, is certain to be pronounced an act of heresy. They are supposed to be incapable of making mistakes, and to insinuate that such a thing as a mistake is possible for them, is simply scandalous and wicked. To undertake to criticize a divine, would be construed into an evident desire to start a controversy with God, and the man who should attempt such a foolish thing as that would find anathemas enough heaped upon his head to supply a whole town. The slightest sign of disapprobation in regard to anything done or said by any divine is certain to be construed as an attack upon the clergy as a body. And, by the way, such a thing is usually found to be rather a serious undertaking.

This picture which we have briefly sketched was more common a hundred years ago than it is now. Times have changed, even in a hundred years, and the people have changed with them. The days of devils and demons and witches and ghosts have gone by, simply because people, as a general thing, have ceased to believe in such existences. They were never anything more than creatures of the imagination, and when the imagination ceases to act, devils and spooks fail to materialize. And in the same way people have largely ceased to believe in divine things or divine creatures here below ; and failing to believe in them, they refuse to worship them. There is but one God in the whole universe. The days of infallibility, for earthly creatures, have departed never more to return. Under the present dispensation, every man must be ready to give an account of his stewardship, no matter what may be his rank, his position or his calling. Even the king upon his throne, or the judge upon the bench, as well as the minister, either in or out of his pulpit, is held responsible for his utterances and his actions. No man is permitted, at this day, to wrap himself in a garb of his own self-sufficiency and simply thank God that he is not as

other men are. Such a thing might have been done in former ages, in other countries, *but it cannot be done in this free and enlightened country of ours, at the close of the nineteenth century.*

It is well understood that all men are made of the same material, and no human being that lives has any right to claim that he is better than the rest of his race. There may have been such men in ages past, but there are no such men living to-day. All men were made after one and the same copy, and why should they not be substantially alike? God made all men, the bad as well as the good, the young as well as the old, the black as well as the white, the subject as well as the sovereign, the layman as well as his priest, and why or how could there be any substantial difference between them? Adam and Eve, as we are assured in revelation, were the first parents of all of us, and so what right has any man to claim that he came from a little better stock than the rest of mankind? Such a claim is absurd—and worse than that, it is false. There is no such superior man living. There never was such a man born. Why should men worship any mortal or any creature on this earth? *God alone is divine*, and that is the end of the matter. Our Creator tells us that we must have no other gods before him and in this case at least, I propose to obey his injunction. I have no hesitation at all in saying that idolatry and fetich-worship, in all its forms, shapes and manifestations, is a practice that ought to be held in abhorrence by every sensible man.

It is in view of these considerations, and many more that I might notice, that I am not able to see or understand how or where any one man gets his right to exercise authority over other men.

THE OBTRUSIVENESS OF MAN.

This world is peopled by restless mortals. No matter how well they find things, they always want them different. They are ready even to carry on a discussion with the Almighty, and

they are more or less indignant because he fails to arrange everything according to their taste and judgment. Men as a general thing, especially if they are of the kind that imagine that they have great gifts through the blessings of Providence, want to help somebody. They are always obtruding their advice upon others, and sometimes their services, and they feel mortally offended if people decline to swallow their medicine and follow their prescriptions. It is a peculiar, as well as a melancholy fact, that a great portion of the time of some men is taken up with looking after the affairs of other folks—and in most cases this intermeddling is uncalled for and unwelcome.

Men, as a rule, are most interested in people and things that are beyond their reach, and that are unknown as well as inaccessible. They pass by unheeded the poor and deserving at their own doors—it is the benighted heathen in distant lands that stirs their emotions and arouses their enthusiasm. They are always anxious to help the Lord, though they know well that the Lord does not need their help. They would do anything for the Lord, but the cries of the suffering and needy at home they fail to hear. They love to lecture and legislate, and they imagine they can reform the world by proceeding on some such line as that. These men are born reformers, and as such they are a continued source of suffering and annoyance to the communities in which they live.

It is the nature of man to strive to do what plainly cannot be done—what is impracticable, if not actually impossible. Men are constantly putting forth efforts that in the end prove to be fruitless. Among other things, they will insist upon saving other people, and generally upon saving men out of their reach and beyond their power. They want to save sinners, save drunkards and spendthrifts, save wantons and rakes, save everybody *but themselves*. It is the lost sheep they are looking for! This is a new kind of business that is becoming very popular at present, but it is doubtful whether it pays. As a rule, those who have to be saved by the efforts of others, by some Keeley-cure arrange-

ment, or otherwise, are not worth saving. The only way that men ever reform is by reforming themselves, and if they are to be saved, it must be by efforts of their own. A man that is really lost, can no more be saved than a man that is dead can ever be made to live again. A man that is nearly lost may be saved, but that is a different matter entirely. Lost things are never found, for if they are found, of course they were not lost.

How many things we are doing daily that produce no appreciable results! We imagine we are doing good; we go about spending our time, and perhaps some of our money, for what? To make a reputation, to be seen of men, to get a position in society, and finally gain an inheritance in heaven. But I doubt very much if heaven is to be gained in that way. Such efforts are to be classed with works of supererogation. They are like the sacrifices made to the gods by the ancients, and the ceremonies performed and the sufferings endured by men in the Middle Ages in order that people might redeem themselves and obtain salvation. They imagined that by so doing they could appease the wrath of God, and possibly bribe him to do them some little favor. But people at the present time are coming to have a different belief. They do not believe in a God that can be bought or appeased in any manner. The God of to-day is an unchangeable Being; he remains unmoved, and even prayer is of no service, so far as changing his plans or purposes is concerned. Hence it is that men of the present age are little given to sacrifices and ceremonies of any kind—with them, circumcision and uncircumcision are all the same. Few think now of propitiating God. They would as soon think of propitiating the storm, the rocks, the sea or the sun.

THE STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

It may be well to examine more closely than we have yet done the relations which properly exist between groups or bodies of men and the individuals of which they are composed, and by

so doing we shall be able to assign to both the value, the credit and the importance to which they are justly entitled.

The first fact to be impressed upon the mind is this, that groups never accomplish anything as a whole ; the work that is done in their name is uniformly done by individuals. The word "mass" when used to designate a group is a term used for convenience ; masses themselves accomplish nothing ; they are inanimate and powerless ; a mass is something that has only an imaginary existence. In all cases, where it is assumed that the mass is a powerful agency or element, it will be found that the struggle is between a few strong men on one side and a great many weak men on the other. The few are uniformly determined to overcome the many. We notice that fact in all organizations and in all the forms in which social life manifests itself—in church bodies, society gatherings, political parties, and in companies and groups of all kinds. A few men, and oftentimes some one man, wishes to have his own way and is determined to rule, no matter what happens. This is what all government proves to be in the end. The few who put themselves forward and assume the attitude of leaders leave nothing for the individual to do, because they want to do everything themselves, or at least to dictate how everything should be done. Sometimes mere vanity is the motive, but generally the motive of such men is one of unadulterated selfishness.

But when the truth comes to be finally revealed, it will be found that one man is as good as another, and the mistake that is made in all governments, is in rendering men helpless and dependent, instead of teaching them to do their own work and thus rendering them strong and self-reliant. It is a great blunder to ignore the existence of any man in society, even the humblest citizen that can be found, and it is a fatal error for a man to allow others to do for him what he could do as well or perhaps better himself. Dependence leads to indolence and incapacity, and indolence and incapacity to slavery in the end.

What would the world do without the individual, as opposed

to the community or the whole body of the people? Without the individual, there would be no world, no society, no people; without units, we should have no numbers, and so without individuals there would be no race, no party, no sect. Just so far as we go on destroying individuals, we go on destroying the body to which the individual belongs. If we take one from a thousand, what we have left is no longer a thousand, but only nine hundred and ninety-nine, an entirely new number. Then why despise the units, the elements, the individuals of which every whole is composed? They are everything, and the world itself could not endure without their continued existence. How absurd it is to talk about destroying a part to save the whole! No, that is never done, though we may destroy a part with the hope of saving the remainder, which is a different thing from saving the whole. When a part is lost, clearly enough, the original whole is gone.

It must be remembered that all that has thus far been done in this world has been the work solely of individuals. Individuals built the Pyramids, laying up the blocks of stone one by one. Individuals constitute armies, individuals lead them, and it is the bodies of individuals that cover the field after the battle is lost or won.

“Take care of the pennies and the dollars will take care of themselves.” We should make every effort to save the individual, and not destroy him ruthlessly, as was the prevailing practice in the Middle Ages, and as the practice still continues at the present day.

The present custom of sacrificing one or more men for the public good, is a great wrong done in all cases to the one that is sacrificed. Uniformly the sacrifice made does not produce the slightest good, and in all cases it is an act of the grossest inhumanity. No sacrifice should be made under any circumstances; it was a foolish thing for Abraham to prepare to sacrifice his son, and as for poor Isaac, there was not the slightest justification or excuse for taking his life. No man should be

sacrificed, for no one is better or worse than any other man.

Nations never do anything of themselves; they are always instruments, always servants under the direction of some leader. They always follow but one leader at a time; it would be impossible for them to obey the orders of more than one. Hence it follows that, in a proper sense, the work of nations or peoples is always the work of individuals. Even in America, it is always some leading spirit that guides the masses, either for weal or woe—it is either Washington or Hamilton or Jefferson or Calhoun or Lincoln or Cleveland or David B. Hill. The work is wholly that of some leading men. Louis XIV. was entirely right when he said: “I am the state.” So were Charlemagne and William the Conqueror the leaders of the people in their day; so was Alexander, Cæsar, Napoleon; so was Socrates, Plato and Demosthenes. The nation itself has no mind of its own, it has no will, and so it always follows the guidance of some leader; and it is the same with the party, the army, the multitude. Such bodies always have a leader and never more than one at a time: they could do little without a leader, and still less with two. What would an army do if it were not led? Having no mind, no brain, it could not possibly have any object upon which to concentrate its efforts. If an army had two leaders, one would be the real leader, and the other no leader at all. It could not possibly move in different directions, following two different men at the same time. Christ was entirely right when he said that a man could not serve two masters. There can be no bodies but organized bodies, and every organization implies one head.

To enable the reader to get a clearer idea of the work done by individuals, the following illustrations may be of some service. We say one army defeats another army, as if it were all one single performance, when in fact it is made up of an unlimited number of separate factors. When the battle occurs, one soldier kills two or more of the enemy, another wounds four, and so on through the whole army, each one doing some

little damage on his own account and thus contributing to the final result. The officers, the gunners, the trumpeters, and even the horses and mules all have their share in the grand performance. Instead of being a single action, every battle is made up of an indefinite number of battles of greater or less importance—skirmishes, onsets and assaults at different points on the line, which in many cases extends for miles. Each man, each group, each regiment, each division, each corps fights its own battle, precisely as if it were fighting alone, and hence it happens that every battle is made up of an unlimited number of independent conflicts.

Suppose ten men are engaged in building a house. They do not all build it—in fact none of them build it. One set dig the cellar, another build the wall and do the mason work. Another set deliver the lumber: and going back further yet, a distinct set cut down the trees and draw the logs to the mill, where still another set saw the logs and convert them into boards. Another set make the nails, while another set make the glass and another the blinds. Then there are the carpenters—they certainly do not build the house, though they do much towards building it. But what one man does, no other man does. One puts on a board here, another puts a post there; one man puts in the windows and another hangs the doors. Finally, the painter comes along and does his part. Thus we see, if we come to analyze the building of a house, or the doing of any job, that instead of being a single effort, it is made up of an incalculable number of efforts, and instead of its being the work of a single day or month or year, it is, properly considered, the work of an incalculable number of years. *In fact, there is really no beginning and no end to any work or to any event.* It takes time for the trees to grow and the rocks to form, and if the trees did not grow and the rocks did not form, where would we get the material from which buildings are constructed?

The simplest group is that composed of two individuals, for instance, two men. They are together, we say, but they are as

much apart as if they were miles from each other. What one does, of course the other does not do; the steps one takes or the movements one makes, the other does not make. We say that they go together and work together, but so far as what they do is concerned, they might as well work separately. Suppose they tear down a house or build a fence, or do anything imaginable. Is it not clear that each one does his own work—never does what the other does—any more than he would if they were working a mile apart? So it is in every case when we speak of what any number or any body of men do. *The only work that is done, or that can be done, in ordinary life, is done by individuals.* The result is single, as an army is defeated or a house is built—yet it is always the result of the working of innumerable individual forces. Suppose two men carry a load together, as we sometimes say. Is it not clear that each one carries only a part and that what one carries, the other does not carry?

Just so it is with what the state does; the state is a sham, a delusion. It is a mere blind used to prevent the people from seeing or realizing just who does the wicked work that is performed. It is a common thing to say the state does this or that, but it should be remembered that the state as a whole never does anything. Everything is the work of some individual. What is done in all cases, is what the man who happens to be governor does, or the man who happens to be judge or sheriff does, and in every instance it is the work of a simple, ordinary man. So it is with the national government. We say it was the government that subdued the South and restored the Union, when the fact was that the transaction had nothing to do with the government, it being merely a contest between northern and western states on one side, and southern states on the other. We say the South as a body rebelled, but the fact was, only a certain number of individuals rebelled and they induced the rest to follow. We say the United States made a treaty with Great Britain, while in fact, perhaps, it was only the man who hap-

pened to be president and the man who happened to be secretary of state that did the business on one side, while certain representative men in England did the business on the other side. The public should never lose sight of this one material fact: it is the trick of state-craft to keep telling what the state does and what the state orders, when the fact is, in every instance, that it is simply *what is wanted or what is done by one or more individuals*. So, the judge on the bench delights to tell what "the court thinks," what "the court decrees," as if "the court" in any particular case were somebody greater and somebody better than Mr. So-and-So who happens to be sitting on the bench! And so people will tell what the Lord wants, and what the Lord orders, when it is merely *what they themselves want in every instance*. I beg to add that I abominate fictions at all times and in all places. Fictions are always lies, and lies always harm or wrong somebody.

THE DOCTRINE OF REVENGE.

Our whole doctrine of punishment as manifested in every department of life where government is exercised, is based upon the principle of revenge. Justice itself is always an avenger. Even the Bible, the source of all our ideas of what is moral and proper, teaches in unmistakable language the doctrine of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. But just at present intelligent men are not searching the scriptures for instruction on matters of right and propriety, as they did a hundred years ago or more. The human mind is undergoing a constant development in connexion with such questions as these, and men, both as individuals and in the mass, believe and think no more as they did a few centuries since.

Revenge is simply a manifestation of anger and resentment, feelings which are natural growths in the human breast, but which are the source of more harm to the human race than all other passions combined. It may be natural for men to be

angry, but it is always well in such cases to follow the Bible injunction to "Be angry and sin not." It may be that, as is so often said, revenge is sweet, but under any circumstances, whether in private life or in public affairs, revenge is always an expensive luxury. Every nation, every individual, finds that the business of punishing enemies is always costly, and it is often ruinous. The efforts we make to be revenged of our injuries, never bring good results. To cause ourselves trouble and pain merely to make others suffer, is the most senseless and absurd policy that any one can pursue. A far better way is to let our enemies go on in their career, and see how long they will prosper and where they will stop. A man who will wrong us will wrong others as well, and a man who makes a practice of violating the rights and offending the feelings of other men is sure to be detested by society, and he will meet with that fate which uniformly comes to transgressors in the end. As a rule, it is well to let evil-doers alone, and Providence, fate or society will mete out to them such treatment as they seem to deserve. The best way to treat such men is to pass them by without notice, and as a general thing to ignore them entirely.

Revenge is not only unreasoning, it is also brutal; it has not a single feature that is human. No man ever strengthens his own case by taking revenge upon his adversary. It never settles difficulties; but, on the contrary, it uniformly makes matters worse. Instead of promoting peace, it usually renders peace impossible, and an enemy who has been punished by some avenger is never appeased thereby, but is made ten times as bitter and as desperate as he was before. Instead of lessening the number of wrongs, revenge always multiplies them. A man who is sent to prison or who is punished in some other way, always feels that he has been wronged, and when he obtains his liberty he sets at work immediately to make matters even again.

Then, consider for a moment the utter absurdity of our whole proceeding in this "eye for an eye" business. A man strikes us, and sooner or later we strike him back. Does this

balance the account? No, it opens a new page on the ledger. We say it is to balance the blow we received, but the other party never looks upon the matter in any such light. With him the blow returned passes as an original offence, and if the theory is correct on which each party proceeds, there will never be any end to blows till one or the other dies, and even then it might be that their near friends would take up the contest. I must say, revenge is senseless, and it always defeats its own aims, if indeed it has any real aims. Moreover, it puts the avenger entirely in the wrong; he not only places himself on a level with the offender, but he even plays a lower and more wicked part than the offender himself. The original transgressor had some excuse perhaps for what he did, but the avenger has none. The former felt, no doubt, that the blow was deserved and he was doing right, while the other party, acting with deliberation it may be, delivers a return blow not with the hope of mending matters, but with the design merely of causing pain to one whom he dislikes. It must not be forgotten that an avenger is always in the wrong; he can never have any excuse to justify his conduct. The very most that could be said for him would be that he behaves like a madman.

Let us inquire into the effects of punishments inflicted according to law, and see how they work in practice. Do they generally make things better; do they make anybody richer, or even happier? Do they prevent wrongs? Do they lessen sorrows or relieve the suffering? No, they never do, but on the contrary they generally increase sorrows and intensify sufferings. What a miserable consolation it must be for one who has been offended to see his enemy suffer! It neither repairs his losses nor relieves him from pain, if he has been injured. What earthly benefit can it be to anybody to cut off a criminal's ears, or put out his eyes, or confine him in prison, or even to deprive him of life? There can be absolutely none.

Finally, the fact must never be lost sight of, that the criminal has just as much right to commit his wrongs as we have to

punish him for what he has done. One man's person or property is as sacred as that of any other man. In the sight of God and the world, *the criminal has just as many rights as any other man*; perhaps before God and the world he is not a criminal. In fact, when we come down to the bottom of the matter, we are all criminals.

We make our laws and lay down our rules for the criminal. But has not the criminal the same right to lay down his rules and make his laws as other men have? No law can deprive any human being of what are properly his rights—and one of man's inalienable rights is that of being treated at all times like a man. No law can deprive him of his manhood. Society judges the criminal, and in return the criminal judges society. Where is the difference, or where is the advantage?

PROGRESS AND CIVILIZATION.

The people of this country have remarkable ideas on the nature and characteristics of what is called progress. They have impressed upon their minds the familiar thought that this age of ours is very progressive, meaning thereby that the people of the present day are advancing and are constantly making rapid strides toward the attainment of perfection. But this is, to say the least, an unfortunate mistake. It is true that we are daily making progress, but it is the progress that leads to decay and final dissolution. Age of itself leads to decline, and it cannot be denied that all the civilized nations of the earth are much older than they were when they were still in their primitive stage of development. It should not be forgotten that a state of civilization is necessarily a state of natural disease and decline.

In theory, the grade of morality and excellence that prevails to-day, is just as high, perhaps, as it ever has been, but unfortunately the practice in most cases is far below the standard that has been established for the proper conduct of men.

People have sympathies and sentiments now, as they had a thousand or two thousand years ago, but as a general thing such feelings have now become decidedly morbid in their character. People love each other at present probably as much as they ever did, but this love is usually of a selfish or sensual nature. People are honest in certain cases, but only because they have become possessed of the conception that honesty is the best policy. People are virtuous and moral, but only so far as the law or custom requires them to be such. People are benevolent, but chiefly for the reputation that benevolence brings. People are religious and devout, but far too often the church is prized by them only so far as it will enable them to stand well in society and allow them to gather in a bountiful harvest from their customers or patrons. And so on through the whole long list of qualities and acquirements that usually serve to complete the make-up of one who is known as a worthy and respectable man.

Is there any one who would presume to say that people are either healthier or happier than people were who lived in former times in a more simple way? People as a rule are better housed than they were a hundred or more years ago, but it is really a question whether that fact alone can be looked upon as an important advantage for their side. People nowadays are so accustomed to living in overheated rooms that their bodies have become abnormally tender and sensitive, and hence they suffer far more from exposure to the elements than primitive people ever did; for this and other reasons they are liable to attack from diseases that are entirely unknown to people who live in what is called the uncivilized state. People in our times have a greater variety of food, and they have it served more regularly than was found to be practicable in former times, but it is by no means certain that either this variety or this abundance has been the source of a greater amount of happiness to mankind. It is well known that it is a common practice among cultivated people to eat too freely and too frequently, and a large share of

the diseases peculiar to civilization may be traced to the food which people eat and the manner in which it is prepared and consumed. People in civilized times boast of their wisdom, their learning, their accomplishments, but it is well known that most of these acquirements are valueless, and the commonest native that dwells in the forest could give them scores of points on matters that pertain to the ordinary affairs of life.

Again, is it an evidence of progress and advancement that machines should do most of the work, and that the laborer should become himself a mere machine? Is it a sign of progress and advancement that, with the improvements, so called, made in the line of industry, the workman should degenerate into the smallest part of a man—a human being who can do one simple thing, only one thing, and must depend upon capital for his livelihood? Then, think how civilization adds to the amount of labor that men are required to perform! The native stops when he has enough, but the enlightened citizen is never satisfied.

It is a curious fact that so far as civilization is a factor in life, it is a force that is antagonistic to nature. The lessons of nature are uniformly ignored, and man in his ambitious career seems determined to make his own way through the world without heeding the lessons that God in his wisdom gave him. He is inclined to set up art as something above nature, and he places more reliance upon what he calls science than he does upon the revelations made by the Creator. The ordinary animal lives naturally and never strives to build up an imaginary kingdom for itself outside of the world in which it finds itself. Hence the animal lives quietly, contentedly, peacefully, and it never undertakes to do what evidently the Creator never intended that it should do. Man is also an animal, but one of an entirely different character from the ordinary animal. Man is contented with nothing as he finds it. He thinks of nothing except what he considers progress, and his imagination, his conceit, and his ambition carry him to astonishing lengths. In the early part of his career, while he is young and comparatively

helpless, he believes in God and Providence, but as he grows older and stronger, he becomes more confident of his own ability, and he is inclined to trust wholly to his own guidance.

There is no question but that what man calls knowledge is the source of most of his present misery and wretchedness. It is evident enough that man is altogether too self-conscious—he knows too much. The ordinary animals know less, or rather they think and reflect less, and therefore they suffer less. There is undoubtedly a substantial foundation for the Bible thought indicated by these words: “In the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” The sin of mankind is in knowing too much. As long as men were content to remain as animals in the natural state, they knew nothing of sin, and they had no occasion for feelings of shame, but when their eyes were opened, and they saw they were naked, they felt the necessity of disguising themselves with fig leaves, and their descendants have been doing the same thing from that day down to the present time.

Absurdly enough men have come to believe that civilization is progress upward, when a careful review of all the facts of the case shows that civilization really is progress downward. An animal that needs no clothes, that knows nothing of sin, and in fact does not pretend to know anything at all, has a good, sound, healthy body and lives and rears its young in a sensible and successful way. With man the case is different—the civilized man, I mean. The savage being much nearer to the animal, and therefore living much more naturally, is far sounder and healthier every way than the man who lives in cities and towns. There is scarcely a sound and really healthy man to be found in civilized life—the superabundance of doctors and doctor books, to say nothing of dispensaries and apothecary shops generally, that are found all over our land, shows clearly enough that there is somebody sick in the family pretty nearly all the time. With savages and the lower animals, health is the natural, normal

state ; among civilized men, and especially among civilized women, disease is the normal and prevailing state. I venture to say that a perfect man, a man as nature intended man should be, does not exist in civilized life. In fact, it is absolutely impossible for a man to live as men do in civilized life and be a healthy man. Civilization for man, like domestication for animals, means deterioration, degradation, and finally decay and death. Already he is becoming toothless, and hairless and toeless, and if he keeps on as he is doing now for a few hundred years more, he will finally degenerate into a gigantic oyster, a mollusk that consists mostly of stomach, that is sedentary in its habits and careless of its future, that lives chiefly to eat and drink, and eats and drinks mainly to live and enjoy itself. It will be remembered that the oyster is jawless and toothless, and that hence it takes its food exclusively in the fluid form. Perhaps some such fate awaits the coming toothless man.

Men delight to talk about the progress made in government, but, unfortunately, the progress of government is uniformly from bad to worse, rarely from bad to better. As often happens with moving bodies, government in its progress is carried along by the force of its own velocity or its momentum. Government is not the work of one man, but of many ; to make a change, especially for the better, requires the combined action, or the consent, of a large number of individuals, and these men, having diverse interests, are usually slow to agree. Legislation, with some rare exceptions, makes matters worse, and the only remedy that masses find for their troubles is in revolution. Sad as the fact is, it is a fact that when the people want a radical change in their government, they find that their only way is to tear down and build over again. To repair with success any portion of the governmental structure, is impossible. To retrace steps taken in the way of legislation, is usually impracticable.

People have the erroneous impression that in a democracy, or a republic, all wrongs can be remedied by a resort to the ballot, but in practice it is found that such a theory does not

work. The ballot, in different ways, develops more evils than it remedies. The people under that form of government take altogether too much for granted. They imagine that because they have the power, everything must necessarily go right, and yet as a matter of fact, it is found that a great many things go wrong. Instead of the people doing all the business and having all the power, under a republican form of government, they really do but little of the business and have but a small share of the power. While they believe and feel that they are doing all of the work, they are really doing only an insignificant portion of it. The men who do the work, in most cases, are the bosses and schemers.

Government can never materially improve, because there are so many men of influence who have a pecuniary interest in having things go wrong. Robbers and thieves delight in conflagrations, because of the opportunities they offer for plunder. The doctors have no interest in having the climate salubrious, and undertakers are never so prosperous as when deaths are numerous. The lawyer prefers discord to contentment and the soldier delights in war, because war usually brings either death or promotion. So in matters of government—those who call themselves the state, namely, the officers, have one interest, and the people themselves have another that is directly the opposite. The law-makers want large revenues and large receipts, while the people delight in nothing so much as low taxes and light burdens of all kinds.

Government, or the state, ought to be a model for the people in all things, and yet in too many cases it sets a bad example which the people are too prone to follow. So long as the officers of the government are dishonest, unscrupulous and rascally, how can we expect the masses who are under them to be any better? People as a rule fail to appreciate how much our government has to do with determining men's morals and shaping their character and conduct. The Bible in which we believe has also a powerful influence in the same direction. But when the Bible gives us such models as Moses, David and Solomon, what progress in

government can be expected while people place their whole faith in such a book as that?

It is true we have in these days more government than they had in olden times, with more laws, more conditions, more restraints, more taxes, more burdens and more schemes than were ever known before. But is this a sign of progress? Is this to be taken as an evidence that people are happier or better than they were? To my mind, if these facts prove anything, they prove directly the reverse.

THE MATTER OF BELIEF.

A change in one point of a man's belief implies a corresponding change in the remaining portions of his belief. When people disbelieve in the existence of a devil, they must from that fact alone cease to believe in the Christian religion in its pure and original form. According to Christ's teaching, God is the father, he is the good spirit, while the devil, on the other hand, is the contriver of evil, the tempter and persecutor of men—the bad spirit in the proper sense of the term. But when the devil disappears from the stage, and there is one spirit instead of two, a radical change must arise at once in the character and status of God himself. So, again, when we cease to believe in literal immortality, in the life of the body after death, in happiness to reward the good and in sorrows and pangs to torment and punish the wicked, we cease to believe in Christianity in the ordinary acceptation of the word. Such being our belief, we practically discard Christ as the mediator of mankind, and we reject the Bible, the New Testament, at least, if not the Old. We even reject God as being the Almighty, for if God does not punish, he certainly is not God, he is not the law-giver and the ruler of the universe. There is no middle ground in this business, a man either believes or disbelieves. As Christ says, people are either with him or against him—to be half and half is impossible.

The consequence of these new beliefs which begin to prevail

among intelligent people, is that men have changed their whole idea of evil. They do not believe in evil in the true and normal sense of the word. What seems to be a present evil may turn out to be an ultimate good. But if there is no real evil, if evil itself is actually a good, why should we have punishment? As men are coming to view things nowadays, everything is necessary, everything comes from one and the same source, and is part of one and the same plan. Then, how should anything offend man? There is nothing that is bad, nothing that really deserves our resentment, and for this reason even our enemies are our friends and we should not hate or persecute them. How noticeably different is a man's treatment of his enemies and antagonists now from the treatment that was measured out to enemies up to within a century since! And how the number of our enemies and of the men we hate has diminished within the last fifty years! Not a great while since every man outside of our family, our tribe, our city, our country, our faith, was our enemy, and as such it was our duty to rob him or kill him if we found an opportunity. Now things are entirely different among civilized men. No man is our enemy for more than the present moment, while our rage lasts and the devil remains master of our heart. We fight a man to-day and cut his throat, if we have a chance; to-morrow we are ready to strike a treaty of peace with him and draw him to our bosom as our long-lost brother. Was that not the way things went when the war of the Rebellion ended? The two sides could hardly love each other enough, when they met—at least, that is what they have been saying to each other ever since the smoke of the battle-fields lifted in 1865.

Under such a theory and such a state of things as this, what use have we for prisons and chains, or for punishments of any kind? We have at last learned that even our enemies have rights, feelings and interests quite as well as we ourselves have, and that it is just as much their privilege, if not their duty, to antagonize us as it was ours to oppose them. This is the new

religion, the revolutionary thought, that, in all matters that pertain to social life, is to-day changing the face of things throughout the civilized world. We are even becoming conscious, slowly but certainly conscious, of the fact that criminals are merely our enemies and opposers, and as such they are entitled to all the forbearance and fair treatment that is usually accorded to our enemies in the field, when they are so unfortunate as to be taken prisoner.

What we have shown to be true in regard to a change of views on certain points in religion, would also be found to be true if we came to consider changes of opinion in regard to matters of government. When a man begins to see that there is little need of government in families, he will also soon see that there is little need of government in schools, or in institutions of any kind, and when he gets so far as to see that government, in its ordinary application, is not needed in families or in schools, he will finally begin to doubt that government is necessary in any of the affairs or relations of life.

A few words might be added in this connexion in regard to false beliefs. It is really surprising to observe how much has been accomplished in the history of this world through the medium of false theories, or false hypotheses. In fact it may be well to remark that all theories prove to be false in the end, no matter how popular they may have been at some time. Every theory has its day, and one that is held to be sound at present, is sure to be discarded by everybody as unsound at some future day. It is a curious fact that people seem to get along as well in many cases on a false theory as on a true one. When a man finds which is the wrong road, he often ascertains which is the right one, for if it is not this one on this side, it must be that one on that side. There is a good sound basis for every theory, as there is a reason for every thought, even for one which is considered most idle and senseless.

We have had wrong theories in the matter of religion, government and law, but no doubt those theories, which have been

in vogue so many centuries, have done humanity some good, as well as much harm. For many hundreds of years people have believed that it was alike proper and necessary that men should obey and suffer. That was the doctrine our Bible taught, and as men believed in the Bible, they accepted its doctrines as sacred and infallible. But now that people are coming to ignore the Bible as authority, they discard some of the doctrines which that book teaches. Instead of referring to the Bible, men consult their own hearts and inquire whether it is right that one man shall govern other men. That is the great question that is now under consideration all over the world, especially in Europe and America.

The trouble is, or rather has been, that people believed the Bible too faithfully and that they took its contents too literally. The Bible made civilized men what they were in the Middle Ages. Although the people believed themselves to be Christians in those days, they became, mainly through the influence of the Bible, at the same time intolerant, hard-hearted and barbarous.

The articles which have thus far appeared in this work are preliminary in character, and the purpose of their introduction was to prepare the way for a better understanding of the new doctrine to which the following pages are especially devoted, namely, *that no man has a right to govern or judge other men: that no man has a right to demand tribute or sacrifice from others, and that no man has a right to apply force and punish his fellow man under any circumstances or in any manner.*

FREEDOM FOR FREEMEN.

There is absolutely no foundation for the claim that is usually put forth that one individual should exercise authority over other individuals. The strongest claim in that direction that could be brought forward would be that in the case of the parent and the child. But the only ground that could be given for the exercise of authority in the case of the parent would be the lack of intelligence on the part of the child, and the likelihood of its going astray without parental guidance and restraint. However, in society, that would be a dangerous doctrine, if carried to its ultimate consequences. It would lead to a government by the strong over the weak, whether that weakness was one of body or mind. It would lead to despotism in all cases where there is no power or ability to resist. But no one at the present time dares to maintain the doctrine that justice and strength are synonymous, or that justice and strength have any relations whatever.

Shall we be allowed to coerce people in any case and force our ideas upon them? Most certainly not. We have no right to insist that it is our privilege to compel men to adopt our ways and take our medicine, even when we believe that our ways and our remedies would result in a benefit to them. To advocate such a doctrine would be decidedly dangerous. It would be a defence for any despotic or arbitrary course which a man might choose to pursue. Such a doctrine would lead to the end of all liberty. As a matter of fact, all men who are not slaves are as capable of

deciding what they want and what they ought to have as they would be if they were the wisest and strongest men in the world. They may make a mistake in their preference, or in their line of action, but to make mistakes is one of the privileges of all human beings, so long as those mistakes do not injuriously affect other parties.

Where does the state get its authority to make a slave of me, to place me under its feet and trample me in the dust? "Unfortunately," is the reply, "you were born in this country, and hence you must submit to its rules and government. We must have government and everybody must submit, or we could not get along. A man must submit to government, even though he knows it to be unjust." Yes, that is the old, old plea, and it has been heard at different times and on different occasions ever since men began to make history. Kings have made this plea, tyrants have made it, and even rascals and robbers have found it very serviceable in justifying their wicked proceedings. And so men have patiently submitted to continued wrong and injustice, believing that because things have always been so, things must always remain so. Kings, tyrants, robbers and rascals are not wholly, perhaps, not principally, to blame in this matter. The people surrender too readily and they bear the yoke of slavery too submissively and cheerfully. When despotism finds such a wide and well-beaten path presented to view, what is to prevent it from entering that path at its pleasure?

There never was a greater mistake made by mankind than when they were induced to believe that the world could not get along without a large amount of state rule and state management. What reason is there for doubting that we could get along well with nine-tenths less state machinery than we now have? Suppose we did not have so much government, so many departments and so many officers, so many laws, so many public buildings, so many salaries, and finally such enormous taxes to pay, who is there who would declare that we could not get along just as well as we are doing now?

The desire to rule, to govern, to administer laws! Why should any one have such a morbid appetite as this, unless possessed of a brutal and selfish nature? If people want their own way, as most people do, why should they not be permitted to have it, provided it is not at the expense of some other person? And still people will go on struggling to bend others to their will, and seeking to mould them in such a manner as to best fit their plans, their notions and their purposes! What people really want is to be let alone—in that freedom essentially consists—and so long as they are not doing any harm to others, it would seem that so much should be conceded to them.

Government itself implies an absence of freedom. The more freedom there is, the less government there must be. It is nonsense to talk of having both freedom and government for the same people or persons at one and the same time. Freedom implies an absence of outside restraint, but where there is government there must necessarily be restraint to some extent.

It is the height of absurdity to talk about the freedom of individuals in a state where they are constantly hampered and harassed with a thousand unnecessary conditions and obligations, and where they are kept constantly on the alert for fear they will transgress some new law or regulation and thus find themselves landed eventually in a prison, a jail or a mad-house. Where there is so much innovation and so many changes of law, there cannot possibly be much liberty. And this state of things arises wholly from the determination of some men to either rule or ruin. Men who are possessed of power seem to have only two leading motives: one is to advance their own interests and gratify their own desires, and the other is to force their ideas upon other men and compel the acceptance of those ideas as law, no matter how great the cost may prove to be to others.

Freedom consists not, as many suppose, in an absence of restraint in some things, coupled with the most oppressive subjugation in other things. Even the slave is permitted to do some things according to his own will and preference. But for

all that, he is none the less a slave. A man to be free should be free at all times and in all respects. Part freedom is an illusion ; part freedom is only a source of aggravation. A man who has no idea of what freedom is, because he has never had any freedom, is not apt to feel its absence like one who has enjoyed freedom and therefore knows what its blessings are. A man who assumes to be the master of another, should be his master in all things, and should care for him as he would for a mass of inanimate matter that is known to be destitute of both sentiment and will.

How absurd it is to talk about freedom and independence even in a country like ours in America ! How utterly powerless are the people of this country after all ! How completely are they in the power of their rulers, even though these rulers hold their power only for a limited time ! Suppose the people of the community, of any city or of any county, want a certain wholesome law passed or a rule established, could they be sure of having it ? No, they would be pretty sure of not getting it. In themselves they are utterly dependent and helpless. They must wait, they must petition, labor, beg. They must fee a man here and bribe another there. And when the business is all through, they are very likely not to get what they asked for after all. Their bill must first pass one house and then another house, and it must finally have the signature of the governor. In these two houses there are men with a great diversity of interests and opinions ; they are men with all sorts of characters and representing many kinds of business and professions. Every man there has his own individual axe to grind first, and then if he has any time left he will look after the interests of his constituents. He is very tardy in granting the requests of the people, unless his own interests are advanced at the same time. But suppose the bill passes both houses. It goes to the governor and must be signed by him before it becomes a law. Perhaps the governor belongs to a different party from the one which controls the legislature at the time. Perhaps he has some

prejudices against the bill or against the one who introduced it. In that case the governor vetoes the bill and, if no two-third vote can be secured to pass it again, it fails to become a law, and all the money and time expended in securing its passage goes for naught. It must not be forgotten that under this boasted republican form of government of ours, the supreme law-giver after all is he who possesses the veto power. If a man has a just and clear case and takes it to a court, he runs some chance of getting what he is honestly entitled to. But not so with a claim or request that must be presented to congress or a legislature. The business of our legislature is not to dispense justice, but to pass such laws as are found to be for the interest of the members of the dominant party.

When will people be able to get it into their heads that there is just as much government in a republic as there is under any other system of government? It is only a change in arrangement, and there is merely another set of rulers selected in a different manner from that which prevails under other forms of government—nothing more. It should not be forgotten that through no possible contrivance can men be governed, unless there is some one to govern them; and the more government there is, the more men must be governed in some way. A man may have some preference as to who shall rule him, but he is a slave just the same, no matter how his master happens to be chosen. And yet, in face of all these facts, people still imagine that under a republican form of government they necessarily get more liberty than they would under any other form. Such is the influence exerted upon the minds of men by a name or an idea.

When a state begins to encroach upon the liberties of individuals, there is no limit to its invasions and no point where it can be depended on to stop. Among other prerogatives that the state claims as its own, the leading one is, to make men do right. But such a thing cannot properly come within its province. The state has no special gift by which it is better

able than others to decide what is right. People are generally quite as able to determine what they ought to do as the state is. There ought to be something above government and anterior to it to induce men to do right and avoid wrong. Conscience, custom, religion, education and public opinion ought to have more influence in this direction than all the powers of government combined. It is absurd to establish censors over the people with a view of compelling them to do certain things and leave others undone. Censors are but ordinary men, and usually they are very ordinary men at that.

But why should the state not be omnipotent, seeing that the individual has put himself wholly in its power? For all practical purposes, that is what he has done, and he has reserved to himself absolutely *nothing*. The state takes charge of his education, his health, his business, his property, his family and his pocket-book. There is not a thing to which he pretends to have title that does not really come from the state. Even his life is not his own, and it can be taken away whenever the state pleases. The state makes all the laws, and the power that controls the laws of a people *controls everything*. The people themselves, with all their boasted liberties, cannot make a single law: even a thousand or a million men could not make a law, because they have not the requisite authority, and hence their action would not be legal. That always settles the matter—what is not *legal*, no matter what else it is, amounts to nothing, *absolutely and unqualifiedly nothing*. That is a fact that people should never lose sight of.

The state is omnipotent—but the people, the people, are helpless! Let them try to resist or attempt to rebel, and they will see for themselves how utterly powerless are a thousand or a million of men, provided they are not on the side of the constituted authorities. Let them try it, and at once they will see that every gun, every fort, every ship, every soldier, every marine, every policeman, every judge, every lawyer, every court officer, and indeed the whole country at large is against

them. That is the reason that rebellion comes only at very long intervals; people that try it once are slow to try it again. Men usually think it is better to serve the devil and let him have his own way, than it is to take up arms against the government and suffer the consequences.

The state has freedom to do as it pleases—but the citizen has nothing that he can depend upon with certainty, except a condition of perpetual bondage. The state takes charge of all sales, contracts and business transactions generally; the state controls all the courts and manages the finances of the country; the church in most countries is allied with the state, and in all countries it is compelled to turn to the state for protection and assistance. The state controls all marriages, and establishes laws of inheritance. If a man marries a woman, she is not his wife unless the state ratifies the proceeding—just as in slave times the wife belonged not to her husband but to the master. A marriage that is not legal is no marriage at all. A man may be married for years and wake up some morning and find that the courts have annulled his marriage and made him a single man. A man may be the father of a dozen children and still they are not his children, in the legal sense of the term, unless he was married to the mother according to the due form of law. So a man may make a promise of any kind, and still it is not a real promise, it is not legal, it is not binding, unless it has the sanction of the law. A man can hardly draw the breath of life, unless he has the permission or sanction of the government under which he lives! *This is the kind of freedom that citizens possess in all the civilized lands of the earth to-day.*

How shall we consistently talk of freedom in this age of the world, when we dare not even make known what we think, and when even the community in which we live endeavors, to a large extent, to control not only our action but our belief? What should be freer than a man's thoughts? And if men should be permitted to think, why should they not also be permitted to express their thoughts without restraint or reserve?

Why should we be afraid of the truth in so many cases and try to suppress or conceal it in every possible way? It would seem that the truth would be what people would want at all times, and hence they would unite in promoting its discovery, but it is well known that, as a general thing, they do nothing of the kind. If all were encouraged to speak freely and act freely, we should have no dishonest or criminal conduct and people would seem to be what they really are. As it is now, people are in the habit of disguising their thoughts, feelings and purposes in every way possible. They know very well that if they say what they actually think, they run the risk of offending some patron of theirs, or perhaps they might lose their standing in society. Under such a state of things as now exists, people have every inducement to be dishonest and to deal with their neighbors in any but a candid way. How shall we ever know what people think, if they are not permitted to say just what they think? Is it any worse for people to speak badly of us than it is for them to think badly? People can do us little or no harm by speaking ill of us, when we have done no wrong and are deserving of no censure.

When freedom is found to be so simple a thing, and so easily obtained, why should any one be denied its possession for one moment? Greatest of all blessings, as it is, there is no true enjoyment without freedom. And yet how very few have ever been permitted to know what freedom really is, or what it would be, if men were less selfish than they are, and if nature were allowed to follow its ordinary and unimpeded course! The sources of freedom are inexhaustible, and yet it is a boon that is denied to all of us. Even our masters have their masters, and so on *ad infinitum*. Every man has his yoke; every man is branded somehow or somewhere—*he is somebody's man*. The vassal was under the baron, the baron was under the king, the king was under the pope, the pope was under the Almighty—and we might add that even the Almighty has never yet been permitted to do as he pleases. The Bible proves that fact clearly enough.

The question that arises, finally, in this connexion, is this: Why must men continue to toil and suffer, merely to please or gratify a few other people? We are compelled to help ourselves in the first place, and then we are called upon to help somebody besides. Why not have this order of things reversed, and instead of saying "let us help everybody," have it read the other way, so that everybody shall help us? That certainly would be nicer for us, if not for other people.

OBEDIENCE AND COMPULSION.

From the cradle onward and upward, and even downward to the grave, the first and almost the only important thing that is impressed upon our minds, is the duty of implicit obedience. Children, obey your parents, wives, obey your husbands, slaves, obey your masters, and in return, let parents, husbands, masters and everybody else, obey the law! These are the commands that are given us. We are also instructed to obey God, though we know not who God is, where he resides, or even what he desires. It is a remarkable thing that such poor, helpless creatures as we are should ever have been put into this world at all. We have been given strength of body and strength of mind, but we are strictly forbidden to make any use of our faculties, in any manner, on our own account. Everywhere around us we see signs put up which remind us to "keep off the grass" or "beware of the dog," and we continually hear sounding in our ears such words as these: "this is mine," "don't touch this," "don't make any noise," "obey the law." When we come to look seriously at our humble, helpless condition, we are led to inquire, in the words of a certain congressman at Washington, "where are we at?" or as another fellow stated the question: "What are we here for?"

Can it be that our sole mission and our chief occupation on earth is merely to obey the will of somebody else? But if such a rule is good for one, it must be equally good for all, and then

we should have a state of things where nobody followed his own will, but simply the will of another. Certainly that is the direction taken by all our teaching to-day. Everywhere we are taught to be a good slave—at home, in the church, in school, in society. Everybody must behave himself, and instead of doing as he himself thinks proper, he must do as some other person tells him he must. However, it is not at all strange that we have such instruction as that furnished by the state and the church, for without obedience and unhesitating submission, neither the state nor the church could exist for a moment. In this fact, I apprehend, lies the explanation of the tone of all our teaching. Power always seeks to perpetuate itself, and it can do so in no manner so successfully as through the obedience and the stupidity of the masses. If those who stand at the head of affairs can make the masses believe that the state is godlike in its nature, and that they could not continue to exist without its aid and protection, they will have gained complete mastery over these people and they can easily make them, what they uniformly are, their most willing and devoted servants.

We are continually told to obey the law! Obey the law! Obey not any and every law, merely because it is a law, but simply obey our law! We insist that men shall obey the laws, not because they are good and ought to be obeyed, but because they are *our* laws and *we* want them obeyed. How monstrous it is that we torture a man, imprison him, shut him up in a dungeon, load him with chains, make him suffer and weep, make him writhe and twist—for what? Simply because he refuses or omits to do what we order him to do. In doing these barbarous things, we are worse than the Holy Inquisitors, who really believed they were doing the will of God. The only single point of difference between those who tortured heretics in the Middle Ages and those who torture criminals at the end of the nineteenth century, is that the former served God and the latter serve only their masters. It will be noticed that they had not a single appliance or process which they used five hun-

dred years ago that is not used to-day by our officers of the law. We have our dungeons, fetters and chains, machines for torture, and those who have criminals in charge wring confessions from the prisoner by strategy, deception, or torture, precisely as was done in the worst times of the Inquisition.

Suppose a man does not obey our law. That makes him an outlaw, and he has not the rights of a human being after that. He is entitled to no recognition from civilized man. We can do anything with him that we choose. Men in this country, as well as in England and France, worship idols and the Bible, just as men did in former times. A man who does not reverence the law is for them the same kind of a man as were those among the ancients who did not reverence the gods. It will be remembered that we make and enforce moral law precisely as we make and enforce statute law. We do not simply insist upon our not being injured by others, but we want to lay down rules by which others shall govern their action, precisely as if they were children under age and we were their guardians.

The whole theory of ruling others, and punishing them if they refuse to be ruled, comes from our Bible, from the example set by God and his agents, the saints. God punished. God tormented with eternal torments—why should not man, his representative on earth, be privileged to do the same thing, in his own limited and imperfect way? The Bible, it will be noticed, is emphatically the book of submission, humiliation and suffering. Who shall dare to hold up his head in the presence of the wrathful, vengeful God, his master? Men sacrifice and suffer, and thus endeavor to save themselves for eternity. Not only do they suffer, but they make others suffer. But as men are now ignoring the Bible and its teachings, they come to be gradually more humane, more manlike. We do not punish and torment now as we did fifty years ago, and fifty years hence we will punish and torment still less. Men are coming to love their fellow man, rather than hate him. They not only love their fellow man, but all creatures and all nature besides.

However, though we are slowly improving, it must not be forgotten that in the worst days of Rome and Spain, in the days of the Inquisition, or even under Mohammed's rule, men never delighted more in the sufferings of others than they do to-day. It must not be forgotten that a man may be a savage and still have kind feelings. Savages love their relatives and friends quite as devotedly as men do now, and so did the ancients. And to-day, no matter how much of a Christian a man may be, nor how much he may adore his wife, his children, his fellows, his countrymen, or even his pet cat and dog, he nevertheless hates a criminal, a man who fails to obey the law, as fiercely as the savage hates his foes. Even Robespierre, the monster, had his redeeming qualities; he had his pets that he loved like other men.

The criminal has the same relations to us that the stranger had to the ancients. He is our enemy, he has no rights, and as such it is lawful to kill him as we would a wild beast. That is the feeling we have to-day towards a robber, a burglar, a murderer or a horse-thief. How we relish an account of a burglar's being shot and killed while crawling out of the window of a house he had unlawfully entered! How we delight to hear that an escaped prisoner, even though innocent, has been caught! And then, too, how we hate the man that is accused of treason, the counterfeiter, the perjurer, the bigamist, the common thief! How we do love to see them put into prison, and know that they will suffer torments for years! How many thousands of men would gather in from the country round about to see a man executed! How many scores would leave their business and strain every nerve to aid in catching a fugitive from justice! Indeed, are we in the least better than the Spaniards who delight in bullfights, or the ancient Romans who went into ecstasies over the slaughters of the arena? Every man has two, if not more, different natures which come to the surface according to circumstances. Because a man is good to-day, it does not follow that he will be good to-morrow. A man may be

very courteous to his customers, and yet very morose and disagreeable to his family. In fact, no man is good at all times. We all have our streaks, and weighed in a just and fair balance, when all the facts and circumstances are taken into consideration, one man or one woman is just as good as another man or another woman. Before God all are alike—whether a man is sane or insane, whether he is civilized or savage, whether he is a criminal or a Christian, in the presence of God it makes no difference. All men are God's children.

But what is the dreadful thing of which the offender is guilty? His sin is simply one of disobedience. He does not obey the law. It is not virtue, or morality or goodness that concerns or troubles our rulers, it is merely the question of obedience. Let the subject keep within the law, whether written or unwritten, and that is sufficient.

But people have a very mistaken idea as to what compulsion is and what it can accomplish. The universal opinion is that compulsion, if there is power enough behind it, can do anything and everything, while the truth proves to be that compulsion of itself can do nothing. How do we compel a man to do anything? Only by practically doing the work ourselves. We can perhaps move inert or dead matter, as a log for instance, but in that as in all other cases, the effort is wholly ours. The log of itself does nothing—it would not and could not of itself move even a hair's breadth.

How would we go to work to compel a man to do anything, to walk, for instance? We could not, had we all the power of the czar of Russia or of king Solomon of old, compel him to move one step. The will of men is something that cannot, will not, be controlled. Whether a man will walk or not, is wholly a question for himself to settle. Were he the poorest, humblest beggar in the world, he would not walk unless he chose to do so. Could we compel a man to talk? No, that has been very often tried and failed. But can we not compel a man to do anything? Can't the law, the government, the army, the police compel a

man to do this thing or that? No, the government, the army, the police are all alike helpless, when they come to the question of compelling an obstinate man to do anything that he has decided not to do. But are not the state, the king, the army powerful? Certainly they are, and still there is very little that the state or the army can do. It can do this, and this only, in controlling men's actions: it can cause pain and make trouble, it can punish, and that is just as far as its power extends over men. When the state talks about passing compulsory education laws, or any other laws, the design of which is to compel people to do things, it is talking nonsense. Thousands of laws are enacted that never amount to anything. If the people do not will, do not ratify the proposed law, it is a nullity. We see plenty of illustrations to that effect every year. The legislature is powerless, even the people themselves are powerless, against a man who fears nothing, not even death. We can imprison a man, we can hang him, but that is a very different thing from compelling him to do what we wish. In all such cases of assumed compulsion, we do the work ourselves and the fearless man does nothing, absolutely nothing. Suppose a heretic does not choose to recant, who can make him do so? His enemies can burn him, but that does not make him recant.

What, then, is the power of a conqueror or king, and whence is it derived? What a king or conqueror does is accomplished by the people. Without the help of those who of their own will follow the conqueror, he could do nothing. The people are not compelled by the conqueror, they simply consent and submit, if they do not actually agree to his action. Neither Alexander nor Napoleon was personally more powerful than ordinary men. But they both had the skill and the ability to make available for themselves the power of other people.

The greatest tyrant the world has ever seen held his place simply by the tacit consent, or the cowardice and stupidity of the masses. A minority frequently rules a majority, because the latter does not choose to act, or because it overestimates the

power of the minority. There is no compulsion about the business. It is not numbers or strength that counts so much as tact and skill. Every king, every tyrant is merely an agent or representative, and it is not possible for him to change that relation. A single individual can do little of himself—he does great things only because he is permitted to do them and is aided in his efforts by others. In practice any one man can usually do of himself about as much as any other man and no more. It will be noticed that kings and conquerors understand their feebleness as well as other people. They know quite well that without followers they are lost. A king is always careful to have it understood that he is working through a power that comes from some higher source than himself—from heaven, perhaps, or from the people. Kings must always be crowned, ordained; they never attempt any great undertaking without having the people, apparently at least, ratify their action in some way. Before a king is really a king, there must be a ceremony of some kind, just as there must be a formality in making laws.

When the people get really tired of a tyrant, he goes down directly, just like any other puppet or scarecrow. When the people take it into their heads to rebel, there is always a smash-up of some kind. The greatest conqueror in the world is powerless to prevent a rebellion. Tyrants are peculiarly subject to such mishaps. Many a one has lost his head by going too far and worrying the people too much. No, really, the conqueror is not a big man after all—only just so far as the people consent to his playing such a part. When his followers leave him, the lion's skin drops off, and he appears, as he actually is, a very little man. A man's strength, as a rule, depends upon his ability to organize and keep certain elements together—the barons, the commons, the bourgeois, or the army, for example. So it is in politics. What an insignificant little fellow a boss is, when the people decide to let him down so that he appears for just what he is! There were Tweed, Conklin and Blaine, of recent date,

and Aaron Burr and Martin VanBuren in earlier days. I repeat, a man's strength lies wholly in his following, and is entirely outside of himself. Is it not evident enough that the people are not compelled to do as we see them do?

When people submit, it is only because they choose to submit. Even a slave might never cease resisting, if he really chose to do so. All the power that men have, save a little strength of body, is what is given them by others. No man can make another man move. Men move only from inward impulses. The state cannot compel a man to pay his tax. It can take some of his property, or cut off his ears or shut him up in prison, but that is a different thing from compelling him to pay his tax. No man can plead compulsion as an excuse for committing any crime, for the simple reason that he cannot be compelled. He may be afraid of some bodily harm, but that is no excuse at all for wrong doing. No man can justify himself for doing wrong, on the ground merely that he has derived some benefit therefrom or avoided some injury thereby.

The conclusion that we arrive at is that there is much less compulsion in this world than is commonly supposed. Indeed, we are led to doubt that there is really any such thing. When the conqueror rules or leads his people, the power he exercises over them is not physical. The people follow him because they are magnetized in some way; it is a matter of enthusiasm with them, or perhaps of timidity or stupor. A king can have his enemy's head chopped off, but only provided his followers consent to do it. He must always consult his followers, and secure their expressed or implied approval. But the most ordinary man in civil life can have the same thing done, if he proceeds properly. He can have his enemy hanged according to law, if he can succeed in having him accused of crime and afterward proved guilty. There is absolutely nothing that a conqueror can do or that the state can do, that a common man could not also do, if he were in the same position and had the requisite support. Great men are usually men of great opportunities, rather

than of extraordinary gifts. They usually have some striking talents, but they never have any that are not possessed by thousands of other men. Without the Directory, Napoleon would have lived and died a common soldier: without the war of the Rebellion in this country, Grant would never have been anything more than a tanner or a farmer in the West.

It is not alone the state that is powerless to enforce its commands, even God, the Almighty, is as helpless in this respect as the state. If God had any real power, and if he knew he possessed it, he would simply command, and there would be no question about his being obeyed. Most certainly, if God really was the Almighty, he would simply make his wishes known, and that would be the end of the business. However, God is fully aware of his weakness, and so when he commands, he knows very well that it is a matter of the greatest uncertainty whether he will be obeyed or not. Hence his commands all take the alternative form: men can obey or not obey, as they choose, but if they do not obey, they must suffer the consequences. Even God, though he can make laws, cannot compel the humblest creature of earth to obey him, and that is the reason why he falls back upon a system of rewards and punishments, as he uniformly does.

In view of all these facts, how absurd it is to talk about the power of God, the power of man, the power of the state, the power of the law or the court, in any literal sense! Every creature in this world does as it pleases, and if it does not please, it does not do at all. It should be noted that God governs wholly by promises and threats, the very worst method of government that has yet been tried—and man, naturally enough, follows the example set by his illustrious Master.

The time must come when men will have new ideas of power, and when the word will have an entirely new interpretation. There is in all nature no such thing as power, if we mean by the term any control exercised by one thing over another. Matter is certainly dead and powerless, and if there is

power anywhere, it must be in the spirit. But we have yet to learn what the spirit is, or whether there really is such a thing as spirit.

God is our master only so long as we recognize him as such. A man is our boss only so long as we decide to recognize him as boss—it is a matter that lies wholly within ourselves to say whether we will follow this boss, that boss, or no boss at all. This is unquestionably so in politics, and it is so in all other cases. A sovereign implies a subject, and where there is no subject, there can be no sovereign. People make a great mistake when they assume that they are *obliged* to recognize any man as a sovereign or any being as God. No man is actually obliged to do anything. Obedience is strictly a matter of the will; no man is obedient, unless he obeys willingly. What a man is forced or compelled to do, could not come under the head of obedience. Every man does what he prefers to do; sometimes a man knowingly prefers one evil to another evil. A man often prefers to obey rather than suffer pain or punishment, but in that case what he does is of his own free will, and there is no compulsion connected with the business. In fact, the only reason why men submit is simply because they are afraid; if men had no fears, there would be no masters, no gods.

It might be added that it is not in the matter of government alone that men always make things as they are for them. With us, everything depends upon the conceptions we form and the belief we have. If we believe in a God who is a ruler, then there is such a God, for us. If we believe in ghosts and witches, we will certainly find them, but a man who does not believe in such things never sees them. It would be impossible for us to believe in what did not exist, for ourselves. All there is in life for us, is what we believe. Luther believed in devils, and he encountered them everywhere. For him devils were as much a reality as the moon and stars. If people believe in a hereafter, there is a hereafter, for them. There must be a solid, substantial foundation for everything that any man believes. All there is of truth, for us, is what we believe.

EQUALITY AND SLAVERY.

It is often contended that men are born free and equal. But it needs no argument to prove that no man was ever born free. He is hampered by a thousand conditions, in various ways, and he is not really free to move either hand or foot. Sometimes he can do what he wills, and sometimes he cannot. What he does, depends entirely on circumstances and conditions outside of his control. In all cases he must wait till the conditions are favorable. Conditions are his master. Neither are men, any two men, born equal. It would seem to require no great amount of reflexion or evidence to be convinced of that fact. If all men were born of the same parents, in one family, and always lived in one town, there might be some approach to equality. But even then there would be great differences, as there always is, between members of the same family. One child is stronger than another and more healthful; one is more apt than another, or more diligent or more ambitious; one child is more amiable, another is more willful or more intractable than another; one is easily managed and yields readily to impressions, while another is stubborn and requires an entirely different method of treatment. The difference among children becomes more emphasized and more strongly defined as the children grow older and finally become men and women.

No government can ever succeed which is founded upon the theory that men, being equal, must all have the same place in life, must perform the same kind of labor in all cases, and must occupy the same positions in society. Such a thing is, of course, absolutely impossible. It never has been done and never can be. No two trees or two plants were ever made alike, and God evidently never intended that they should occupy exactly the same piece of earth, or that one should grow up in the place of the other. On the contrary, on whichever side we look, in this world, we see variety and dissimilarity.

But while no two persons are alike and no two can be expected to occupy the same place, or perform the same identical service in life, it does not follow that one is better than another or is entitled to any milder or more favorable treatment in any respect. An elephant is stronger than an eagle, but that is nothing for the elephant to boast of when it compares itself with the eagle. No one can rightfully boast of any gift that has come to him from nature. The idea of privileges and honors should never be encouraged in society. Each one should fill his place and perform his duty to the best of his ability, and the noblest and worthiest of the group could not possibly do better. This being true, how could we justly honor one and not honor the other? If one man can lift five hundred pounds and others but one hundred, that fact is neither to be placed to the credit of one nor to the discredit of others. No man can do what he cannot do, nor more than he is able to do. It is not even just to compare one man with another in any respect. They are two separate and distinct beings, and there is no chance to compare one with the other. Who would think of comparing a horse with a bridge, or a house with a raven, or a child with a man? Again, I repeat, there is no chance for any just comparison in any of these cases. So it is in all the affairs of life. How shall we fairly say that one man deserves more honor or greater privileges than another? It would be impossible that he could deserve anything of the kind.

So I would in no case put one man above another, or make one man the servant of another. In all cases there should be equal rights and equal opportunities for all, so far, of course, as the circumstances of the case would allow. Absolute equality in the way of opportunities and privileges is something that can never be attained, but it should always be approximated. If in the nature of the case, there must be division of labor and a difference of employment to a greater or less extent, it does not by any means follow that there should also be difference in caste or rank. No trade or business can properly be considered

to be above or better than another. Rank is no more a necessary thing in society than it is in a public school, or in any other organized body of individuals. A man may be chosen as a guide or leader because of certain qualities or gifts that he possesses, but that should bring him no honor and give him no authority over his fellow men. The chief of a barbarous tribe is a leader, but he is never a master. The members of the tribe obey his directions or not, as they see fit. The idea that a leader must necessarily be a master, is one of comparatively recent date. The idea that because a man is strong, or has powerful followers, he shall be a despot, is something that cannot be charged to the account of barbarous people. Savages do not even punish their children, as men do in the civilized state. Slavery is a development, or an invention rather, of civilization. The old Germans had no slaves—even their wives were free. All the men were free men, and as such they had their voice in council. They went into council armed—it was the government that had no arms. They followed their leaders in war, but the commands they obeyed came from the priests, and they imagined that these commands were messages direct from God. In peace they had no governors. We speak of the Germans as they were known before being overcome by Cæsar. After their conquest by the Romans, 1,900 years ago or more, the Germans and their customs changed very rapidly. The work of civilization had begun. The Germans before Cæsar and the Germans whom Tacitus describes, were quite different people. A few decades had sufficed to produce wonderful changes for that race. Cities had begun to appear, landed property had been established and wealth had come to prevail. That poverty and slavery should follow such developments, is what might have been naturally expected. It will be remembered that these old Germans were our ancestors.

As civilization advances, men lose their liberties—though their masters often deceive them with the pretence that their liberties are retained. I know very well that the term slavery

is not usually applied in connexion with bondage as it exists under the state. But I am not able to find the slightest difference between that and any other form of slavery. A slave is simply a man who is in the power of another, and any man who is wholly in the power of another must be a slave. Is this not the case with every man who is held in subjection under the law and officers of a state? A slave is a man who owns nothing, as between himself and his master, and when he performs any service, he gets no pay for his work. He may be allowed to retain enough of what he produces to keep himself from starving, but that is all. Are not these the exact relations which exist between the subject and the authorities of a modern state? The state can take his house, his land and even his life. Every title to property that he possesses is held under the state. The state calls upon the subject to perform some ordinary or some extraordinary service, without giving any compensation, just as the feudal barons made demands for services upon their vassals, because those services were *due* to them. When the subject gathers his crops, he must always give a portion to the state, under the familiar name of "taxes." The old name was "tithes." If the subject has nothing left, and his family starves, the state has no concern about such a small matter. The tribute must come. The masters of these slaves, namely, the officers of the state, are generally careful to leave the subject something with which to sustain life and continue another year, because if they did not do that, they would be obliged to look for their tribute in the future to some other source. Those oppressive burdens called "taxes," are, like slavery, to be classed with the other peculiar features that characterize civilization.

Must an officer of the state necessarily be our master? Is an employer necessarily a master, a ruler over those whom he employs? Formerly he was, but he should not be so now. Officers ought to be agents, they ought to be mere instruments through which certain work is done, but in no case should they

have any controlling power over others. They should do their duty, and if those in other relations did not do theirs, it would be no cause of reproach for them. The officer is not responsible for what the people refuse to do. *In no case should there be coercion.*

John Stuart Mill says: "Obedience is the first lesson of civilization." This is true, but true only because slavery is one of the earliest developments of civilization. Obedience always implies slavery; before we can have obedience, we must have a command, and no man gives a command, at least with authority, but the master. So, no one obeys any one but his master; to his equals a man yields because he wills, but to his master he yields because he must. Of course when a man obeys the will of some one else, he does not obey his own will. That must be evident enough.

Every man in civilized life is a slave, and because he is a slave, he is, in his intercourse with his fellow man, to a greater or less extent, a hypocrite and a coward. Indeed, a slave can never be anything less than a coward and a hypocrite. As a matter of fact, it is so common, and it is looked upon as a thing so usual and proper to fawn, flatter and deceive others, in our daily intercourse with men, that we do not realize for a moment that our conduct is in any way improper or reprehensible. Lying, lying everywhere and at all times, in the church, in politics, in diplomacy, in social life, has become so common and so popular a pastime, that it is looked upon as an excusable weakness, or at least as a pardonable sin. Why, state lying in all transactions, and especially in dealing with foreign nations, either in times of peace or war, is always regarded as justifiable, when any advantage is to be gained by dishonest and tricky practices. It is well known that in the early history of Christianity, the saints taught that the end justified the means, and therefore lying was exceedingly common in those days. It must be observed that there is something beyond law and custom that enslaves people. The slavery that

comes from the homage paid by the client to his patron, in all the departments of business life, is quite a noticeable phenomenon. There is no tyrant so exacting, so unrelenting, as the patron or employer, and there is no slave so cringing, so apprehensive and submissive as the ordinary client or employee. Men who without the restraint of patronage would be as straight as a tamarack, become very weak in the vertebral column, and they bend over and grow quite out of shape, from a habit they have contracted of crouching and cringing to every patron or employer who makes a demand on them.

There is really no free thought, or at least no speech really free, in any civilized land at present. Men have to be very circumspect in all they do, and they are naturally very careful what they say and to whom they say it. As matters are now arranged, and as things are now constituted, it is not a prudent thing for people to speak the truth at all times, and not a safe thing to speak the whole truth at any time. It is far better for men to dissemble—a fact that is so well known that most people do dissemble more or less. When people have to depend upon others for the money that gives them their subsistence, they are not so apt to be telling everybody all they know or all they think. The most prudent thing for a slave to do, is to consult his master before he makes any special remarks, and that is the way that people usually do who live in a country where every step is cadenced according to law or custom. It often happens that, for some reason or other, the master prefers to have the slave keep his mouth closed and his tongue quiet.

It is evident enough that no man can be part slave—a man either is a slave or he is not a slave. If he is a slave at all, he is a complete slave, and so every man in civilized life is a complete slave. He does a few things of his own free will—but only because he is permitted, only because it is lawful. Slavery extends its ramifications into all the departments of social life, and its influence trammels every man and, to a large extent, it

controls his action. Does not every sensible man, before making any move or taking any step in life, first of all inquire : “ Is it lawful, is it permitted ? ”

In considering the working and effects of power still further, it should be noticed that law binds and holds down ; law rather prevents than encourages development. All advancement made in science or art is made in opposition to law and precedent. Law never provides for things new or unknown. Law is conservative, but intellect is radical ; law holds fast to that which it has, but intellect is constantly looking for some new and undiscovered land.

It has been said before, and the fact ought never to be overlooked, that law, which is another name for force, never makes men good or virtuous, or even wise. Neither laws, nor masters, nor chains have a tendency to make men either virtuous or noble, but rather the reverse—that much seems to be established beyond question. We must obtain goodness and excellence from some other source. Force can neither develop nor sustain virtue ; force is the weapon of tyrants, and in society it is used mainly for the purposes of tyrants.

In its present stage of development, law has nothing to do with virtue or goodness, and it will be remembered that this is strikingly the case with religious law as laid down in the Old Testament. In Old Testament times, doing a man’s duty consisted solely in worshiping God and obeying the law—and doing a man’s duty is not materially different from that at the present time. Obeying the law is a man’s whole duty to-day. A man who obeys the law can be as wicked and immoral as he likes ; when he has done that, nothing more can be required of him. After he obeys the law, he can do as he pleases.

Is it not plain that we cannot speak of the virtue or goodness of a slave, of a man who is in chains, who is in the power of another and who can only do as he is permitted to do ? And is this not the condition of all men who are under the law, whether it is moral, religious or otherwise ? A man is good only

when he wills to be good, chooses to be good, desires to be good. We never call a man good who could not possibly be otherwise. A man is honest who acts honestly from his own convictions and inward impulses, and not from the force of circumstances, nor from the power of law nor from actual compulsion. No, we must first remove the fetters from a man before we can decide upon his character and call his qualities either excellent or the opposite. We must annul the law, we must have free men as the condition precedent before we can have a manly and progressive people. But as it is now, there is no free development or free action for man in any case. Really, free thought and free speech are things not known.

The condition of slavery may be considered to be the source of man's wickedness and of his general wrong doing. If we had no law, we would have no crime. If there was no restraint and men had no fears, they would have no motive for doing wrong. They would tell the truth at all times for the simple reason that they would have no reason for doing otherwise; they would do in every instance what they felt to be right, because they would see no object in doing anything different. I do not believe in the innate wickedness of mankind. Wickedness is something taught and learned. A man does bad deeds simply to accommodate himself to circumstances. With him such conduct is practically a necessity. Men do not lie to nature, they do not wrong nature. All of man's dealings with nature are strictly on the square. Nature never pretends to exercise the slightest control over man. Nature presents to him the conditions of the case and he meets them or he does not. If he does not, he uniformly fails.

And yet with all that has been said about slavery, it is a curious fact that we must have slavery in order to have freedom; if all were free, it would be the same as if none were free, or rather as if there were no such thing as freedom. Freedom rises and supports itself upon the foundation of slavery—from the slavery of some, the freedom of others comes. That

has at least been the history of the world thus far. So it is also with enlightenment and advancement—these things are always for the few. There never was a case where the whole people were enlightened ; it is the splendor of a few shining lights in a nation that is reflected by the whole body. And especially is this the case with wealth, the wealth of a people always implying the wealth of a few, while the great mass suffer from poverty and destitution.

OUR RIGHTFUL MASTER.

If it is really a fact that we cannot be trusted in this world without being governed by some men—in other words, without having a chaperon—it is well to inquire, who is the rightful master? Who is the one that is wiser than we are, and who is it that knows what we want and ought to have better than we do ourselves? According to the prevailing theory, we are merely subject to the will of others, and hence at every step we are compelled to ask, “What shall we do, and what must we leave undone?”

Where shall we turn to find the rules, orders and directions that shall guide us, and at last lead us safely to the promised land? Shall it be our Bible? But why not the Vedas as well, or perhaps Confucius, Zoroaster, or even Joe Smith? At least, why not the Koran, a book that is accepted and trusted by more people than our Bible is to-day? All these various books and authors differ materially from each other, and we have no doubt that one has just as much claim to being called standard and reliable as any of the rest have. Of one thing we feel certain, these works are all human productions, and the men who wrote or edited them were just such frail mortals as those are who write books at the present day.

Since these sacred books and authors thus differ radically from each other and one stands as high as the other ; since each one is adopted by one country and one set of men and rejected as

worthless by the people of all other countries, we are left to exercise our own judgment and to select and follow the precepts that suit ourselves best.

Again, how could we follow the Bible of our country as a guide of life? It is not adapted to the times and is not in harmony with the spirit of the people among whom we are called upon to live. It was meant for other men, in other days—for men with a different philosophy, with different surroundings, different aims and purposes and different capabilities from those of the men in this country at the present day. Most of the laws laid down in our Bible are now practically obsolete, and no one pretends to regard them as anything more than curious relics of the past. They were rules and ordinances laid down for another people in another age of the world, and every one knows that no Supreme Ruler ever made such regulations as those to govern all men in all ages of the world.

But since we could not safely or consistently follow the Bible as our guide and director, is there not some book of morals that we would dare to trust, with the assurance that by following its teachings we should always be kept in the straight and narrow way? There may be some such work, but unfortunately I have never been able to find it, and I very much doubt if such a book exists. All books of that character contain merely the views and theories of men, and while one points out one path as the one that should be followed by all, the others have each a different route which they are certain is better. But the views of these men cannot all be sound, for when theories differ, it is absolutely certain that some of them must be wrong.

Hence we are left with nothing to guide and direct us in life but our reason and common sense. Indeed, it is the only guide I have ever had; I would not recommend it, or insist upon any one's following the same guide, but I must say it has answered my purpose thus far exceedingly well. Thought, reflexion, judgment have always served myself admirably. Even in selecting my companions and my authorities, I have never

had anything but my reason to guide me. I find we must think, reflect, consider, compare, observe and inquire. In this way, while we may not gain wisdom, we are sure to get what serves us better than wisdom, and that is knowledge. In fact, every man should be his own master and have his own Bible.

If what I have said is true, and what I have claimed is sound, what do we really owe others, what are our duties and obligations to them? None, absolutely and unqualifiedly none. If we owe one, we owe all as well, but it is well known that it would be impossible for us to serve all or obey all. We came into the world a stranger—a poor, feeble, helpless being. We are the one that should be served. The strong need no service, no assistance. If there is any obligation at all in this world, it is not to some master; not to some one who is abler and stronger than we are, but to one who is poor and helpless. It is evident enough that we ought not to be taxed, worried and burdened simply to make soft beds, or perhaps grind axes, for other people. But notice the help we are called upon to render and the kind of service we are expected to perform. It is not the needy or unfortunate to whom we are called upon to pay tribute. No, the hard-earned money that we pay in tithes and taxes goes towards feeding and supporting an army of fortunate office holders, who usually have plenty of time and find very little to do—parasites, lords of creation, masters and monarchs, at least for the time being, if not for an indefinite period. Our tithes and taxes, which come around almost as regularly as the seasons, go farther than this. They help pay the salaries and furnish fine lodging for the judges of the land, for whom we have not the slightest use; they go to help build splendid edifices that we never want and perhaps will never see; they help maintain the army, the navy, and the police, for all of which we have no use whatever; the tithes and duties and taxes that we pay go to help the rich bind their fetters upon the poor and to enable the employer to keep the iron heel of a master upon his employees—they go, finally, to help collect other people's debts, defend other

people's property, educate other people's children and pay other people's bills generally. To all this I would enter my solemn protest. All I ask is to be let alone, and to be allowed to go my way as I like ; and if everybody else would be content with the granting of this simple request, we should require no taxes, and no government that would call for taxes. It will be noticed that all of our troubles in this world come not so much from our doing as we like as from an insane desire to have others do as we like. It must not be overlooked that while every individual is "he" or "you" for some one else, he is always "I" for himself, and that while we want our way, other people want their way likewise. Government makes the constant mistake of treating people as if they had no feelings or wishes of their own —in fact, as if they were mere sticks to be kicked about at the pleasure of any one who happens to be in authority. But what business is it to any one, properly considered, what we do? Suppose we drink, suppose we swear, suppose we spend our money foolishly, suppose we work little or will not work at all, suppose we go with strange women, suppose we drive fast horses, whose business or concern is it but our own ? Who has a right to interpose on the mere ground that we are making fools of ourselves and will by and by get into trouble ? When we finally get into trouble, we will probably understand that we have made fools of ourselves without being told.

Moreover, men may honestly differ as to what is foolishness, or even wickedness or vice, and what might be foolish or wicked under one set of conditions or circumstances, would not be deemed so foolish or so wicked under another set of circumstances. We grant religious rights and political rights to men. Why shall men not have civil and moral rights likewise ? We do not at this late day insist upon any man's having some particular religious belief ; we do not even insist upon his having a religious belief of any kind, if he does not prefer ; and so in regard to political ideas, we do not insist that all men shall belong to one and the same party or adopt one and the same

political creed. We even grant that they may not belong to any particular party, if such is their wish. Perhaps a man's religion or his politics displeases us, what of it? Possibly in return our religion and our politics are not very agreeable to him. Yet, no one thinks of insisting that either shall drop his politics or his religion and adopt that of the other. But that is precisely what we do in all matters that are covered by the moral and civil codes.

We have toleration in matters of politics and religion, but none whatever in matters of morality or questions of civil law. We insist upon measuring the daily conduct of men, not by their own standard, but by ours. We demand that they shall do not as they want to do, but as we do, and as we want them to do. And we do not by any means confine ourselves to cases where we are personally interested in the conduct of others. Whether we are affected by such conduct or not, makes no difference with us. We want men to do right, and more than that, we insist upon the privilege of telling others what is right. In fact, we want other men to be better than we are ourselves. We make the law, lay down the conditions, fix the standard and then demand that everybody (except ourselves) must square up to it. This is a monstrous doctrine, and it does not make the matter one bit better because it is very much in vogue to-day in all the civilized countries of the earth. Indeed, every man who does not do as we think he ought to do, we brand as a heathen and an outlaw, and we at once proceed to make war on him accordingly. The savages, however, have a different way. They never think of meddling with the private affairs of their neighbors. They have customs and traditions, but no laws beyond them. A savage is a free man, but a civilized man is a slave.

It will be remembered that it is only since Christ's time that men have undertaken, to any great extent, to control the conduct of others in private matters; and persecution because of one's belief is not much older than the Christian era. In ancient times men had to reverence the gods and obey their

rulers—their duties as citizens ended there. Before the birth of Christ, men were killed in battle, cities were destroyed, but individuals as a general thing were permitted to do as they pleased. If tribute was demanded, it came not from the individual, but from the city or tribe. To make men the slaves of law is decidedly a modern discovery. And yet people talk, absurdly enough, of making the enforcement of laws consistent with the freedom of individuals.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

No man should be the servant of another, no man should labor for another man for pay. Whoever sells his labor sells himself, and he is no more his own master. He is a slave, at least so long as his engagement lasts. Every able-bodied man should help himself, wait upon himself, provide for himself, and the same remark would apply to an able-bodied woman, or to a child that has passed the age of feebleness and immaturity. If a person should be helped at all, it is because of his disability, and not because of his rank or position, nor on account of the class or clan to which he may happen to belong. Those who labor in a subordinate place, should labor *with* others, rather than for others. Their place and position should be like that of the child in a family, or that of the apprentice in the old time guilds; or like the individual in a village or country town, where there are no ranks and where all stand upon the same platform. There should be no aristocracy anywhere. We have classes and castes only when the hearts of men are perverted and when they become selfish, arrogant and tyrannical.

A servant, we all know, was a slave (*servus*). There were originally no other servants than slaves. Servants after a time take the place of slaves; that is one of the stages in the transition. But there should be no sale of labor to-day. All men should be equally free men. Men might aid others as a kindness or favor, but *never for pay*. All men should earn their

own living, do their own work and *be their own servants and their own masters.*

It is known that service is only a form or modification of slavery. In feudal times there was no paid service. It should be remembered that all slaves are mere things. No laws are made for their benefit or for their protection. They have absolutely no rights. They are merged and lost in the owner—and so it is to a considerable extent with the servant. Slaves have no soul and there is no heaven for them. All the thoughts and conceptions connected with slavery arise from the mere accident of a man's being found in the power of another and left dependent upon his will. The misfortune in his case was that he happened to be the weaker one and so was subdued and brought under the yoke. Had he had more strength, more cunning or more skill, perhaps the case would have been entirely different. Then he might have been the master, perhaps, and the other fellow the slave. A man has just as much right to hold another man in bondage as he has to hold him to service. A servant is in our power, either from want or from some other cause, and if it were not for this fact, he certainly would not be our servant. That we pay a servant something for his services, and do not pay the slave, makes no difference in the real nature of the case. We have to support our slaves and we leave the servants to support themselves—there is the only difference. What we pay our servants is merely what supports them, and they often get a poorer living than they would if they were slaves. Even the horse that labors for us we are obliged to feed. We pay the servant merely because we would rather do that than furnish him the house, food and clothes that he would need, and in that way we have far less cause for concern than if he were our slave. If our servant were our slave, we would have to furnish medical services and all such things. Now we *pay* the servant, and there our obligation ends. It is but a little matter to us if the servant dies, for probably we know where we can get another servant for the same or even

less money. It is about the same as if we lose an ox or a horse. It is no wonder at all that slavery has been abolished! *It did not pay*, or at least it was not so cheap and so convenient as our present system of *hired labor*. When we tire of a servant, we can change him; but in the case of the slave the change is not so easily made. The slave is property, the servant is not.

If we did not have hired service, if we did not appropriate the avails of the labor of others, we should never become rich. Without slavery in some form, no people could accumulate *riches*. It would be only a few thousand dollars that any man of himself could earn and save even in a long life time. Yes, he might get rich by conquest, but the principle is the same. *We get our wealth always by taking what other people have earned and saved.* What difference does it make whether we appropriate a man's labor or his property? His property is identified with his labor. It has long been known that *no man gets rich by his own exertions, or his own labor*. A man might avail himself of the aid of all the powers of nature, the winds, the waves, the earth, and even then his labors would never make him really rich, not even if he lived to be a hundred years old. *All profits come from the labors of other people, and so do all per cents.* These, it is well known, are the main sources of wealth. I know very well that a man might manufacture an article, but he could never get rich in that way. The only way that men get rich by manufacture is by selling their wares for more than they are worth, or more than they cost. *Men get rich from profits and the profits always come from other men.*

How far should we ask or demand help from others? Shall others do our work for us, while we remain idle and receive the benefits of their labors? Perhaps we may with propriety assist the feeble, the unfortunate and the helpless by doing work that properly does not belong to us to do, but about our obligation in that direction, there is room for much question. However, whatever we do in this way should be done because we will, not because we ought or must. There is no reasonable basis for

any such obligation as that. It is a law of nature, if not of nature's God, that those who cannot help themselves must be left to fall by the way. To a great extent that is the rule that prevails in savage as well as in civilized life. It is evident enough that in modern life we do altogether too much to foster indolence and impotence, by the assistance that we are accustomed to render to those who appear to be needy. There is no possible question that the number of our paupers is greatly increased by our misguided charity in feeding them, instead of enabling them to feed themselves.

Again, I ask, on what ground can I justly avail myself of profits that come from what another man earns, either in whole or in part? Evidently there can be no foundation for any such claim. I have no more right to another man's labor than I have to his person or his property. There is no relation, no actual connexion of any kind, between any two independent beings. So, how could there be ties or obligations between them?

It is clear that I can only insist upon a man's working for me, on the condition that he is my slave or vassal. But can a man make a binding contract to labor for me—to sell himself to me and be my slave, even for a time? I apprehend not. It does not accord with our usual way of viewing things. There can be nothing valid or binding in a contract that involves the slavery of a human being. It is against the most vital interests of society.

The conclusion to the whole matter would seem to be this: Every man should do his own work, and never receive any recompense except the legitimate product of his own labor. Of course under such a condition of affairs, such a thing as riches or wealth as we have it now would be impossible, but the gradual disappearance of wealth would be no misfortune to the world.

One remark more—people who are compelled to employ help in any way must be content to remain dependent, they must, practically, be slaves to their own slaves. No man can be

called independent who is not able to provide for himself and do his own work. Dependence upon servants or slaves is just as bad as any other kind of dependence.

THE RIGHT OF SELF-CONTROL.

It is asked, how shall we have society without government? While it is an evil and without full justification, perhaps it is true that we cannot get along without some government. But that arises from the fact that there is much which we must yet learn. There is much in the realms of truth and fair dealing, evidently, that men have not yet discovered. Men ought to be able to have organization without government. Men ought to be able to associate together for the purpose of the common good without even being governed themselves or seeking to control the sentiments and conduct of others. Unfortunately there is much progress which we must yet make before such a step could be taken with any prospect of success.

But if we must have government, let us have the smallest amount of it that is practicable. The best of all governors is the one who governs the least. This is as true in the family as elsewhere, and more true perhaps there than in matters of state.

The right to govern implies the right to punish; without the right to punish there could be no government in the proper sense of the term. If the master had no means of inflicting punishment, no means of causing pain for disobedience of orders, he would have no control whatever, and the subject would obey or not obey, according as his wishes or fancy might dictate. There is no government without laws, either written or otherwise, and where there are laws, there must be penalties and punishments. No law is complete without a penalty, expressed or implied.

The prevailing tendency of thought at the present day is towards less punishment—less in families, in schools, in the state.

It is found that affairs proceed more smoothly, and there is greater satisfaction and contentment, where people are allowed to govern themselves and act upon their own responsibility, than where they are not. Men may be advised, instructed, and even directed, but no true man suffers himself to be driven like a beast. It is against every law of nature: it is against all the ordinary promptings of the human heart. No one can see what he does not see or cannot see. No man can see how it is or why it is that he should be a slave, to obey the will and whims of other men.

The whole doctrine of mastership, in all its forms, ramifications and developments, I emphatically discard. Even the father should not be a master over his family. He should be a guide, an adviser, an instructor, but never a despot, never an overseer, whose only argument is the lash. The father is much less a master now than he was in old Roman times. More and more, as truer knowledge and purer sentiments prevail, the father loses his authority and his right to parental control. He no more dares to kill his offspring, as at one time he might do; he dares not sell his children into slavery, in any truly enlightened country at the present time, though such a thing may still happen in those countries where despotism is the rule, both in the family and the state. Even beating and ill-treating children, though not strictly against the law, perhaps, is decidedly against the higher law of public opinion. No more is the family, in any civilized country, founded upon the doctrine of an unlimited monarchy; no more is the father the law-maker, the supreme judge in all things, the irresponsible tyrant whose will must be obeyed at all times, without question or consideration, and without hesitation. No more does the wife take the position of a slave without murmuring. No more is it conceded that children must be slaves merely because they are born of a slave.

Government in the state is built up on the theory of government in the family. The family has been the type of all state

government—it was so in its inception at least. As the theory of family government has changed, so the theory of state government has changed. Men are ruled to-day, but not ruled as men were ruled one hundred or five hundred years ago. Men are slaves still under the authority of the state, but they are slaves to whom new rights are granted and new concessions are made. Their manhood, or humanity, at least, is not denied them. Men are governed altogether too much yet, but it is some satisfaction to feel that they are governed more lightly now than they were some centuries since. They wear the shackles still, but they are fully conscious that they are shackles, rather than articles of ornament, and they will never rest contented until those ancient symbols of bondage are finally removed.

Until recently there has been liberty for only a small portion of mankind. There has been liberty for the father, but none for the family ; there has been liberty for the master, but none for the slave ; there has been liberty for the king, but none for the subject. Until recently, throughout Europe, as still is the fact throughout Asia and Africa, nine-tenths of humanity has been held in the most helpless bondage. Even in enlightened Greece, liberty was only for the few—the great majority of men in that country being, as it is well known, slaves. So it was in Rome ; so it was all over Europe for at least 1,500 years. The old Germans originally were all free men, but under the authority and influence of the Roman empire, from the early centuries of the Christian era down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, slavery prevailed everywhere in Europe.

But it must be evident that if there is a right to the use of force in government, there must be equally a right to resistance on the part of individuals. So, it would be seen that force would be required to settle all questions. But why should either force or resistance to force be necessary ? *It is the writer's belief that no force should be used in any case, and consequently no resistance would be possible.* There can be no reaction unless there is action in the first place. If people cannot unite and associate

and live together on friendly terms, they should certainly separate. If it is once conceded that every man may of right say and do as he pleases, there can never be any need of calling in the help of force.

The use of the word government should be abolished, or at least we should avoid the exercise of government in schools, in families, in communities and the state. Does the wise father busy himself with governing chiefly, with a view to giving evidence of his power or his arbitrary disposition? Is that the course which the successful teacher pursues in school? No, the teacher does not govern, does not punish. He leads, he advises, he guides, he instructs. The term master is getting to be obsolete. Men do not need masters in any of the walks of life. Do we see much attention given to governing or mastering in well-ordered corporations? No, the term in that connexion is little used. The employee meets the conditions given by his employer, or he does not. If he does not, he speedily takes his departure. So in schools. There is no need of governing, no need of inflicting punishments of any kind. Governing and punishing belong together—and in the end they must go down together. The wise preceptor lets the pupil govern himself and punish himself. If he does wrong, he suffers the natural, inevitable consequences of his error. Every act of real wrong-doing should bring with it its unavoidable evil consequences. So it is in nature. Self-government, self-restraint is what the world needs now.

There is one fact that should never be forgotten or overlooked, and that is that power is always dangerous. Wealth is power, and therefore wealth is always dangerous and aggressive. When a man is poor and helpless, we have no occasion to fear him, but give him power, and perhaps put arms in his hands, and then it is well for everybody to look out for him. A man with power is always a tyrant; the temptations of power are too great to be resisted. A poor man, when he obtains power, makes just as cruel a tyrant as a rich man does.

THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS.

It may be necessary to concede that, in the nature of things, men must associate together in some manner, but I am inclined to deny what is generally assumed to be true, that the larger the group, the greater is the benefit to be derived by each individual member. Indeed, I should rather claim the reverse: that the smaller the group, generally speaking, the less will be the sacrifices required and the greater the benefits to be derived by each individual.

Why should men, except in families, associate together at all? It is generally asserted that men associate together simply to be enabled to make a stronger and better defence against their enemies. But if that is the main reason why men thus unite, there is much less occasion for their doing so now than there was a few centuries since, when men were more warlike in their disposition than they are at present. Men are not compelled to unite together now and build a strong fortress upon some inaccessible rock, as men found it necessary to do in centuries long since past. A man now who behaves himself properly and who does not meddle with other people's affairs, will hardly suffer harm in any civilized country on the globe. But there is no doubt that men originally came to build towns simply because they found that the larger the group to which they belonged, the better able they would be to defend themselves against their enemies. That was the origin of all the old towns and cities of Europe. It must be borne in mind, however, that such a state of things existed when war and rapine were the chief occupations of men, and when incursions from outside enemies might be expected at any time.

The circumstances of the case are entirely different now. There is no necessity for large organizations of any kind, or for any groups except the family. A man may go out into the wilderness, as many a man has done, with nothing but his axe to aid

him, and nothing but his rifle for protection. It is a well known fact that even as things are now, with all the law and government that we have, men really receive little assistance either from the state or their fellow men. It is perfectly well known that every man in this world must paddle his own canoe, or he will finally find himself going over the dam.

It is clear that there is no necessity, especially under present conditions, for the existence of any groups larger than families, but, nevertheless, there seems to be implanted in the nature of man a fondness for the society of his fellows, and hence there is a disposition for men to unite upon terms of greater or less intimacy. But men can associate, and they do, without any arrangement between them, and without any bargains or conditions, and hence without obligations or loss of liberty on either side. I am not able to see that any harm can arise from any such state of things as this. Such impromptu associations we find on the plains, or in the desert, or among nomadic people who have no fixed place of abode. In such a case, every man remains free and independent; he is master of his own household and pays tribute or homage to no man. There is something noble and assuring in a condition of things like this, but it is quite different from what is experienced in civilized life, where the individual is compelled to give much regularly, in order to have an opportunity of receiving a little perhaps occasionally in return.

It must be conceded that the closer the union that exists in groups of any kind, the less must be the liberty of each individual member. Every man, with his family, should have his own work to perform, thus making his own way in the world and leaving other people to do as they please, provided they do not meddle with his affairs. Then there would be freedom for all outside of the family, and each would secure the largest amount of happiness that it is possible for man to obtain in this life.

It is impossible for men to associate together and form any

organization without binding themselves by contracts. But a contract is something that no man should ever make, when it can be avoided. In the earlier ages of society few contracts were made, and those few were not enforced by law. A contract is always an obligation that binds and fetters a man. It makes a slave of him, so far as the power of the contract extends. And so when two or more men unite and obligate themselves by articles of association of any kind, they so far cease to be free men. In all such groups, it will be found that only one man can have his way at one time. When two men differ, as men always will, one or the other must surrender and let the other take the lead. And so it is in all societies in which men unite or associate together. Where arrangements of this kind are deemed necessary for the common good, they should always, so far as possible, be temporary. Whenever a man binds himself in any way to do something a long time hence, he will almost always find that he has taken upon himself an engagement that he will dislike to carry out. It is quite probable that he will find that things have changed, and that they do not appear as they did when the obligation was assumed.

To be a slave for a few hours, a day, or even a week, is not such a bad thing, but to be a slave for life, as men are in society, is another matter entirely. As communities are managed at the present time, with the rules and laws that prevail, men are compelled to sacrifice and surrender too much in order to secure the few benefits which they are supposed to receive. In these communities, men are constantly hampered with conditions that often result in their injury, instead of being the source of benefit to them. They are not expected to govern their action by what they want or prefer. It is really an arrangement by which many men hope to gratify their own selfishness at the expense of those with whom they are associated. Originally, as we have seen, men united together expecting to receive some benefit from the union, but now as there is so little occasion for any defence to be made, men seem to be constantly studying to see

how much they can make by overreaching their neighbors in a commercial or business way.

As matters are now, it is every man's interest to get as far removed from society as he can. But he finds it impossible to go so far that the state cannot reach him, nor can he in any way hide himself so cleverly that the tax-gatherer will not find him. The state is a gigantic octopus that sends out its tentacles in every direction, and he is a lucky man indeed who is able to keep himself entirely out of their reach.

Society, as we have it at present, is founded upon government, and it is the general belief that without government society could not exist. But I have grave doubts that it can be said that such is the fact in any strict sense. We certainly do know that society could get along well, nay, even better than it does now, with much less government than we have. Men do indeed need government—but what is wanted is self-government, rather than the government of one man by another man. Men should be controlled in every action of their lives by their own judgment, their own sense of right, propriety and justice, and not by the varying freaks or the selfish whims of other people. The idea that any man should dictate terms or give conditions to any other man, or to any set of men, is one of the most absurd things conceivable. Men might be permitted to reason with their neighbors and perhaps enlighten them by the information they might give, but they should never for a moment attempt to compel other people to act contrary to their own wishes or opinions.

FASHION AND SLAVERY.

There is just as much tyranny in fashion as there is in government of any kind, and in that case, as in every other, the thralldom is self-imposed. We all know that fashion possesses only an imaginary or problematical existence, and at most it has no medium through which it can exercise anything that re-

semblies actual power. We obey the laws of fashion, and do it voluntarily, just as we obey the laws of an imaginary God, or an imaginary state, through fear of the consequences. We are fearful that unless we implicitly obey the mandates of fashion, we shall certainly lose our standing in society, or perhaps some patronage that we are anxious to secure.

Herbert Spencer has shown very clearly that all forms, fashions, ceremonies and matters of etiquette, as well as all the terms employed in connexion with those observances, are founded upon the theory of bondage. All the terms used are those which a slave employs when he addresses his master, and when he is anxious to flatter, conciliate or persuade the one who makes rules or laws for his daily observance. We all know what affectionate and servile terms men use when they address the Deity. Just such language the Chinese use when they address their visitors or their acquaintances. Flunkeyism and toadyism prevail in social life in all countries, but China seems to surpass all others in the depths of self-humiliation and self-degradation to which her people have been able to descend in carrying out their ideas of propriety in social intercourse. The oriential way of addressing acquaintances when they meet is: "I am your slave," "all I have is yours." Of course they do not mean a word of it; they are merely trying to be polite, and nothing more. We are continually applying in our social affairs titles which imply that the people we meet are our masters and we are their humble servants. If we address them a letter, we are careful to put down at the end of the epistle the silly falsehood, that we are their "obedient and humble servant," or some similar nonsense. In all civilized lands, people are extremely fond of applying endearing epithets or some kind of title. They never address even the most ordinary person unless they prefix the title "Mister," "Master" or "Sir." Sometimes the title used is "lord" or "lady." Years ago it was common to call an ordinary minister a "dominie," a form of the Latin word *dominus*, a master or lord.

But we do not stop with the use merely of servile language, and flattering and deceiving terms, in our daily intercourse with men. We carry the same theory of thrallodom and inferiority into our manners. We take off our hats when we meet a man, and we bow to him, just as obsequiously as a negro slave would bow if he encountered his master. A man is expected to do these things in order to be called a gentleman, and the conclusion is irresistible, that to be civil, genteel or polite, is to be a cringing sycophant and an accomplished hypocrite. Servility and politeness always run parallel, if they are not quite identical. Politeness means deference to others, and servility means the same thing.

But why follow fashion? Why have any fashion? What men decide to do, they should do because it ought to be done, or because it seems to them to best meet the requirements of their case. A man should get what he wants, and when he wants it, and it is a matter of no moment whether it is like or unlike that of somebody else.

In olden times, fashions did not change, because there was no need of a change and no occasion for any. People then dressed mostly alike, because there was no object in dressing otherwise. In those days a man's dress was his uniform and showed the class to which he belonged. Fashions then did not change with the years or the seasons, because no gain could be secured by such a change. Now the case is different. All endeavor to follow every new fashion and thus to prove themselves the equals of everybody else. Things are bought not because they are needed, but simply because they are the latest thing out. Garments are now rejected, not as they were fifty years ago, because they are worn out, but because they are out of fashion or their neighbors have better ones.

Fashion as a rule of action ought to cease to be a law by which to govern men. A man who measures his conduct by what he sees others do will never be anything more than a poor slave. In ancient times men followed tradition and custom, but

then, it must be remembered, these things did not change as fashions do now.

Again, how is a fashion made, or who makes fashions? Common people, just such people as those who make laws and government, make fashions—some leader in society, some man or woman of influence, some lord, some duke, or perhaps the heir apparent. But what substantial reason can be given why I, or you, my reader, may not make fashions? Fashions are wholly matters of judgment or fancy, and these endowments are the common possession of all men. Strictly speaking, the right of any one man to make a fashion is just as good as that of any other man.

How much better it would be if fashions were different, and if it were not the prevailing custom for people to lie and deceive. How much happier we would be if we knew every time the kind of men we were dealing with and felt confident that they meant what they said and said what they meant! How much better it would be if every one were frank, honest and upright in all his operations and had the courage of his opinions at all times! How much easier we would feel if we knew that when a man invited us to come, he wanted us to come; and that if he did not want us to come, he would either say nothing about it, or frankly explain why our company might not be agreeable.

It will be noticed that the same spirit of servility that is found in fashion pervades every department of civilized life. It is more noticeable or more pronounced among the Orientals, but the principle is just as fully recognized by all the so-called enlightened people of Europe. It is amazing to see how long the childhood state lasts among those who call themselves intelligent and cultured men and women. They are more easily diverted with ideas than with realities; they amuse themselves with baubles, just as children amuse themselves with ordinary playthings. A man puts on an old fashioned French chapeau, with a few feathers in the top, wears on his shoulder a strap

with a certain number of stars—that makes him a major general, and gives him the command of an army! The way the buttons are grouped on his coat, and the color of the girdle he wears, also makes a vast difference in his rank and station. An Indian chief carries out the same idea, only he uses more paint and a few more feathers. It is really surprising to see what an effect such little things will have even among refined and highly civilized men! Fashionable people are also much concerned about matters of order and precedence, especially on public occasions. If they have a certain rank or title, it would worry them greatly if they did not have a particular place in line or a certain seat at the table. There is no end to such nonsense in aristocratic and highly refined circles. As I have before said, the principle of slavery prevails everywhere. Everybody must be before somebody or behind somebody. There would be no living, if such trifling formalities were not duly regarded. Trifles in life make up the sum of human affairs. The absence of the merest bit of common paper, called a seal, might invalidate a written instrument. It is the bit of paper that sanctifies the document and makes it legal. A piece of cloth with some color on it, we worship as the flag of our country! If it had a condor on it, instead of an eagle, or if the stars were wanting, we would not worship it, because it would not be *our flag*. And in bringing out the truth, on trials, how potent is a kiss on a book supposed to be the Bible!

Fashions lead to untold miseries. The observances which fashion requires, entail upon the devotee much expense and an immense amount of worry and fatigue, without resulting in the slightest benefit to any one. But why has not the time come when men should have minds and wills of their own, and should do as sensible and independent men would, at all times and under all circumstances? To be living a life of continued lying and deception is not creditable or becoming to any one. Why should men be afraid? It is only their own shadows that frighten them. It is what they apprehend, and what never

comes to pass, that causes them so much pain and anxiety. If men would hold up their heads and enable their neighbors and associates to see that they are not crawling worms to be trodden on after all, things would improve at once, and such oppression as is now to be observed all over the civilized world would become practically unknown. It is the sneaking, cringing cur that goes along with his head and tail down that uniformly gets the kicks. We will never have honest, honorable and magnanimous men, until we first have men who acknowledge no other man as their master.

I despise tinsel, trappings, trumpery and titles—because they are all equally shams. All the real difference there is between the captain and a private lies in the clothes the two men wear and the arms they carry. A title is the most superficial thing imaginable. A private might be a captain, and a captain would be a private, if they would only exchange uniforms. In their nude state nobody could tell one from the other. The politeness that we have been considering, or the servility or subserviency we might better call it, has its origin in the conception that some men are better than others, and hence they should be honored or revered. But who is entitled to honor or reverence, or who at least besides God himself? Personally, I do not believe in honoring or worshiping any human being. One man is as good as any other man, but he is no better. There might be some excuse for worshiping a being such as God is supposed to be—if we could find out where he is—but when it comes to the question of worshiping some human being, there is no room for argument. The whole Bible, as well as reason itself, is opposed to the doctrine. All that men do must come under one of two categories. They either do what they ought to do, or what they ought not to do. If they merely do what we have a right to expect of them, they certainly are entitled to no particular credit, and if they do what they ought not to do, of course they would claim no credit or honor. For nothing that men do or leave undone, can they justly claim any reward.

Of this one thing I am tired—heartily tired—and that is of doing things for no other reason in the world than that somebody else has done or is doing or will do the same thing; somebody else has bought a book or recommended a patent; somebody else is going to the meeting, or somebody else is coming to the party; somebody else has given five dollars, and therefore I ought to give a like amount. Nothing is so arbitrary as fashion, particularly if you are in the least inclined to submit to it and let it have its own way. It should never be forgotten that any one who makes himself a slave to fashion is just as pusillanimous as one who makes himself a slave to any other master. No one likes to appear odd; no one likes to offend those with whom he is called upon to associate; no one likes to oppose fashion. But suppose it is fashion itself that is odd and is making all the disturbance! Are you not—is not anybody—just as good and just as worthy every way as the one who makes fashions? Why may not any one make the fashions for himself, if not for every one else? No, men have just as much right to make fashions for other men as they have to make laws for them to observe—and that is just no right at all. If people were not so anxious to get rich, they would endure less and be more independent. The best way, it would seem, would be for people to go where they wish to go and where they ought to go, without taking much thought as to who is ahead of them or who is behind them; and as to the matter of giving, they should give what they want to give and because they feel that they ought to give and would like to give just what they finally decide to give.

BORROWING AND BONDAGE.

It is commonly supposed that Satan has a genius for inventions and schemes, and when one of his plans does not succeed, it is said that he is prompt to try some other method. In other words, he is remarkably fertile in expedients. Assuming this theory to be well founded, there can be but little doubt that

borrowing and lending, with the debts, claims and obligations that follow in their train, is an invention of the devil. It is certain that the purpose of such a contrivance is to enslave one class of men and put them in the power of another class, and that being the end in view, the experiment must be pronounced a most complete success. Men who borrow, who owe debts and who place themselves under bonds or under obligations to other men, cease to be their own masters and become the property of the lender or mortgagee, and at the same time they enter into the most miserable state of dependence in which a man can be placed. We must go back to old Roman times, if we wish to have a proper understanding of the true theory of debt. A man who owed a debt in those days was generally little esteemed; he had no rights; he could be sold in slavery, he could be imprisoned, and in certain contingencies, his body could be cut in pieces. Even Shylock, in later days, it will be remembered, was resolved to have his pound of flesh from his debtor, according to the condition nominated in the bond. The law, in all countries, has borne heavily upon debtors and upon those who have given pledges or made contracts. The law is wholly on the side of the creditor; it is the creditor that the state, with all its power, uniformly assists and defends—never the debtor. The creditor has a claim, and the business of the state is to enforce claims, but a debtor has no claim, and so has nothing to be enforced. In this, as in all other cases, the state is merciless; the state, it will be remembered, is a machine, and has no more feeling than machines usually have.

The prevailing practice, in all civilized countries, of incurring debts and entering into obligations, is the leading source of the miseries with which the masses of mankind are generally afflicted. In this practice will be found also the chief source of wealth for those who in a few years succeed in amassing a fortune. They lend, in various ways and under various pretences, not only to secure their per cent. and interest, but to get the unfortunate debtor wholly in their power. They encourage him to

borrow, just as the merchant encourages his customer to buy on trust. Men that borrow invest uniformly beyond their means, and those that buy on credit buy more than they want, and usually they pay very dear, in high prices, interest and costs for the accommodation they receive.

There is really no excuse for a man's borrowing at any time, or for his running into debt in any way. It is a pretty safe rule that what a man cannot pay for he had better dispense with until he has more means. The borrower is simply laboring constantly for the capitalist and money-lender; he is the client of the capitalist and pays tribute to him as if the latter were his lord and master. If it were not for this tribute that the poor and unfortunate are constantly paying to the rich, the rich would themselves make but slender accumulations. It is through debt mainly that people in civilized lands are kept in perpetual bondage; a little reflexion must convince any one that no man can call himself free and independent, so long as he is in debt and under obligations to others. However, it is not really a man's indebtedness that enslaves him, but his poverty and helplessness, and his inability to pay on demand. Of course men borrow, as business goes now, who are not poor, but even such men take many risks. They sometimes make money by borrowing, but they often lose. The men who become bankrupt are uniformly those who owe more than they are able to pay. *No other men fail.*

Another feature to be noticed in this connexion is that of a man's becoming security for another, simply as a matter of business or duty—endorsing a friend's note, going on his bond, becoming a hostage for the keeping of his friend's promise, or for the performance of his friend's contract. Here we find another fruitful source of misery and wretchedness in civilized life. It is bad enough for a man to incur debts on his own account, but it is immeasurably worse and vastly more foolish when he assumes the debt of some other man, over whose conduct or action he has not the slightest control. It is a kind of

vicarious sacrifice for which I can see no excuse. I cannot see the slightest justification for a man's ruining himself, destroying the happiness of his family, leaving himself and them destitute, for no other reason than simply to please some one else—and even in that effort he usually fails at last. It is a mistaken conception of a man's obligation to his friend and neighbor. As the reader by this time must be well aware, the author does not believe in voluntary sacrifices at any time or for any purpose, and especially not in sacrifices made for the mere gratification of some one else. He can see no reason why he should give up either his life or his property to save some one else for whose condition and misfortune he is in no way responsible. Certainly, a man's first duty is to himself in all cases.

The first and most important step towards absolute or practical freedom, is to stop incurring debts, or entering into contracts, or assuming obligations of any kind. That step alone would relieve this world of most of its miseries and misfortunes. Of course, if we ceased to have debts and mortgages and claims and obligations, some men would cease to get rich, but that fact alone would of itself be a very great blessing to mankind. I have only to repeat, that wealth never made any people happier or better—I mean surplus wealth, wealth that nobody can use and that is actually a damage and a source of trouble and worry to the possessor himself.

It might be added that civilization is making the same progress and going through the same stages in South Africa to-day that it does in the early history of all countries. In Natal the East Indians are doing for that country what the Jews did in Hungary and Poland. A recent account says: "They traffic with the natives by means of wily ways which westerners can emulate at a distance. The trader first gives the negro drink, then encourages him to buy what he would not have bought when sober, then coaxes him into debt, and allows him credit out of proportion to his capacity in ready money. Then, when the native is likely to be most embarrassed by a demand upon him,

the Hindoo presents his little bill, and threatens legal proceedings if it is not immediately paid. The trader, however, does not wish it paid, and thus he can pretend to accommodate the native who is not able to pay it. The Natal Shylock asks only a promissory note or a mortgage, along with a stipulation that his debtor shall trade with no one excepting himself. Thus, out of a little original debt of a few shillings, the black man has converted himself into a bond-slave of the Jew, paying to him everything that he can possibly earn, and remaining unto the day of his death in a condition differing only in name from that of slavery. Wise men see this great wrong that is done, but no government has yet ventured to cope with it." And are such methods unknown in this country?

THE RIGHT TO RULE.

Men delight to talk about authority. But the people would naturally ask : " Authority from whom, authority over what ? " I am not able to understand how any man comes to have authority ; I do not know any source from which authority might be derived. And yet there are men who are perpetually telling you what to do ; they are authority on taste, authority on morals or law, or on the Scriptures. There is an authority that is supposed to come from the state, and an authority that is supposed to come from the church. Over and above these sources, there is an authority that comes from men who assume to be possessed of power and influence.

But suppose I do not recognize any such authority, what is to be done with the matter ? The only man who really has authority when it comes down to a question of final results, is the one who has the strongest arm, the longest knife, or the readiest revolver ; or who has the largest number of followers at his command. Beyond some such condition as that, there is no such thing as authority in any department of life.

Of all the men that I dread, it is those who claim to speak

by authority—men that have a message from God, or from some other unknown source. Such men are like the Indians; they dream, and what they dream, they take for reality. One man may know more than other men do—indeed, that must necessarily be so in this world—but knowledge does not, any more than strength, confer rights or privileges upon individuals.

If we carefully examine the pages of history, we shall find that the idea of having people ruled by a power outside of themselves and above themselves, was something entirely foreign to the views of the early inhabitants of Europe. This was especially so with the early Germans. Their herzog, duke or general, was selected and named only for a certain occasion, some particular war perhaps, and when that was over, he dropped back into the ranks and became one of the people once more. But by gradual assumptions and encroachments, this duke eventually became recognized as a king. However, even the old German king was no such personage as our latter day sovereign. He was merely an agent, a minister, a servant—a man who was not a *master* over anybody, but a guide and director for all. So, in other countries, the oldest government of which we have any record was that by a few select elders, who advised, instructed, urged, but never governed.

But with us now, in these days of wealth, civilization and acquired power, things are quite different. Even in a Democracy, we are ruled as it were by a foreign power. Our officers are strangers, and they have ceased to be as one of us. Instead of being our representatives, they merely carry out their own views and consult their own interest. They are for the time being our masters, and we are simply their slaves. They order and we must obey.

It would be better for our people, as a whole, if we could get back to the practice of olden times, when there was no law but community law, which was unwritten, but well understood by all. No man acknowledged any man as his master in those

days. There was no government then, properly so-called. Advisers, elders, councillors they had, but no rulers.

The old German king was a judge; he was the highest judicial officer in the country. And it must be remembered that even in these degenerate times of ours, we accord to our sovereign the highest of all judicial privileges, and that is to grant pardons to offenders. So, too, the old German and old English parliament was only a council, a gathering of lords, nobles, spirituals and leading men of the realm—mark, a council, to consult and advise, but not even representative in the modern sense of the term. Such members represented nobody but themselves. Assemblages of that kind date back as early as the fourth century, and give us some idea of how people were led, not ruled, in those days. In the early centuries of European history, the king's edicts had the power of laws. Kings spoke not their own views, but they declared the views of the people, and their edicts began with the words "I, the people," or "together with the people," or "in accordance with the views of the council." Kings never assumed to have their own will pass as law. And even in our later days the people are allowed to flatter themselves with the belief that they make the laws, because they are made in the name and with the sanction of the people. All laws were originally the edicts merely of the officer having the supreme authority at the time. In Rome the praetor made laws in the form of edicts. And even in America the president of the republic or the governor of the state can make laws in the form of a proclamation in certain pressing emergencies. In old Roman times the laws were made by kings consulting with his council of *meliores et majores*.

Down to the last century legislation or law-making was considered an exceptional step and an act of policy, and in England at least it was regarded with great jealousy. Eastern nations to this day are governed by custom, rather than written law. The old-time legislator in Europe never conceived the idea of converting his own individual will into law. His duty was merely to

declare what was law and custom. He never attempted to make what might be called a new law. It must be remembered that legislation is still with us only one of the sources of law—but it is daily becoming a much more fruitful source than it ever was before.

It is easily seen as we look back into the history of the past, that we are, so far as law-making is concerned, in a state of decay. We have carried the making of new laws so far that it has become really a source of national disease.

The first government of which we have any record, is that which is found in families. It is supposed that government as it exists in society has been patterned after government in families, being simply a development of paternal rule. It is well known that all Asiatic governments are more or less patriarchal in character; the king is the father and he disciplines, directs and provides for his people as if they were his children. In eastern countries all government and authority belongs to the sovereign, and submission and obedience is left for the people. The masses are properly called subjects, for they are responsible to their ruler for all their thoughts and actions, and it is by his permission alone that men are allowed to live, move, and have their being.

There is something so anomalous and unnatural in one man's assuming authority over the life and conduct of his fellow man, that sovereigns have always deemed it necessary to explain or justify their assumption of power by falling back on some higher authority. Sovereigns always endeavor to convince their subjects that their authority is divine in its nature, that God has commissioned them to govern others, and that it is their privilege to mark out for them the course in life which it is best for them to pursue. Kings always appeal to God as a justification for everything they do, whether it be good or evil. They take the church under their care and protection with all the apparent fondness of a parent for his offspring. The church helps the state, and the state helps the church. Indeed, it has only been

in quite recent times that it was deemed possible for the one to exist without the support and assistance of the other, and we are not aware that there is to-day a single sovereign that does not ally himself with the church in some manner. The proudest monarch must be able to see that if he cannot base his authority on the mandates of God, he really has no foundation at all for his claims. Certain, it is, it has never yet been the conceded prerogative of any man to put a crown upon the head of another man and thus give him a commission to rule over a certain portion of this earth.

But it must be evident to every thinking man that this claim of having divine authority is simply a fraudulent pretence or phantom with which to amuse and delude people, while they are being bound hand and foot. The only divine right that any monarch possesses is that which is obtained by the superior might or superior cunning of either himself or his ancestors. Monarchs do not descend from God, and they cannot show any official seal or signature which gives any evidence of authority derived by them from any divine source. Men come to be kings either by conquest, by descent, or by the votes or voices of their fellow men. God has no more to do with the crowning of a king than with the hanging of a pirate, or the killing of a robber.

Unquestionably, the authority under which men are to govern men must come finally from some other source than the Scriptures. It is evident enough that the intimate relations supposed at one time to exist between God and sovereigns are all a matter of imagination. The doctrine of infallibility and divine commission must be discarded forever.

What excuse, then, or what justification can there be for the assumption of authority by one man over another? Properly speaking, there is none whatever. A man has no more right to enforce his will upon another man than he has to take his life from him or his property. In fact, if it is conceded that the sovereign may have absolute authority over the subject, it must

follow as a matter of course that the sovereign may have the power of life and death over him, whenever the occasion may seem to demand the exercise of such authority. Such was the theory and practice during all those ages in the past of which history furnishes us any record. When a man conquered another he had the right to kill him, and he generally availed himself of the privilege. Later on, the practice was so modified that the conqueror allowed his captive to live on condition of becoming his slave. This change of practice did not arise from any improved sentiment, or from any sympathy for the oppressed, but because the conqueror found that a living slave was more profitable than a dead captive. It must be remembered that the slave always held his life at the mercy of the conqueror. And is not the theory and practice the same to-day, even in the most civilized states? Is not the state, the sovereign, permitted to drag the conscript from his home, drive him to battle, and force him even up to the cannon's mouth? Did not England make a practice of impressing seamen, without a shadow of right, either legal or otherwise? War, which by the way the state is itself usually responsible for, is one of the excuses which it makes for taking the life of the subject, but there are plenty of other excuses that are no better founded. It can take the life of the citizen when it pronounces him guilty of certain crimes, such as murder, arson and treason, and not long since, for even much milder offenses. The state, the party in interest, first determines for itself what is criminal, then pronounces a man guilty, and finally administers such punishment as suits its fancy as a sovereign! What could be more monstrous than such a proceeding, when you consider it in all its enormity?

The fact must never be lost sight of that the right to govern implies everything; it implies absolute control over a man's peace, his person, his property, and his life. That is the power possessed by the state, even in so-called democracies like ours. The state determines a man's course in life, and to a large ex-

tent also the number of his days, and, finally, while he lives, it fixes the limit of his sufferings or enjoyments. Properly considered, the subject of a state is the most miserable slave that the imagination can conceive of. He is in the power of the sovereign absolutely, and he has but one single privilege really, and that is the privilege of rebelling. Even that would be denied him, if rebellion were something that could by any possibility be brought under government control. As it is, he is rendered as helpless as possible, and he is denied every weapon with which a free man would naturally defend himself.

The origin of government cannot be traced to any prescriptive right derived from any higher source than man. Government is clearly not a matter of right, of justice, or even of necessity. The only question that remains is whether it is expedient. That is the subject which we now come to consider. This is identical with the question whether slavery is expedient. The relations between the governor and the governed are in no essential respect different from those of the master and slave. Mastery lies at the foundation of all sovereignty. But if it is demonstrated that every governor must be a master, it must necessarily follow that every subject must be a slave. All history demonstrates the truth of these propositions. Every subject is absolutely in the power of government, and being entirely without ability to resist, he must be absolutely destitute of liberty. Weakness and liberty are never allied; wherever there is want of power, there bondage must follow. The subject has some privileges, like the slave, but like those of the slave, they are simply privileges granted by the master or sovereign.

The citizen has absolutely nothing of his own.

Slavery is never expedient. No one has ever pretended that it was really expedient for the slave, for nothing compensates for want of liberty. No man, we venture to say, was ever better off for being unconditionally in the power of some other man. No people have ever yet gained anything more than a temporary advantage by surrendering themselves to some one

that is stronger. All that a man gains at the expense of liberty is so much that is not worth having. When a man loses control over his own action and over his way of living and doing, he has lost everything that has any real value for him and he might better be buried. But up to the last hundred years or so, it was supposed that slavery was expedient for the master. However, that position is now abandoned by every enlightened people on the globe. The few who still cling to the idea that slavery is a good thing for the master are those who have not yet progressed far enough in the study of practical life to enable them to understand facts as men with clear and acute minds would understand them. *No, slavery can never be expedient*—and the same thing is true of all government. Government, in the strict sense of the term, is never expedient.

People are entirely mistaken about the amount of government that is really needed in civilized life. There are those who imagine that things would promptly go to ruin, if we should happen to have an interregnum and people should be compelled to go along without a governor for any considerable time. But did God make any governors? Who are our born masters that are found to be indispensable in this world? Who are the men that we ought to know and recognize on sight as our lawful and natural-born rulers? Show us even one of these God-created and God-chosen beings that can readily be distinguished from ordinary mortals.

But is it not more reasonable to believe that, if God had any plans at all on the subject, he so made man and so provided him with the means of sustenance and defense that he was prepared to take care of himself, like the birds of the air and the beasts of the field? If he did not he certainly cannot be called a success as a contriver or creator. Creatures that cannot take care of themselves must be looked upon as abortive or defective, and they ought never to have been sent out into the world under any circumstances. But the lower orders of creation, and animals of all kinds, do take care of themselves, even without the aid

or co-operation of others. Why should not man, with all his boasted strength and intelligence be able to do as well?

The trump card which is played by those who put forward such extravagant claims for government, is that which is marked with the word "protection"—men must have government, in order to be protected against their enemies! But where does this protection come from, when it does come? It rarely comes from the officers of the state, or from those who call themselves the state, in the first place. The initiative in the way of protection and assistance is uniformly taken by the men whom the person knows, or by the community in which he lives—by those who are on the ground and who know the facts long before they are ever brought out in court. They are the ones who either give assistance when it is needed, or at least put the wheels of government in motion and get the officers of the law interested in the first place. As a rule, the community does the most important part of the work in such cases. if not the whole of it, and why could it not do this work as well, or better, without the assistance or at least the intervention of government?

If a thief is to be arrested or a robber is to be caught, who is it that starts in the matter? Rarely the officers of the law, for it is seldom that they are found where they are most wanted. Generally it is the people who have no connexion with the government that do most of the business. If a man is set upon by ruffians, or is attacked by robbers on the highway, who assists him, if he receives any assistance at all? It is not some officer but some ordinary citizen, who happens to be passing by or looking on, some man who does what he does entirely independent of the law, from the natural promptings of the heart, and without compensation. This is the source from which men in an emergency get their assistance in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. So, how does it appear that we need government simply for the sake of protection?

The best illustration of the fact that men can live and thrive without the application of force or the service of some master, is

to be found in the management of the fraternal societies that are so numerous in large communities. There is no government in these organizations—none properly so called. In the first place, they admit their members, and reject those that are not congenial or not desired, and that is a method that ought to be followed in every community. No man should presume to settle down in any place as a matter of right. His antecedents and character should be known, and he should be accepted or rejected according to the record he has made in the past. In that way, tramps, vagabonds, criminals and rascals would uniformly be kept out. In the societies that we are considering, a member understands what is required of him, and he does it. There is no punishment, no application of force of any kind; each individual member is just as good and just as powerful as any or all the others. A man either behaves himself, and remains, or he does not behave himself and goes out. That is all there is of it, and in practice it is found that such a rule is all that is necessary. Instead of having an interest in offending his brother members and keeping the whole order in confusion, he has every interest to be at peace with his brethren, and thus have the respect and esteem of those with whom he is associated.

How unfounded is our belief that everybody needs government from some outside source! We grew up under the rule of others, and we imagine that there is no way of getting along in this world without either mastering somebody, or being mastered ourselves. We govern and punish our children chiefly for the reason that we ourselves were governed and punished by our parents. We have government in this country mainly because our ancestors lived under government before they came to this continent. People who remove to foreign shores uniformly carry their habits and customs, and, so far as practicable, their ideas of law and government, with them. When our ancestors shaped their government, after independence was achieved, they shaped it almost entirely after the model with which they

were acquainted, that of the mother country. Our ancestors did as they did because they knew no other way. Had there been a hundred better ways, how should they have known about them? They simply did as well as they knew.

It is a serious mistake to suppose that when men are assembled together for any purpose, they would at once proceed to tear each other in pieces, if it were not for the interposition of the officers of the law. It is a fact that we have gatherings and crowds in thousands of instances where the officers of the law are never seen, and where they are never needed, because the people conduct themselves in an orderly and peaceful manner without them. It should not be forgotten that most of our gatherings are held independently of law and without its protection. Multitudes of people, a thousand or two thousand at a time, men of different nationalities, cross the ocean in steamers, being crowded together for days, and even weeks, and yet everything goes on in an orderly manner, though no court is held and no officer of the law is present.

It should be remembered that when men claim that we need government, they at the same time claim that we need punishment. Punishment is of the very essence of government, and where there is no punishment, there can be no government. Government exists only so far as force is applied, and the only way that man can be moved by force, is by the infliction of pain or by the adoption of methods that produce fear and dread on the part of the subject.

And then the question that naturally arises is this: what is it that government actually does for us? Will any one pretend that our health is better, that our habits are better, or that our character is better than were the health, habits and character of people who lived a hundred years ago, when there were less laws and fewer masters than we have now? Are we in any way wiser, any happier, or any better in any respect than our ancestors were who lived in a simpler and more modest way centuries ago? It would seem that any competent observer and

unprejudiced judge would answer in the negative. We are not happier nor more virtuous, nor more noble than our ancestors were. That fact is well enough established. Whether it is a cause or merely a coincidence, it is a fact that with our constant increase of laws, ordinances and regulations, our people are becoming more corrupt, more selfish, more dishonest and more immoral every day. It is evident enough that an increase in power and the multiplying of laws, on the part of the state, do not have a tendency to make men better, but rather the reverse.

Civilization and much regulating of conduct through laws and ordinances seem to go together. If people were entirely free and were left to govern their own affairs in their own way, we would never have civilization as the term is understood now. To have civilization and culture to any extent, we must have wealth, and wealth implies power concentrated in such a manner as to enable men to get wealth. If all men had equal rights and priviléges, of course no man would be a slave or servant of another, and without servitude in some form, there could be no such thing as an accumulation of wealth. It is only when people can avail themselves of other people's labors, that a few of them, under especially favorable conditions, can become rich. In no other way is such a thing possible. So, I repeat again, that the multiplying of laws, the development of wealth and advancement in civilization all alike imply servitude on the part of a portion, and generally a very large portion, of mankind.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

It would seem to be a well ascertained fact that what is called representative government must be pronounced a chimera or delusion. In other words, in government, there is no such thing as a man's being represented, or having his wishes carried out and his place filled by another.

Let us examine into the facts and see how representative government works in America. Who are our real representatives, or how are we represented by them? We elect men—or we imagine we do—and then we allow them to go on and do as they please. In effect they become our rulers, and they are very much such rulers as we find under any form of government. They avail themselves of every opportunity to carry out their own plans and provide for their own advancement, and pretty generally it is found to be with them as it is with other people, that the public good is a side issue, a sort of secondary matter. Why, in fact, we in America are ruled—just as truly and as emphatically ruled—as any people in Europe. We are taxed, just as systematically and persistently taxed, as the subjects are under an eastern despotism. We are the poor, helpless sheep who are shorn year after year, under various excuses or pretexts, for the benefit of those who call themselves “the state.” How were we as citizens of a free country treated during the war of the Rebellion? Was there ever any despotic government that treated its own people so heartlessly as the people on the Union side were treated by those who assumed to be the government, during our civil war? Think of the cruel conscriptions, of the men that died in prisons, of the lives lost in hospitals, as well as on the battlefield; think of the wives left homeless and of the children left fatherless; think of the vast sums of money squandered in that war, and then think of the toil and suffering required, on the farm and in the workshop, from those who were compelled to produce that money! And were those terrible sacrifices made by the people of their own free will? Only to a very limited extent can such a thing be said to be true. No people as a body desires war. A wild, intractable, or a selfish majority may, but the people as a whole never does. Certainly the war of 1861-5 was not the work nor the wish of the American people. It was the work of politicians, and to a large extent of designing and unscrupulous demagogues, who had interests or prejudices to gratify, by having

the country plunge into a war. The people would never, in the south or in the north, have voted to declare war. The people were forced into the conflict and were driven forward at the point of the bayonet like cattle selected for slaughter. Talk about the horrors of slavery! Are not the horrors of slavery always far surpassed by the horrors of conscription? What becomes of freedom in a representative government at any time when war is declared and military law prevails? Who has any sort of representation then, save those who are the managers of the ruling party, or who happen to have full control of the machine? And it must not be forgotten that these managers constitute, so far as numbers are concerned, only an insignificant portion of the people as a whole.

As a further illustration of how far the people rule under a representative government like ours, we might refer to the action of congress on the silver question in the fall of 1893. No one would deny that a very large majority of the people of the whole country desired a change at once in the free silver law as it had existed for some years. The people wanted less silver bought by the government and piled up in the treasury than had been the practice, and when silver was to be coined, they wanted more of the metal put into the pieces than had been used for some time. But what did congress, or the senate especially, care for the wishes of the people, or for the desires of the whole or of any part of the country? The senators had their own views, and evidently they did not for a moment realize that they were representing any one but themselves, or perhaps themselves and a few personal friends. And this is the way that representation works usually, not only in this country, but wherever a representative government exists. The representatives endeavor to carry out the wishes of their own constituents so long as those wishes and their own do not happen to differ: but when a disagreement comes, the people are certain to find their wishes disregarded, in every instance. This is the way that matters have worked in legislation ever since representa-

tive government has been known. No one can decide what legislators will do, whenever a pressing emergency arises. They will consult the wishes of their constituents if they find it policy to do so, and otherwise they will not. Sometimes delegates or representatives are instructed, but even such a step affords no guarantee that the delegates will do precisely as they are requested.

What made matters worse, in the case of the silver bill, was that a minority of the senate was able to block the wheels of legislation for some time and prevent the enactment of laws demanded by the country. Can this be called representation for the people? Again, it must be remembered that our senate is elected for six years, and it usually takes that length of time before a radical change can be made in that body. How can it be said to represent the wishes of the people? What the people desire, they want now. Six years hence they may want something else. What people desire, and what they have a right to insist upon, is representation of their thoughts, feelings, ideas and wishes as they exist to-day.

Viewed in any fair light, it is evident that in no branch of government are people, the whole people, really represented. Our representatives, no matter how chosen, are our rulers, just as much so as the master is in school, or the captain on the ship, or even the king on his throne.

What sense can there be in speaking of a people's governing themselves in a representative government, if we use the term government in its ordinary acceptation? Government implies two parties, the one that governs and the one that is governed. It is impossible to conceive of one without the other. Government implies force or power exercised by one party over another party. How can a man or men govern themselves in any such sense? The fact is, that when we speak of self-government, there is either no government at all, or the government is of the usual kind, namely, of one over another, and properly not the government of one's self. As a matter of fact there is

no more of real self-government, or of the people's governing themselves, in America than there is in Russia or Persia. In all countries where there is a government of any kind, the people are governed by a force outside of and apart from themselves. There can be no other government.

John Stuart Mill says, every man should vote, every man should be consulted on public measures in which he is as much concerned as the rest. But what matters it whether a man does or does not vote, if he happens to be in the minority, and his vote does not count? What is the sense in consulting me, if the party, or the leaders, go on and do as they please, regardless of what I think or advise? Indeed, is it practicable that a man's wishes or ideas should count where he associates himself in any way with others? In the very nature of the case, unless two men happen to agree, they cannot both have their own way. Those who are strong, either from force of numbers or some other cause, will triumph and the rest must succumb. If my vote does not avail, I am for all practical purposes disfranchised, and that is the case with at least one out of every three at every election. So much is absolutely certain. Force controls in such cases just as it does in a despotism. What difference does it make to me whether I am kept down by one big giant, one powerful despot, or by a thousand small despots, as is uniformly the case in a democracy? The most abominable of all tyrannies is that of the majority. Passion or prejudice is more apt to sway a crowd than an individual. In crowds, the rage of one adds to the rage of the whole.

All there is that is in any way attractive and enjoyable under a democratic form of government is the diversion that people obtain by exercising the elective franchise. Nearly all the work done in the name of the state is done under false colors. People imagine they have the power, when the fact is they have none. It is like the trifle with which the child is amused, while at the same time it is kept in close confinement. The only case where votes would be certain to count, and where

the people might be sure of having some power, would be where a unanimous vote was required, as in jury trials.

In practice, in all representative governments, it is party rule that prevails. And what is the propriety of talking about liberty, or about true representation, in a country where a party controls the government, and the "boss" controls the party? There is Tammany Hall, for instance, in New York City. Was there ever in the wide world anything more despotic than the rule of that body? Was there ever a case where pure selfishness on the part of a few individuals was allowed such absolute sway? What is unfortunate for us is, that we have party rule not for the country's good, but simply for the good of the party. The rulers of the party have but one aim, one purpose in life, and that is to devise ways by which to get the people's votes, and through those votes finally to secure the spoils. History gives us no account of anything quite so wicked and so heartless as party rule in this country. To speak against the interests of the party to which a man belongs, is heresy, and to vote contrary to the orders of those who control the machine, is sure to result in his downfall. Such an offence is never condoned. Religious zeal is not half so blind and so intolerant as party zeal. No man dares think outside of party limits. The bosses dictate the policy and lay down the platform of the party, and in that simple way they settle everything. There is no opportunity either for question or complaint on the part of the individual members of the party. No better illustration could be found anywhere to show how the parts, or the individuals, are absorbed in the whole than can be seen in the case of party organization.

Yet, in this country we continue to flatter ourselves that we at least have representatives. But how far do these men represent us? Do they make any laws just as we want them, or just as a thousand other men want them? No, they do not in one single instance—they could not do so if they tried. Our representative might vote for a bill a hundred times, and still it

might not pass. No, it is well known that laws are enacted in spite of legislators, while other measures fail even with all their assistance. Our own particular representative is only one out of a hundred, or out of five hundred perhaps. What could any man do in such a case, were he ever so able or excellent in his way? The answer is, nothing. Our laws, those in which we are most concerned, and which we are compelled to obey, are clearly not made in any case by our representative—if for no other reason, for this alone, that no one legislator ever makes laws. Laws are always made by the representatives of other men, not by ours, and those representatives do not even belong to our part of the state or country. Or perhaps they are made by some one who is not a representative at all, and who does not even pretend to be one—some lawyer who prepares the bill, or some lobbyist who engineers its passage.

To have a representative properly so called, the representatives for any locality should make the laws for that locality—in other words, we should have home rule—but as it is now, a member from Buffalo has as much to do with making laws for New York as the members from that city have. If the laws were actually made by our representatives, these men might with some propriety be called our representatives, but it is well known that laws are not made in that way. Probably in all cases the men who actually make the laws are as much strangers to us as they would be if they resided in Siberia.

But if, as we have seen, laws, even in a republican government, are not made by our representatives, but rather by those who are foreign to us, men who do not know our wants nor care for our wishes, what difference does it make to us who the men are who make the laws in which we are chiefly concerned? In any event, we must trust to luck and take our chances, and that is something that everybody is doing to-day in regard to legislation throughout the whole broad land. It would not be worse for us if the judge on the bench made the law as he went along, or the governor, the sheriff, the constable, as he really

does in many cases. It is well known that originally it was the custom of the executive, the king, or monarch, to make all the laws and select all the judges. He was the sole source of both law and justice. He ordered and was obeyed, he sat in judgment and his word was law. He was the sole fountain of light and truth. And probably there are as few evils under that system as there are under ours. The king had no more interest in robbing his subjects than our modern representative has—perhaps not so much. It makes not the slightest difference to us who or how many they are who make the laws for us, or who sit in judgment on our case, provided they are impartial, disinterested, capable and honest men. That is all there is of the business any way. One man of that kind would do better for us than one hundred of the other kind, and where he resides or where he was born, is a matter that little concerns us.

So, it is evident that I would place little trust in a representative government. A government by one king is not apt to be so bad as a government by a hundred or more kings all differing in aims and interests, as well as in temperament and capacity, and all anxious to accumulate money. What difference does it make to me whether the one who does the ruling is called a sovereign, or merely a representative? A king who is elected, it must be remembered, is as much the people's representative as the man whom we send to congress or place in the presidential chair.

Our laws, it must not be forgotten, are not usually made by the legislature. That body simply ratifies what has been decided upon somewhere else, or in some other way. Laws are uniformly machine-made. Laws are made for, not by, the representative. His vote on the question is usually only a matter of form. Whether he votes with his ears and eyes open or shut, is a matter of very little consequence. He is not presumed to vote understandingly, or to know much, if anything, about the provisions of the bill to which he is called upon to give his assent. Sometimes a legislator, if he is of the right fiber and

has the proper capacity, can be of some service to his constituents outside of the senate or assembly chamber, but when it comes to a vote, his yea or nay counts only one, just as the vote would of the humblest law-maker in the body. It is well known that men are sent as representatives to the capital not to deliberate and consult as to what is the best or the most proper thing to be done, but rather to make such bargains and enter into such combinations as may be found necessary in order to ensure the success of their undertaking.

Again, as matters work under our system, and more or less so in all representative governments, how can we possibly call the representative who happens to be elected our representative? Or how could any one call him his representative? At the very best, we have only the privilege of making our choice between two or more men, neither of whom, perhaps, is the man we want. They are men who have secured a nomination, probably in some crooked or adroit manner, at some party caucus, and no matter whom we may prefer, the men who are nominated are the only ones whom we are permitted to consider. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the men who are called upon to vote have had absolutely nothing to do with the selection of those who appear as candidates for the office in question. Candidates, it is well known, do not wait to be called. They call themselves. They secure their own nomination in some way, and that of itself, in more than half the cases, settles the whole business. Or, if the parties are nearly equally divided, a man may vote and vote again, and still have no real voice in the election. The man for whom he casts his ballot may lack a vote or two; he may have only 1,000 votes, while his opponent has 1,001. In that case the one he did not want, and for whom he did not vote, is declared elected and becomes his representative! Strange, is it not? The representative understands the matter in its true light. He knows that he owes the ordinary voter nothing, and so he feels under no obligation to him. Instead of looking after the voter's interests at the seat of govern-

ment, and representing him, he looks after his own interests, and represents himself and his party.

It is for reasons like these that I find a representative form of government extremely objectionable. It is not a representative government in any true sense of the term. Certainly no particular individual is represented, nor is any particular part of the community from which the representative is supposed to be chosen. The mere privilege of voting for or against a man that we do not know and have never seen, some man, finally, that somebody else, and not ourselves, is certain to choose, or for one who actually chooses himself, is not a privilege upon which people should place any very high estimate. At least it is not a privilege that could compensate them for the burdensome taxes they must bear, or for the miseries they must suffer as the result of the many bad laws that are enacted.

If the matter were left wholly to a town or community, things would be different. But there would be unfairness and injustice even then. There always must be injustice whenever there is a question between two persons, for what is just to one must necessarily be unjust to the other. It is impossible that what is supposed to be just should work well for every man in the community. Generally, what benefits one man injures some other. But can anything be really just to a man that proves to be an injury or an affliction to him? However, in small communities there will be less difference than in large ones, and hence there will be less difficulty and less injustice. The men in these small communities are usually all on one level, belong to one caste, have common interests and common sympathies, and therefore little trouble is found in agreeing upon a line of policy which is good for all concerned. I repeat again, there cannot be absolute and inflexible justice for all men. Men must sacrifice. They must suffer injustice. They must continue to do as they have done, they must often obey a law or a custom, even while it is not agreeable to them in all respects. Such is the fate of man in this life. I have only to add this remark,

that people may be better represented by an agent or an advocate than by one who is their representative properly so called. So it is in the case of colonies. They may send no one to parliament in an official capacity, and still they may be better represented than if they did so. There are other, and perhaps better ways of having people represented than by going through the ceremony of an election. It is not to be forgotten, moreover, that no man can properly represent more than one man. If he represents B, he could not also represent C—surely, not if they have opposing interests. What kind of a representative would that man be who represented a thousand or ten thousand men? There can be no representation in any proper sense. The nearest thing to it is the European method by which there is the representation of guilds and classes.

THE DOCTRINE OF INFALLIBILITY.

The doctrine that the king, the supreme ruler or sovereign, can do no wrong, is founded on reason and sound sense. Could God do wrong? If he could, he would not be God. To assume that God could do wrong, would imply that he was imperfect. It would also imply that there was some one above God who was qualified or authorized to judge of God's action. The one who judges is always supreme, and the one who is judged must be subject to his powers. But God is the supreme judge, and from his decisions there can be no appeal. His decisions cannot even be brought into question.

To be authorized to pass judgment is the highest point that power can attain. We give our case into the hands of a judge solely on the ground that he is the proper one to decide, believing that he knows what is right and proper and that he will judge according to his superior knowledge. So it must be with the king. So it must be with the Pope. A true pope must be infallible. To doubt that he is infallible, is to doubt that he is genuine. Like the king, he is God in the flesh, God as he is

represented on earth. The true master can make no mistakes, because the master is always right.

The one who is highest, who is above all and who makes the laws, is really the maker or founder of all right and justice. Why, to deny the infallibility of those who make the laws, is to undermine the whole foundation of government. If I must obey a master who is sometimes right and sometimes wrong, who is a drunkard perhaps, or a lunatic, a fool or a knave, my lot on earth is wretched indeed. How could such a being rightfully hold me bound under his authority and keep me helpless in his power? Such a being could not appeal to my reason; his sole argument would be brute force, which of course is no argument at all.

It was the old English doctrine, less than one hundred years ago, as is well known, that the king could not do any wrong, and so it was that many an unfortunate man lost his life, or his liberty at least, by assuming to question the rightfulness of the king's action, or by criticising his course in some way. To attempt to sit in judgment on the conduct of one whose power is supreme, is simply rebellion. To criticise government is to oppose it, opposing government is treason, and treason means death. A king cannot be tried for any offence whatever, for he has no peer, and there is no one above himself to act as judge. The only way to try a king is to reduce him to the level of a private citizen. So long as a king is king, he has all the power. How could judgment be enforced against one who is really a king? When the people are supreme, how can they be tried or brought to account? It would be the height of arrogance to question the rightfulness of their decision. It would be equally absurd and useless to do so.

The whole question comes up in another direction; whence comes the right of a man, or of any set of men, any two, ten or a dozen men that may happen to be chosen, to sit in judgment on the conduct or course of other men? Or, what is the same thing precisely, whence comes the right of one man, or of any

number of men, to set himself or themselves up as masters of other men? No man was ever born who possessed any such privilege or prerogative. The right to judge and the right to govern are two things that have never yet been inherited by any human being.

If we go back and examine the earliest records of the human family, we shall find that conquest with a view to slavery is comparatively a recent development. In the earlier stages of society, men are not held as slaves, and one man never meddles with the conduct of other men, except so far as he may be personally concerned. They have wars, but they never take captives, and hence they never have slaves. Captives are generally killed at once; it is only in rare cases that some captives are adopted as members of certain families in the conquering tribe. The farther back we go into the origin of society and government, the less do we see of kings, governors or masters. Savages never obey the command of a superior—they acknowledge no superior. They have leaders, but not commanders. Their bravest and noblest men lead—the others simply follow. Savages know of no discipline, for discipline is strictly a matter of authority. Neither do savages have trials in court. There is no one among them that assumes to be a judge over the rest. Slavery and lawsuits go together. A man who is tried and judged always has the place and the obligations of a slave. He is in the power of the court, and the court may do with him what it pleases. But no true freeman would endure such a state of things, and hence we can understand how it comes that courts and trials are matters of comparatively modern development.

The conclusions thus far arrived at, in this article, are such as must inevitably follow. *provided* there is a God who is a supreme being, and *provided* there are certain men who are or may be masters or judges of other men. We have seen that God must be infallible and likewise not accountable for what he does. We have also seen that a man who is properly a

judge, or really a master, must have his position and authority as such recognized without conditions. Such a master cannot be criticised, and the justness and propriety of his course should not be brought in question. Such a judge must be infallible, and his decisions should not be appealed from. But men now very generally deny the infallibility of rulers and judges, and the reason why they do so is because there is a growing tendency among all thinkers to deny the right of any man to rule over other men. The prevailing tendency is now to treat a ruler as a mere puppet or idol, to be taken down or set up at pleasure, which could not be done if he were a true master. Of course, if he were a master, with the power that belongs to a master, he would not allow himself to be taken down and set up at the pleasure of other men.

Our governors and presidents, and even the so-called monarchs of Europe, are now simply representatives of the people. All the power they have is delegated to them. They are merely agents, but an agent is only an instrument in the hands of other men. His position is that of a slave, and he has no more power than that which might be accorded to a slave. Such a monarch is held accountable for what he does; he can be tried in court like ordinary men. But it must be clear enough to any mind that such a man is no monarch. He is destitute of power, and one that has no power cannot be a sovereign. And so it is with judges. A man is allowed to judge, but his decision is never recognized as final. The court merely gives its opinion, just as other men give theirs, but it is not a final judgment. The opinion is appealed from and carried from one court to another, being either affirmed or reversed, just as the appellant court takes a fancy. Even when the last court is reached, the decision then may not be final, for the people may be in rebellion or in some other way they may reverse the decision. If the people really believed in the infallibility of judges, or in the divine right of kings, there would be no appeal, no resistance, no discussion, no rebelling. It is evident enough that

the people as a rule do not believe in any such thing. Judges, legislators and rulers are all held accountable for their acts, for the reason that they are looked upon as ordinary men, having all the weaknesses and the fallibility that characterize ordinary men.

If a man has a right to rule, he is clearly entitled to have his authority recognized. If a man has a right to judge, his opinion cannot properly be re-judged or appealed from. The whole question turns upon the right to judge or the right to rule. Formerly this right of appeal was generally denied.

A few words further upon the history and progress of this doctrine of infallibility. In Europe at the present day, especially in England, the question is evaded by making the minister responsible for wrongs done, and not the monarch. If the ministers do wrong, they are deposed, while the monarch remains. In the United States such a course is not necessary, because the question can be met when the officer comes up for re-election. On the continent of Europe they still hold to state infallibility. The state being the supreme power, it is seen that it cannot be held responsible for what it does. What the state does must be right, because the state is the one that determines what is right. In other days, it is well known that the sovereign was held to be holy, godlike, and as such he was more or less worshiped as a god. The king always represented God; in theory, he was sent by God to do a certain work. Why should he not be worshiped as divine? To this it may be added that if a man has power over other men, or the right to exercise authority over them, he can get that power from no other source than God.

Would a father be held responsible for the treatment of his children? Until recently he would not. Until recently there was no appeal from a father's decision. So far as his family was concerned, he was supreme. Among the Romans the father was infallible, and as to the fate of his children he was the sole judge. There was no appeal from his decision. He

was the typical master and judge. A man who is accountable for what he does is not a master, and the father is not accountable for the treatment of his children because he is a master.

When it is once conceded that authority is not well grounded, that it is in no sense divine, then it is seen that it is something that is wrong, and it soon weakens and finally fails. So it was with the right of the master over his slave, the father over his children, the husband over his wife. So long as there was no question as to their right to govern, they were deemed, in their proper spheres, omnipotent and infallible. It must be remembered that the slave and the subject originally had no more right than a horse or a fly now has. But eventually people began to question the authority of the master and his right to exercise power over others. From that time on the power of the master, and also of the father, began to wane, and it is waning still.

The right to rule and the right to do as we please with another, leads to the destruction of all rights on the part of the subject, and to the absence of all justice in the treatment he receives. Justice and fairness are things that cannot be talked of as between the one governing and the one governed. Justice implies that even the weak have rights, and demands that their feelings and interests must be regarded. But the right of a man to be a master goes to the very bottom of every right that would naturally belong to those under him. The slave cannot talk about justice. Justice is only for free men. The slave is conscious of the fact that he has lost his will, or what is the same, the power of using it, and so he has nothing to do but follow the direction of another. No justice can be found where such relations exist. Justice is something that prevails only between men who are equal in their rights. A king may be just as between one man and another, but as between himself and his subjects, justice is not a thing to be conceived of. Who would speak of God as being just? God knows abso-

lutely nothing of such matters as justice, right and fairness. They are exclusively human affairs. To insist that a king should act justly, would be to limit him, hamper him, and being thus bound, he would not be a true king. A king merely consults his own will—he never thinks of justice. Hence we observe that in all governments which are really despotic, the subjects are true slaves. Even their lives are at the disposal of the monarch. And so it is in our modern state. The state owns its subjects, and may even demand their lives, as well as their property, when circumstances would seem to require the sacrifice. If the king governs according to law, he is not really a king, unless he makes the laws himself. The law-making and law-enacting power is always the true sovereign. Under a true sovereign the people have no rights. Louis XIV. had the correct idea of the matter. He said, in giving instructions to his son and heir: “All your subjects owe you their persons, their goods, their blood, *without having the right to claim anything.*” He added: “The kings are absolute lords and have naturally the full and free disposition of all the goods which are possessed.” Louis was quite correct; he carried the idea of sovereignty and state-rule to its legitimate consequences. So Elizabeth, of England, believed that the state could do anything it chose to do; it could take all the revenues and have charge of all trades and manufactures. What is true of kings, is of course also true of the state, and of the ruling power generally.

When the state, or a monarch, makes laws and determines what is right and proper, that is not a matter between the state and the citizens, but between citizens and citizens, or one citizen and another. What is the use of raising the question whether the sovereign does right or wrong, when he has the absolute right to do as he pleases, and no one is able to oppose his action? A true sovereign never binds or obligates himself with any restrictions or conditions. Does God do so, does a master or father? So far as he yields to conditions, so far he surrenders his power. There can be no magna charta, no bill of rights,

for any king, unless for one who like king John has lost his power and is compelled to concede what others demand of him. The people never get charters, except when the one who pretends to be sovereign ceases to be such. That is a matter that history demonstrates over and over again.

In old Rome appeals were little known, and in ancient Germany still less. We have appeals to-day, because we do not believe fully in judges and rulers. If we really believed in the right of one man to govern another, there would be no courts, no law-making, nothing at all to hamper or embarrass the governor or king. All these things are so many signs of the decadence of the ancient kingly idea. A real king knows no laws; laws tend to destroy sovereignty. Laws bind the people; they bind subjects, but they never bind kings—not real kings.

Bluntschli speaks about the accountability of legislatures. He says that nowhere except in America is such a thing thought of or mentioned. And, really, how could there be accountability in such a case? The law-maker is supreme, and if he is supreme, he cannot be held accountable for what he does, no matter how wicked his actions may prove to be. Can it be conceived of as possible that one who determines what is right and lawful should himself be guilty of wrong-doing? This would be the same as saying that a man in doing what he has a right to do, does wrong. If the law-maker is not supreme, then certainly he is not a maker of law properly considered. But in America they set the law-maker up, and then after a while they take him down again. Like the butterfly he is made only to flit and display himself for a very brief period, and then he is called away. In America the court is placed over the legislature, so that the court has the power to give the final, finishing touch to all laws. Hence, the court in America is the last resort, the real sovereign. It settles everything, finally, according to its own judgment and preferences. But even the court is human. It cannot interpret the constitution solely as a matter of intelligence, but feeling and prejudice must enter into its

decisions. If it were not for diversity of interests, and perhaps of education and associations, the members of the court would never differ as to what is constitutional and what is not. It must not be forgotten that the members of courts are ordinary people, men of common flesh and bone, just such as we see in our walks every day.

In America the constitution is above law and law-makers, and this shows that this country is opposed to all sovereignty on the part of either individuals or organized bodies. The programme is laid down beforehand for every American citizen—this he may do, and that he must not. Real sovereignty is not tolerated in any place or in any form—at least that is the theory. As soon as any signs of sovereignty appear in any quarter, in congress for instance, it is promptly suppressed.

But if there is power, as there must be under any system of government, it must reside somewhere. There is no way of escaping that result. In England they tried the barons first and gave them the mastery; then they tired of the barons and gave the power to the king, and finally they took it away from the king and gave it to the House of Commons. After a while they will be sure to try some other experiment. In this country the sovereignty is placed in a great many different hands, and in none of them in particular. The president has a share of the power, congress has some, the courts a great deal and the people a little of what is left. It is really a novel state of things and is not destined to last.

THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY.

Is it right that eight men should lay down the laws by which seven men shall be governed? What mysterious power or what remarkable qualification do the former possess that the latter do not have? From whence do the eight derive the right by which they are to rule over seven? Where did the idea ever originate that the majority could be made equal to the whole

body, and that as such it could take its place and make laws in its name? I have never yet heard these questions answered. Indeed, it is seldom that I have known such questions to be raised. In fact, people would no more think of questioning the right of the majority to rule than they would of denying the authenticity of the Scriptures.

Yet what the majority does is not what the mass does, and what the one wills has nothing at all to do with what the other wills. The majority, so far from involving or absorbing the minority, proceeds entirely independent of it and ignores its existence entirely. That is the way the majority always governs. So far from the whole body having a voice in the matter, its wishes are never consulted, and its rights and interests are always trampled under foot. In fact, under our present system, where numbers alone count, the existence of a whole is ignored, and all the questions that come up are those which are to be settled between the majority on one side and the minority on the other. The number fifteen is of no consequence. It is the eight to seven that always determines the result.

What the majority decides is not what the minority decides, and therefore the latter cannot be bound by the former's action. The eight and the seven are as distinct from each other and as independent as any two groups possibly could be. Indeed, the idea of their belonging to one and the same group is something entirely imaginary. There is nothing reasonable or just in one man's exercising authority over another; and the case is not bettered at all by eight men undertaking to control the action of seven men. There never was a more astounding fraud perpetrated upon mankind than that which is found in the monstrous pretensions of those who claim to be the majority! All that the whole business amounts to, as we shall find when we examine it in its entirety, is that one set of men seek to rule over another set of men by mere force of numbers.

An election is simply a contrivance by which heads or noses may be counted, but it determines nothing, proves nothing, so

far as truth and justice are concerned. An election indicates what the majority want, or what the few who control the majority want, and what the minority may want is something that is discarded as a matter of no moment. If the minority did not vote at all, the result would not be different. What good does it do men to vote and declare their wishes, when no attention at all is paid to their preferences? But that is something that happens to every man who finds himself in the minority.

The rule that eight should control seven, is one that is entirely arbitrary. That is not necessarily the proportion which is to govern in all cases. Sometimes it is four to two, or perhaps eight to four. There is no reason in the world why the rule might not as well be established that seven should control eight, so far as the mere question of right is concerned. In fact it very often occurs that the seven, being adroit men, really govern the eight, who are not so adroit. Sometimes even one man rules eight, either from the peculiar circumstances of the case or his own superior tact or power.

I have spoken of an election already as a contrivance, but it is more than that. It is a game whereat many men play, and at which some lose, while others win. In this game the minority are the ones that are beaten—they never beat themselves, they are beaten by their antagonists, though the claim is usually made that they beat themselves. A man's case is not bettered in the least because he was allowed to play. That was only for appearance sake. He would have been beaten just the same if he had not played, or had not voted. The majority always have their way at all hazards; that is the sort of divine right that the majority pretends to have, and with which it uniformly imposes upon the minority. No man has his way simply because he has been allowed to vote. His voting has absolutely nothing to do with his rights. But if a man really has rights, the voting of ten thousand other men can never deprive him of those rights.

An election is a contest or a trial which makes neither side any stronger or better than it was, and it never alters the facts of the case in the least. It is only an experiment or investigation, a form to be used for appearance sake. The majority being the stronger party mean to have their own wishes carried out, and they go through with the forms of an election merely to have the minority ratify what they are determined to have done. That is all there is of an election. Elections prove nothing, alter nothing. In that respect they are like a trial at court. We risk our lives and our liberties on the result of an election, but we might just as well risk them on a throw of dice, for one is just as certain as the other. If the result of an election was not uncertain, there would be no need of having an election to ascertain that result. When we consent to be governed by the result of a count, we always put ourselves in the hands of chance. We practically abandon our case. We are not compelled to do it—we do it because we choose to do it, or think it necessary to do it, but when we consent to it, we throw right and propriety to the winds. Right and propriety are not things to be voted on—they are questions to be settled in some other way. They are questions that each man must settle for himself and they cannot be settled by proxy. No amount of voting can ever make a wrong right, or a right wrong. It has often been tried, but it has never yet been accomplished.

A thing is either right or wrong, and if it is right or wrong for one, it ought to be equally right or wrong for all. Voting can neither make or unmake rights. How many there are who believe on one side and how many on the other, has nothing to do with the right or wrong of the question. I think no one pretends that there is necessarily anything right in the views of a majority. History has shown that majorities are more apt to be wrong than the minority. Ten thousand simpletons are never, in wisdom, the equal of one wise man. In fact ten thousand simpletons, all being of the same caliber, know not a whit more than one simpleton. I repeat the intimation thrown

out often before, that numbers never change character. Ten thousand pennies have some characteristics that one penny does not have, but they can never be anything but ten thousand pennies. There is not one of them that has the slightest increase of value from the simple fact of its being one of ten thousand. But people on the matter of voting seem to have a different idea. They imagine that if a hundred men think so and so, it makes a stronger case than if only ninety-five think so. But if I make an assertion and a thousand men agree with me, that by no means proves that I am right. No, an election is merely a sort of compromise, a matter of expediency or necessity, and no man can maintain that it ever determines what is right or what is wrong.

It should not be forgotten, in conclusion, that allowing the majority to decide is not the only way of settling questions. It is only one among many ways, and is comparatively a modern practice. In some cases a two-thirds or a three-fourths vote is required, and some other proportion would be just as correct and would answer just as well. In many cases, as among the Russians in their village government, a unanimous vote is required, and in other countries such a thing as a comparison of voices or a counting of heads is never heard of.

There is no tyranny equal to that of a majority. One man is generally careful what he does, because he knows he will be held responsible for his deeds. But a body of men is entirely irresponsible, and therefore always does as it pleases. In practice, what is called the democratic form of government is the most despotic form known.

Where the majority rules, or where the party rules, it is the height of nonsense to talk about the people ruling as a body. There never was such a thing; there could be no such thing. When we come to analyze the matter fully, we shall find that one set of men rule another set of men. There can be no other kind of rule—no man, no people rule themselves. With us, the caucus consisting of a few men does the whole

business, while a boss, like Senator Platt or Senator Hill, sends out his orders and controls the caucus.

POLITICS AND PARTY RULE.

In a democracy like ours, where all questions of state management and state policy are settled ultimately by the ballot, government degenerates into a matter of mere party rule. Under such a condition of things, men are counted not in accordance with their moral or intellectual worth, but rather in proportion to their influence and the number of votes they happen to control. No one pretends that any questions which are even remotely connected with politics are settled exclusively upon their merits, or that men are either elected to office or favored in any way on the simple ground that they are deserving of honor or worthy of confidence. In elections, the issue is decided by a mere mechanical process of counting, and it becomes not a question of right or wrong, but merely a matter of enumeration. If the number happens to be 20, the result is one way; but if it happens to be 21, then the result is just the opposite. It is well known that the ballots, when they are counted, are not a measure of the judgment, experience, intelligence or even of the integrity of those who have voted. It is very well understood that, at our most important elections, many people vote who are wanting in all the best elements of manhood. They are often men who are not noted in the community in which they live either for sound judgment, large experience, or even for common honesty. As a rule electors vote in droves. They often vote under orders, often under a misconception of facts, often without any knowledge of the subject under consideration, and still oftener without any serious convictions of their own or any concern about the result. They frequently vote for the pay they receive or the benefits they expect, and their choice between candidates or measures is governed solely by what they conceive to be their own personal interest. Per-

haps such things must be expected under a democratic form of government, but what could be more unworthy or unjust? No question could ever be settled upon a basis of fairness and right in that way. It is, as we have said before, wholly a matter of figures. Legal forms and rules are observed, it is true, but of what avail is this, when legal forms and rules can always be altered to suit the interests or fancy of those who are in power?

We are not able to conceive of anything so dishonest or so destitute of principle as political management or party rule as it prevails at the present day. Neither party makes any pretensions to being fair and honorable in its action. It is an established rule upon which all parties act, that everything is fair in politics, as in war, and that to be successful is always better than to be right. Their constant aim is to deceive the people, and always to seem better than they really are. During a canvass all parties keep themselves disguised as if they were acting a part at a masquerade. The moment a party succeeds and is placed in power, the mask suddenly falls, and then for the first the country begins to understand what it has done, and it is enabled to perceive the character of the men into whose hands it has fallen. During the canvass, the rallying cry heard on all sides is, "the good of the country," but after election is over, it is soon ascertained that what was meant by "good of the country," was really "the good of the party," and generally of only a very small portion of the party at that.

No form or phase of human nature can give such an exhibition of unalloyed selfishness as a political party. A party, any party, will do meaner things and get down to lower depths of corruption and infamy than any individual alone would ever dare to do. We see this fact exemplified in New York city, at our state capital, and in all places where spoils can be reached, and where men find they can get rich more rapidly by foul than by fair means. We saw the selfishness of party exemplified in the war of 1812, when the Federalists favored the British, with whom our country was at war at that time; also in 1846, when

the Whigs sympathized with Mexico, and practically opposed their own government in its war with that country ; and again in 1861, when the Democrats as a party were opposed to the war with the South, and did much, in the earlier stages of the contest at least, to render victory on the side of the Union a matter of very grave doubt. Even in the war of the Revolution there was a party opposed to Washington, and it did all that was possible to embarrass the commanding general in his efforts to secure the final independence of the American colonies. It has often happened in the past, and it will doubtless often happen in the future, that a party not in power would rejoice at a defeat in war that would bring ruin upon its country, for no other reason than that a victory would result in some material advantage to an opposing party. Alas ! where shall we find villainy manifesting itself in darker hues than in the management and maneuvers of a political party ? What did the Republicans of the nation do in 1876, and the Democrats of New York in 1891 ?

How can we talk about liberty, equality, justice and proper representation under any form of government, where everything is controlled by party, and where the sole aim of the leaders of the party is the spoils ? What shall we expect where the welfare of the public, and even the much talked of "greatest good to the greatest number" is lost sight of, where decency and fair dealing are ignored, where all that is manly and magnanimous is trampled in the dust and where people lose their heads, as well as their character, in the mad scramble for office ?

Politics, especially under a form of government where everything is decided by the ballot, leads to the development of the very worst characteristics of which human nature is susceptible. Its chief stock in trade is vilification and misrepresentation. Everything that is done by one party is assumed to be right, while that which is done by the opposing party is presumed to be wrong. The party managers and their agents spare no efforts that might serve to blacken the name of their antagonists, or that might tend to bring them into disrepute with the

people. Politics is largely a game of trickery, treachery and deceit, and the most persevering schemer, if not the most unprincipled rascal, is the one most apt to succeed, at least for the time being. It is no wonder that good men by the hundreds refuse to come out on election day, preferring to be disfranchised rather than to soil their garments by coming in contact with some men that they are certain to meet at the polls. If they went, they would be sure to find the front seats all taken; they would find themselves crowded to the rear, while boodlers and professional politicians, would be left sitting in high places. These, the boodlers and the politicians, are the men who own, control and run the machinery by which our laws are made, by which the destiny of men is settled, and in harmony with which all the departments of the state are managed.

No, there is not a tinge of honesty, fairness or principle in politics as conducted in this country. Even the laws, as everybody concedes, are usually the result of a compromise—but it is well known that where the spirit of compromise prevails, there principle is thrown to the winds. Compromise is always unfair to one party or the other. Compromise is the argument of rogues.

THE STATE IN FACT.

The first thing to be done in entering upon the consideration of this subject, is to obtain a clear idea of what the state is, and ascertain if possible who they are that compose the state. When we have reached that point, we shall be better able to decide what homage or service men owe the state, and what it is, if anything, that the state owes them in return.

Who is the state? Where is the state? Is there really anywhere any such thing as the state? Is it not largely, if not wholly, a fiction? Where, for instance, shall we be able to find the state of New York? It is not the land that is the state; it must be the people who occupy the land. The land remains

while the state changes. The land now embraced within the limits of New York has been where it is for thousands of years, but it has not been known as the territory or state of New York for much over 200 years. No, the land is in no sense the state, and it should not be called the state any more than the house in which a family lives should be called the family. As Bluntschli says: "The man is the state." Those who act as proxy for the state, who wear the garb and bear the shield of the state, the men who call themselves the state and act for the state, are simply a set of individuals who reside at the capital, or who are scattered about in various places, taking charge of this or that department, collecting the money which the people are forced to pay, and finally disbursing the same, or using it for their own personal benefit. These are the men who, for the time being, are the state.

Is there any other state than these men who pride themselves on being officers of the state, but who are after all made of just such flesh and bone as the ordinary run of men—no worse than other men, perhaps, and probably no better? Who else is it that constitutes the town or the county, or any society or group whatever? Really, the state is a shadow—and, to a large extent, it is a sham. It does not perform what it advertises. It is not what it seems; it does not possess the character that it pretends to have. But the men who represent the state and who live upon its pay and perquisites, these are real, live men, who must subsist like other people, and who must like other people eat food and wear clothes.

Perhaps we may get a better idea of what a state or government really is by considering the condition of things as it existed during the war against the southern confederacy. Was that war actually a struggle between the government on one side and the South on the other? That was the pretence that the northern people made, and that is the face that they tried to present to the world, but it has no foundation in fact. They claimed to be the whole government, though it must now be

acknowledged that in truth they were only a part of the government, which is the same thing as admitting that they were not the government at all. We all know it was not a struggle between the government and some other party, but merely a struggle between the seceding states and the balance of the union, two sections as independent of each other as England and Ireland, or Sweden and Norway. This contest typifies the contest in all cases where the fiction of the government or nation is brought into consideration. The work that is done in the conflicts of this world is never done by whole groups, whole nations, or whole states. The movement, as in the case of the war that we have just noticed, is always started by a few, and is carried forward by one section of the people, without regard to the feelings or wishes of the remaining faction, which is forced by superior strength to submit and go along with the current.

Unfortunately, mankind have always had very vague and imperfect ideas of what constitutes a state. Designing men have from time to time been at the head of the state, and having charge of its affairs, they have succeeded admirably in deluding the masses and making them believe that the state is something divine, rather than human. It is in this way that people, in all ages, down to the present time, have been induced to worship the state. The state is like the king, it can do no wrong. Hence it is that it never admits its responsibility for any injury that it occasions. Whatever the state does is right, because it is the strongest party. The state is strength in the concrete. The state does a vast deal of wrong in a year, to say nothing of what it does in a hundred years, but it rarely or never apologizes for the damage it occasions. To individuals it never does so, and to nations it only does so when it is fearful of the consequences of refusal. The state thinks it nothing out of the way to ruin a man's business, as it often does, by enacting some new law or abolishing an old one. The state builds up and the state tears down, always, be it remem-

bered, in accordance with its own sweet will. The state may do anything it pleases. It may send a man to prison, or it may strangle him to death, with no higher motive for its action than to save itself a little inconvenience or prevent the loss of some advantage. The state claims absolute ownership, or at least prior title, to all the land in the country. According to the theory on which the state is founded, the people are only tenants at will, or perhaps serfs attached to the soil. Why, they have not a single element of freedom left to them when it comes to a question of right or authority as between them and the state. To resist the state, even when the individual is clearly in the right, is treason, and treason, as everybody knows, is a dreadful thing. In such a case, there is no appeal to any tribunal save God, and an appeal of that kind is always accompanied with a great many difficulties. There is no provision made in any state that we have ever heard of for resistance by the individual against any action taken by the state, no matter how monstrous it may be in character. The state always has what seems to itself a valid excuse for any rascally piece of work that it chooses to perform. The stereotyped justification is, "the public good." And, indeed, how many wicked things have been done already in the name of "public good"! It is a false and deceiving term, often used to conceal the vilest motives of the men who manage the affairs of the state. I am disgusted with the exaggerated demands made on behalf of the public upon individuals who are so unfortunate as to belong to the state. As if it were the duty of the individual to make all the sacrifices, and the state none! Is not the individual's life, comfort and health as dear to him as life, health and comfort are to a hundred or a million of other men? And then it must not be forgotten that the sacrifices demanded from individuals by the state are never made for the whole public, but only for a certain portion of the public. In every instance where men talk about the good of the public, it will be found on careful examination that what they really mean is only the good of a

favored portion of the public. So it is in the case of building highways, or widening streets, or laying out railroads, and all other so-called improvements. The expense is borne and the sacrifices are made by one portion of the people, while the benefits are enjoyed chiefly by another portion. There never was a law or regulation made by any state that did not in its effects injure some, while it benefited others. No such law could possibly be devised. But if the facts are such as have just been stated, on what fair and just ground can we insist that any man shall be compelled to sacrifice himself or his property to gratify or to benefit ten or a hundred other men who are no better, perhaps, than himself? Such a forced sacrifice as that could never be justified on any principles of justice or truth. What, then, becomes of the claims of the state upon the life or property of individuals?

Again, I urge that men should make no mistake in their estimates and conceptions of the state. They should not allow themselves to be deceived by the pomp, splendor and lofty pretensions of power. Louis XIV. was entirely right when he said : "I am the state." He was the state, and there was no state but him, at that time, in France. He possessed all the power, and whoever has all the power, or at least the preponderance of power, is always, for the time being, the state. Whoever makes laws and measures out justice, is always the state. William the Conqueror, after he had won the battle of Hastings, became the state for England. Before that event, King Harold was the state,

But these men who are the state, these kings, these conquerors, these leaders, these ministers, who and what are they? Divested of their robes and emblems of office, they are at best mere men, and as often happens, they are very corrupt, very wicked, and sometimes very weak men. They are usually selfish men, intriguing people, designing creatures, and unscrupulous and ambitious persons. What just claims can they have upon the homage or adoration of men? By what right shall

they demand sacrifices from the people? I am not able to see that they have any right, except so far as the homage is rendered or the sacrifices are made by men of their own free will.

And now, further, if the state proves to be what we have claimed it is; if what has been assumed to be the state is only a portion of the state; if the claims that are made upon our service and homage in the name of the state, are really made by men just like ourselves, by men, finally, who have no claims at all upon our submission or obedience, and who can present no single argument in their behalf except that which comes from numbers and position, why should we bow down like slaves before the state and allow ourselves to be transformed into bondsmen who have no other use and office than to labor for other people and pay tribute to men who have no occasion to toil for themselves, but who make a business of reaping where others have sown?

What sound argument can be advanced, what justification can be offered for the claim that is usually insisted upon that these same ordinary men who happen to have the reins of government in their hands shall practically own the balance of the people of the state, and have at their command and disposal the lives and property of their fellow men? This claim is never based on their superior wisdom or on their exalted character. Indeed, those who have the power and are in a position to take charge of the affairs of the state, never stop to reason the matter or discuss the question of right. They simply order and must be obeyed. As God said at the beginning of creation, "Let there be light, and there was light"—that is all there is of it. The story is very short in all such cases.

But the moment a man with ordinary intelligence stops to examine this subject and apply the most common principles of reason to the question, he must inevitably come to the conclusion that the state comes into court without any case at all. It has nothing to support itself in the position it assumes except its own presumption and audacity. No man owes anything to

the state or anything to the public. He may make sacrifices for the state, or sacrifices for the public, he may give to either or to both his labor and his means, but if he does, it is only because he chooses, and not as a matter of compulsion. The doctrine should never for a moment be admitted that the state may act as our censor, our patron, our protector, our instructor or our master. Every man should be left to take that course which he prefers, and to do as he likes, and then he should be left to meet the consequences of his action. If a man chooses to make a fool of himself, that is a privilege of which he cannot justly be deprived. If he does not always act with what we would consider sound judgment, that is his misfortune. Men owe obedience and submission to no one under heaven, whether he comes in the name of the state or with some other unfounded pretence. Men should not only be permitted but encouraged to act upon their own judgment and depend upon their own exertions. They might consult with wiser men than themselves, but they should not be compelled to follow the advice after it is given. No man should be forced to do anything, which means simply that no man should be punished for doing what others do not happen to want done. The only punishment men should ever receive should be the evil consequences of their own misconduct.

One fact cannot be too well understood and too carefully remembered, and that is that no dealings, no transactions, no questions that come up in life, are ever really between men and the state, but they are always between one set of men, and another set of men, either men as individuals or men claiming to represent the government—always, be it not forgotten, simply ordinary men. We should do for the state what we should do for individuals, no more and no less. In dealing with men, we are allowed to consult our own judgment, even our own fancy. We are permitted to do or not to do, as we see fit. So it should always be in matters of state. There should be no attempt at compulsion, and no effort to dictate our action.

Whoever undertakes to compel us to do anything, wrongs us—always wrongs us. God never gave any such authority to any human being. At least there has been no evidence given yet that God ever attempted to delegate such power to man. But, as it is now, the state treats all men as if they were children or simple people who need guidance and protection like wayward orphans. The reasons for such assumptions of authority are always selfish ones. Officers of the state do not take the masses under their care and direction simply to confer some lasting benefit upon them, but to provide easy places for themselves and furnish an opportunity to amass riches without either danger or fatigue.

There is no evidence anywhere that the affairs of men move along more smoothly or successfully because of the interference of the state in all their doings. There is no evidence that ordinary men are not as well able to conduct their own business for themselves as other ordinary men are for them. It is well to bear in mind that the state interposes not because it can do things better, but because such interference is assumed to be its privilege. It is customary, and what is customary, it is claimed, ought not to be changed. Previous custom is all the ground that the state has to stand on in all this business. But it is well known that even custom ought to be changed after a time.

The main argument which the state puts forward to justify its interference in the affairs of individuals, is found in the word "protection." It assumes that men are in the need of protection, and it affects the part of the big boy who keeps off the bears and robbers and prevents thoughtless children from hurting each other. There was a time, a long while since, when this argument may have had some force and a better application than it has now. There was a time when war was the rule and peace the exception. Then everybody had to keep himself on a war footing, and it often happened that in order to be secure against attack, a man was compelled to ally himself with a stronger party. But it must not be forgotten that in all cases where a

man goes to another man for protection or assistance, he puts himself, to a greater or less extent, in the power of his ally, and it very often happens that he loses his liberty by the experiment. The doves in the fable found themselves in a much worse plight by calling in the aid of the hawk. The English lost their liberty by appealing to the Saxons, their neighbors. How many times has it happened in the business affairs of this world that a man mortgages his property to one whom he believes to be his friend, in order to escape some danger, and finally loses it all and becomes the slave of his protector! And so it is in the history of the state. Under pretence of doing this and that thing for the protection and comfort of the citizen, the state comes at last to have the citizen absolutely in its power. As times and practices are now, there is little occasion to call for assistance from any outside sources. The occupations of all civilized people now are those of peace rather than war. A man who attends to his own affairs and respects the rights of others need have no apprehension of attack from some stronger party.

And few people are aware how little the state really does for the protection or security of citizens. Indeed, the state does not guarantee that it will keep them from injury, but that it will punish the offender if it succeeds in apprehending him. In too many cases this *if* is fatal, and even when the culprit is caught and punished, that fact can do little of itself toward alleviating the sufferings of the victim. Everybody understands that he must look out for his own safety and protect himself, if he is protected at all. If he waited for the state to do this work for him, he would find himself in a very sorry plight in nine cases out of ten. Generally, where the state is needed, it is rarely found, and even in the few instances where it does appear, it is too slow in getting around. A man might rob and kill another in a hundred cases, and every time escape before the state or its officers would learn of any disturbance.

It is a mistake to imagine that the business of governing is so intricate and peculiar that it must necessarily be accorded to

a certain privileged and experienced class. Government, or control of a man's conduct, is something that every man should learn for himself. It is one of the things that cannot be well done by proxy. It is clear that the state has no definite notions as to what a man may properly do for himself and what the state should necessarily do for him. There has never been even to this day any perceptible line drawn in this matter. In a large portion of the common affairs of life, all men are allowed to follow the dictates of their own judgment. In other words, they are allowed to shift for themselves. Indeed, the state tacitly admits that as a protector of individuals it is more or less of a failure, for it concedes to men the right of self-defence, and in many cases it allows them to fight their way out in any way they deem best. Is it not clear that if a man is capable of managing a part of his affairs, he is probably able to manage the balance, and that if he can defend himself in one case, he doubtless could manage to defend himself in another? How many hundreds, and even thousands of instances are there where men are permitted to conduct their affairs as if they were sovereigns, without the least help and the least intercession from either the law or the state! But if a man may be a sovereign in many things, why not in all things, at least in all those things in which his personal interests are alone concerned?

Why does the state continually meddle or interfere in the affairs of men? No man needs government. He may need instruction, advice, or even caution, but governing never does him any good. And yet the state constantly acts upon the theory that every man not an officer of the state must be *non compos*, and as such he needs guidance and control. The poor, helpless individual is kept perpetually on the rack of uncertainty. Truly, he may say that he does not know what a day will bring forth. He may know what the state will demand of him to-day, but he could not possibly tell what the state might determine to call for to-morrow. A man may be doing a prosperous business to-day, and by some new step taken by the

state, or some new law passed by the legislature, he may find himself a bankrupt to-morrow. It is not certainty, but uncertainty that torments the men who live under the iron rule of the state. A man is in a lamentable condition when every movement that he makes is subject to the arbitrary will of a despot. The citizen begs for nothing but to be let alone, but alas! that would be impossible. A man might fly to the uttermost parts of the earth, and even there he would find himself the subject of some government.

It must not be forgotten that the ways and tendencies of the state and its agents are strictly those of the robber and extortionist. Government officers are parasites; they fasten upon the people and suck the blood from their veins. That is the chief duty which they are called upon to perform. No man who represents the government, from the king down, is a producer. He is a vampire who lives by what he extracts from other creatures. The state gets what it can by deception or persuasion first, and the balance it secures by compulsion afterward. The state is the stronger party, and when its screws come to be applied to a victim, he has no alternative but to yield, as he uniformly does. When the unarmed traveler is met by the robber, and it is a question whether he had better sacrifice his life or lose his purse, he is usually sensible enough to let the purse go and preserve his life. But unlike the ordinary robber, the state does not take all it can find. It reserves the victim for future use. It knows better than to kill the bird that lays the golden egg. The citizen is permitted to live and go on accumulating more property, and by and by the state comes along quietly and makes another reprisal. That is just how it has been done, in every civilized land where such a thing as government exists.

It is often claimed that men owe submission to government because there is an implied contract on their part to obey all laws and all officers of the law. But there is really no foundation for such a claim as that. A man comes into the world

and becomes a subject of a certain state without his will. He remains where he is, simply because he has no other place whither he may go. He obeys because he must; his submission in all cases is a matter of necessity from which he cannot escape. I venture to say that no government was ever formed by contract or agreement. A constitution bears the semblance of a contract, but it is always the work of a few men, generally without any legal and binding authority, and it certainly could not obligate future generations who had no part in framing the constitution. The theory that the subjects of a state are bound by some implied contract which they are supposed to have made with the government, is now generally abandoned.

In concluding this article, I would remark that nations have dealings with each other, and they get along year after year in a very neighborly way, without laws, without a written constitution, without legislatures and without either governors or kings. They cannot be bound by laws, for they are all sovereigns, and smaller states and the larger ones are alike supreme. No one assumes or presumes to exercise the slightest authority over the other, and still we see that they get along well together for a long series of years. They have long since learned both the necessity and the propriety of doing right by each other. Whenever any question arises, and the two parties differ in their opinions, as parties with opposing interests naturally will, they leave the question to arbitrators, and abide by their decision when it is rendered. Now, why may not men as neighbors and friends do precisely the same thing? Why should they be subject to laws which they themselves never made? Why should they be treated as subjects, as slaves? Why are not they sovereigns, why is not every man a sovereign, owing allegiance or submission to no man under heaven?

THE STATE AND ITS POWER.

It is generally assumed that all the state has to do, when it really wants anything done or anything omitted, is to have a law passed, and that settles the business. But careful observers and men who reflect upon what they have learned, know better than all this. When it comes to something that power alone can do, the state is as helpless as an infant. Indeed the state at all times is a fine example of how little power or force of itself can accomplish, when power or force is the only thing to depend on. The state passes a law or gives an order, and then it is left for the people to say whether they will obey or not. Have there not been thousands of cases in the history of this world where laws could not be enforced, even when backed by all the power of an empire? To give any law a value, it must be enforced; the mere enactment of a law and spreading it out on the statute book never harms or helps anybody. It is only when an attempt is made to enforce the order that the question comes up in a tangible shape. The men who pass laws never enforce them. For that part of the business, a new set of men is required and they can proceed or not proceed just as they like; and if they do proceed, they can take whichever way they like and go as far as they choose. The enforcement of a law or an order depends wholly upon the will of man, and the will of man is something that no power on earth, or in the heavens over the earth, can control even for a single moment. Hence, I say, the strongest government in the world is powerless from the moment when its people refuse to obey.

Men delight to talk about the power of the state, as they do about the power of God—in fact it very often occurs that one is confounded with the other—and yet we know very well that there is no God that has any power, in the sense that is commonly understood when the term power is used. There is no God that is able to make black white, or seventy-five cents equal

to one hundred cents, or to change the course of events or the laws of nature, in a single respect. So it is with the state—it cannot create anything, it cannot destroy anything, it cannot metamorphose anything. God can do what nature permits—so can the state, so can anybody—but that is no evidence of real power. Nature will do what is to be done without God's help or without the help of the state.

Yes, the state can do a few things—it can obstruct, embarrass, delay, confuse, but that is about all. It can dam a stream and prevent it from flowing in its natural course—any set of men could do that much—but it cannot change the nature of water, nor prevent it, even for one moment, from obeying its natural tendency to seek a lower level in some direction. If the water cannot flow on in its own channel, it is certain after a brief delay to find a new channel somewhere else. Just so it comes to pass when the state interferes with the affairs of individuals. It may obstruct their passage and prevent them from doing just as they otherwise would, but it cannot alter their disposition nor can it prevent them from manifesting that disposition in some new and perhaps more dangerous manner. The state cannot do anything that in the nature of things is impossible. It cannot prevent men from drinking; it cannot stop crime; it cannot even check prostitution to any appreciable extent. The state cannot make people honest; it cannot even make them happy or wise. The state can only do what the people are willing to have done. The people can veto any provision that the state decides to enact or put in the form of law. And yet, what the state cannot possibly do, it is sure to be continually striving to do; what is evidently practicable and easily accomplished, the state as a general thing is not particularly concerned about.

There is much that is mysterious about the state. To this day men do not know what the state is, nor where it is to be found. There is a state, as there is a God—no more and no less—both exist only as a matter of theory, in the minds of men.

And, finally, when people come to see that there is really no state, and that common men called officers are the ones who speak and act for God, they will begin to have different conceptions of things from what they have now.

It must be clear to every careful student that the state has become our God—and as such it has taken the place of God and the church. The state takes the place and does the work of Providence. The state educates and trains its subjects. The state makes men rich, makes them powerful, makes them happy. The state is supposed to give men wisdom and help them out of their difficulties. The state will do for us what we ought to do for ourselves, and so far it resembles Providence. But Providence will let us starve, if we can do nothing ourselves, and so will the state. Men are too ready to run to the state for assistance. Whenever they get into trouble, financial or otherwise, they immediately rush to the state, as the child does to its parent or as the Christian does to his Saviour.

But people ought, at this late day, to begin to realize just what the state is. The state works exclusively for itself, and its leading aim is to perpetuate its power, develop its own wealth and promote its own happiness, precisely as the king does or the pope. The state at the present day takes the place of the monarch in every respect. It is true, that under the present system, men do not see their master, the man who touches the button and controls all the machinery, but he can be found, concealed behind the curtain precisely as the priest was formerly concealed in the old pagan temples. *The boss of the dominant party is the monarch in all modern states.* The boss is the man who rules the party, and the party is what governs the state, and really is the state. No state, not even a democracy, has more than one boss, one sovereign, at a time. How could it have more? As has been so often said, it is impossible to serve two masters.

But the only community that flourishes is the one in which the individual flourishes. Men talk about the “greatest good

to the greatest number." What does that mean? Does it mean that ten men shall perish in order that ninety shall survive? As a rule, what is understood to be the "greatest number" is really the smallest number. In practice, the multitude must suffer and economize in order that a few may become wealthy and powerful. Not only in this but in all countries, the end or aim to be attained is usually the greatest good to the smallest number. But what have numbers to do with the business at best? We should seek to do good to all, making no distinction in any way. We should endeavor to save the ship of state, *with all on board*, rather than to cast a few Jonahs overboard in order to lighten the vessel and let the balance have fair sailing.

Man is preeminently a selfish being, and no matter what position he may hold, he will always seek to "feather his own nest." Hence, whenever we put ourselves into the hands of other men for protection, or for any other reason, we make a sad mistake. When a man is allowed to take charge of our affairs and settle up our estate, he uniformly makes all the money out of the business that the law allows, and sometimes more. The best way is for every man to attend to his own matters and settle his own business. Men will never be free and independent until they adopt some such course as that. So long as men have other men to do their work, they must expect to be dependent, and the chances are that in the end their fate will be poverty and bondage. So, if Americans allow foreigners to work their farms, while they themselves do nothing, as has been the practice in this country of late, they must expect that at no distant day those foreigners will own the farms, while the former owners will themselves have nothing. What we have just been saying in reference to man in his relations to man, would apply equally well to man in his relations to the state. If men leave everything to the state, they will eventually be not only the servants of the state, but its bondsmen.

The state is altogether too ready to take charge of our schools and do all the teaching, knowing that if it has charge of

the schools it can determine what shall be taught in them. No one can doubt that the state will manage the school and lay down the programme of instruction in such a manner as to be most conducive to the advancement of its own interests. So children are taught in school to be obedient and to honor their master, and especially to honor the state. Patriotism is taught as the highest of all virtues and the national flag is made, practically, an object of worship. The chief object of state instruction is to make willing and faithful servants of the children.

THE POLICY OF THE STATE.

Success in state management depends largely upon the practice of deception, and the better the state is able to conceal its true inwardness and hoodwink the people, the more certain it may be of securing prompt and trustful submission from the masses. The people are never allowed to know who the state actually is, nor who is the one that needs or wants their money. The whole policy of the state, as a rule, is one of actual or constructive fraud and deception. The people are not permitted to know, except to a limited extent, what becomes of the taxes that are raised. A favorite method of raising revenues is through what is called "indirect taxation," a scheme by which large sums are taken from the pockets of the people annually, while those who pay the bill have no means of knowing how much is thus taken, nor what becomes of the money.

In this, as in every other civilized country, no man can own anything unless it has the government brand on it in some place; no one is permitted to do even the most simple thing, against the will or without the approval of the state. Society, or government, has all the power—*the individual has none*. The theory is, that all that people are good for is to serve the public, and in so doing, to serve the state. What the public wants, or rather what those want who control the machine, is to have some one else do the serving and sacrificing, while they

simply give the orders. The public always extols a man for his patriotism—it loves patriotism, in other people—but when a war is begun it is only a certain portion of the people who are sent forward to fill the enemy's prisons, or die in the hospitals or on the battlefields. Those who call themselves the state, with their favorites and friends, are careful to remain at home to raise funds and send forward recruits. Even if they join the army, they uniformly obtain some choice place, some office, or a position on some officer's staff, a clerkship in some department, or perhaps a situation as hospital steward. It is the “bone and sinew of the land” that is usually sent to the front—at least that has been the experience in this country in previous cases. It is always much more pleasant to rule than to be ruled, and to be on the inside than the outside when trouble arises.

Max Stirner says, with truth: “The state rests upon the slavery of labor. If labor were free, and the worker were his own master, the state would cease to exist.” The great works of this world are usually the product or result of what may be called slave labor.

No one obeys this man or that man; he obeys simply the law or the constitution. That is the prevailing fiction, and it has worked with surprising success thus far in most countries. But who makes the law, and how is it made? It is much easier to name those who do not make the laws than those who do. The people who obey the law do not make the laws; if they did, they would usually make them different.

Men generally hate black slaves, but they have no objection at all to white slavery, provided it goes by some other name and is not against the law. They would not see a dog ill used or trodden under foot, but they stand by and see the noblest men of our land imposed upon, trampled down and even murdered in cold blood, if it is done in the name of the state, and if it is claimed to be necessary for the good of the public. The state can do anything it chooses—it can commit any imaginable

crime, in order to tighten its grip or insure its safety or success. That is the remarkable prerogative that the state seems to possess.

The "Horrors of Slavery" was a book that I happened to come across in my younger days. It was an account given by an American who had fallen into the clutches of the Algerines in the early part of this century. The tale of sufferings related by this man was shocking enough, but a more affecting account than that could be given, if one should attempt to describe the sufferings and misfortunes of men and women in every civilized land to-day who are pestered, persecuted, prosecuted, ruined, and sometimes slaughtered in the name of Christianity and the law! What will men not do, if they can only be brought to believe that it is their duty? Is there any crime that they would hesitate to commit under such circumstances?

But, we cannot have brave men unless we have free men; and we cannot have honest and virtuous men, until we have men who fear neither God nor man. Men who are afraid fail to do what they know they ought to do. A man who is under the law is a slave, and a slave can have no virtues, certainly no virtues of his own. He can never be himself—he must be some other one than himself—a sort of fraud or hypocrite, a nondescript, a kind of centaur that is half horse and half human being. How can a man develop himself, fully and naturally, when he is always kept in a strait-jacket and is always under restraint?

It is rascals that get the most service and assistance from the state. The state will send out a regiment to protect a scalawag, if he happens to be a protege of the government, but what it would do for an honest and worthy citizen, would usually be very little indeed. It is the majesty of the law, and its supposed violation, that arouses and irritates the state, and when the state feels insulted, it brings out its big guns in short order. Then the trouble begins.

Under the state no man does anything that is not author-

ized. When a man does anything, the first question that is asked, especially if it is a little out of the ordinary course of things, is whether it is according to law. Everything is supposed to come from the state—it is the source of wealth, power, happiness, everything. No wonder the state is our God, and there is no other God but the state. In the Middle Ages the church had all the power; now the church is allied with the state, in a subordinate capacity, however. God himself has become simply a shadow, a remembrance, a form without either substance or power.

It is a curious fact that the state in which the people rule is strictly an unlimited monarchy, because the government, the people, is the source of all power. The people are above kings; the king gets his power from the people, and the people are the original source of power. The people take the place of God. And, by the way, whom do we mean by the “people”? Do we mean everybody, the whole people? No, most assuredly not. *The whole people never does anything—it would be impossible.* When we say the people, we mean some people, a few people, those who take the lead and conduct the business—they are the people in all cases. All other people are ghosts, mere words. Nay more, when we talk about what the whole people does, we are trying to perpetrate a fraud and deceive the public.

We pay to the state because we feel obligated on account of the good we imagine it does for us. The state, as we believe, gives us our daily bread, or at least if it were not for the constant protection the state gives us, we could not have our daily sustenance. We have everything from society and the state. But what does the state have from us? What could the state or society do without you and me, and the rest of us? Without us, *there never would be any state.* The obligation is really on the other side; we could exist without society, but society could not exist for a moment without the individuals of which it is composed.

In this connexion, the following additional truths may be

brought to the attention of the reader: All men are equal among themselves—but as against the state, there is no possible room for comparison. The state has all the power, and the individual none. The one who has the power is right always—power is the only source of justice that is known. Unfortunately, it is impossible to reform either the state, the government, or law. We can dispense with them, but we cannot improve them. It is impossible to make a good man a bad man, or to convert a bad man into a good man. It must not be forgotten that the state in its whole nature is depraved—*it was conceived in iniquity.*

It must be remembered that the state is a ghost, so is society, mankind, the court, and organizations of all kinds. They are all ideal and not real things. Bodies of men are always ghosts, mere imaginary existences. Their sole representative is a word.

Finally, nothing is holy unless I make it holy. No man is my master unless I make him such, or unless I follow and obey him. As a matter of fact, I do not believe in sacred things, because I do not believe in sacredness itself. Why should I recognize power? What is power desired for? Simply to have something to apply to those who are subject to power. *If men did not desire my labor, my money, my property, myself, they would never seek to overpower me.* So it is with the state.

STATE INTERFERENCE.

As a matter of principle, I am decidedly opposed to government's meddling with the affairs of individuals in any way or for any purpose. Ninety per cent. of our business is done without the aid or interposition of law, and it seems evident that with a little effort the interference in the other ten per cent. might also be dispensed with. Since people who make rules and establish laws for our observance are ordinarily no better, no wiser, no abler, and no honester than the common run of man-

kind, why should they set themselves up as the arbiters of our fate, or as the men who must control our action and dictate our course in life? Men need but little governing. If every man learns, as he ought, to govern himself, there will be nothing, or essentially nothing, left for the officers of the law to care for. The few duties to be performed for the community should be left to experienced and reliable men who know their duty and are willing to perform what is required of them without hope of reward. Men should not be taken from their duties in life to do this or that for the public, such as serving on juries or going to war.

There is no machinery so expensive as government, and the expense it incurs is by no means necessary or unavoidable. The only case where the government could be of any real benefit to the individual would be when called upon to aid or defend him in case of attack by a stronger party, and that is something that could rarely occur in society, organized as it is at present. But we pay very dearly indeed for all such protection and assistance when it comes. It might be better for us to save the money we pay out in tithes and taxes in various forms, and buy off our enemies when we find ourselves too weak to resist their encroachments.

Government provides, at the expense of the people always, for an army of parasites—indolent, tramplike fellows who produce nothing themselves, but who, when they come to what others have produced, are ready to consume all they can put their hands on. They are of no earthly benefit to society, and yet it is compelled to support such people, often in idleness, with the products of its own toil and exertions. No matter how great or how glorious may be the nation to which we belong, provided we are neither beggars nor thieves, we must still earn our own living precisely as if we belonged merely to one of the humblest communities in the world, and not only that, we must labor to support a multitude of others, who, being in the employ, or rather in the pay, of government, are relieved from

all ordinary cares and are able to spend much of their time in indolence.

It is a grave charge to be made against all governments, even those of the mildest form, that they place unjust and unwelcome burdens upon the shoulders of those who ought not to bear them. It is clear enough, for instance, that if men do not wish to join in foraging or marauding expeditions against a people who have never done them any harm, as always happens in the case of war, they ought to be permitted to remain at home and they should not be called upon to share in the expenses or dangers of such an undertaking. But it is well known that no government will allow things to be done in that way. It is enough that war is declared, no matter how unjustly nor with what selfish motives on the part of the leaders, to entitle the government to call out every available man. Can the absolute subjugation of the masses by the government be demonstrated by any fact more clearly than by this?

We often hear it said that the government does this and does that for the people. But how does it do these things? Whose energies does it employ and whose money does it use? It is the people—bear in mind, the people—who do the work and always pay the bills. And what makes the matter all the worse, is the fact that the burden usually falls upon only a portion of the people, while the remainder derive the most of the benefit and pay nothing themselves. It is said that the government supports schools, aids manufactures, protects the iron interests, helps the sugar industry, pays subsidies to steamboat lines, opens harbors for localities where they are little used, and carries the people's mails to the most remote settlements in the land. We will grant that it does. But how does the government do this? It requires money to conduct and continue such enterprises, and yet the government itself, as everybody knows, has not a cent of money of its own. *No, it is all done with the money of the people. The main business of government, it would seem, is to take money from one class of people and deposit it safely in*

the pockets of another class of people. It aids the iron and sugar industries by the money which it takes from the pockets or purses of those who are compelled to consume iron and sugar. It subsidizes steamboat companies, supports schools and builds school-houses, carries mails, and maintains harbors, with the money which it takes from the people as a whole, through the medium either of direct or indirect taxes. That is just what governments have been doing ever since Noah left the ark, and no doubt it is what governments will continue to do till the day of judgment comes. For, so long as we have government, the people must continue to pay taxes in some form, and the main office of the state must be to keep money in circulation *by taking it forcibly from one or more large classes and spending it for the benefit of one or more small classes.* Governments are just like our loan associations. They do not invest a cent of their money, and they rarely have any of their own to invest, but they handle the money of other people with most surprising dexterity. Money comes and goes, and we are reminded of the figures in Punch and Judy : "now you see it and now you don't." It all comes from the way the figures, or the funds, are manipulated. The government, especially modern government, seems to have no other office than to collect funds and disburse them.

The state has no pity, no sympathy, no mercy. How could it have, when it is not even possessed of feeling? The state, never conscious itself, is not concerned, for one moment, as is too well known, about the sufferings and sorrows of its citizens —its concern is confined entirely to the needs and troubles of the state itself. The state is said to protect and provide for people and in that way to take the place of a parent. But what a queer protector, provider and father the state proves to be! Instead of the state providing for the people, it is absolutely a pauper itself and never has a cent of money that has not been wrung from the taxpayers under some pretence or other. The state is a parasite in all its ways, purposes and workings ; it always consumes and never produces. Its subjects are slaves.

They hold precisely the same relations to the state that the vassal held under his lord in old feudal times. Never working itself, its main business is to appropriate the lion's share of all that the people produce. If the people have nothing left, more's the pity for them ; in such a case the tax must come from some one who has been more fortunate than they. The tribute must always be forthcoming, and if the people at last become so poor that they starve, emigrants from abroad are brought in to fill their places.

Who ever heard of the state caring for the people merely for the good of the people ? Where in the wide world does the state do business in that way ? The occupation of the state is exclusively to look after its own interests and the good of the favorites of its party. The state is preeminently selfish in its character, but it is always a great stickler for law—that is, law of its own make. The state always follows the law—that is, the law as its own judges interpret it. It would not violate the law even to save a poor sinner's neck. The state does occasionally help people, its own favorites or men of some one particular guild, but mark, the money with which the assistance is rendered is in every case taken from the people. Indeed, one of the chief occupations of the state is to take the money from one class of people in order to help another class that it likes better. The state always has some job on hand. Every law that is passed implies a job for the benefit of somebody.

The state is continually taxing some men to help others. No doubt we ought to be liberal with our fellow men, but the state cannot compel us to be liberal. What the state compels us to do, we do not do ourselves. The state says, " be industrious and labor for me ; earn money, and when you have accumulated a little, I will divide with you." That is precisely what the state is doing every day, told in language that is so plain that it cannot be mistaken. It is surprising to see how callous people come to be by long suffering, and how they cease to notice burdens that they have borne on their shoulders for a

lifetime. A whole nation may come to be slaves, and yet not realize that they are slaves. Only convince people that they ought to do this or that, and they will do anything that is demanded of them, even to offering up their lives. People have always been taught, they have always believed, and they still believe, that their first and last duty is to pay taxes and labor for the state. Is it not strange that people should see nothing wrong in taxes, no matter to what extent or under what pretence they are levied? A few centuries ago people would not have paid taxes as we pay them, but now we look upon taxes as the most natural and proper thing to be found in practical life. So we go on paying taxes for the school-district, taxes for the town or city, taxes for the state, taxes for the nation, taxes at the custom house, taxes for license, taxes to help the church, taxes to feed the tramps—taxes for every place and thing conceivable. Everything with us is conducted on the old feudal basis; the state is our lord and we are its vassals or villeins. Our government is strictly military in its character. With us the people rule—but there is a power behind the throne, unseen, unheard, unnoticed, that rules the people. So the king is supposed to rule—but a mistress or a favorite often rules the king.

Our whole education as subjects of the state is to make good soldiers, good servants, *willing slaves*. Of course people do not call themselves slaves—they call themselves sovereigns, but all they have to show for the claim is the name. People have a great aversion to the name of slave. The slave-owners of other days did not call the blacks slaves; they went by the name of “help,” “hands,” “boys,” and the like. So the hired man and hired girl would rebel if they went by the name of slaves. They are called servants! But what is a servant? One who serves, and one who therefore holds the same relations to his employer that a slave holds to his master. The word servant is identical with the Latin *servus*, from *servo*, which was the word for slave.

How can we properly call the state a protector? Does it ever lift a common citizen up when he is found to be prostrated? Does it ever defend him when attacked, does it give him bread when he is hungry, or does it render him assistance when he is in need of it? No, on the mere outcry of an ordinary man or woman, it would not raise a hand, give a nod or even move its tongue to relieve the helpless. No, nothing can be done except by due process of law—the court must first issue its mandate, before any man can be arrested, and before the court gets ready to move, the culprit usually escapes. The part of protector that it pretends to play as a star performer is a fraud, a mere pretence and nothing more. Its ruling doctrine is neutrality, non-interference, strict observance of the law in all cases—that is, of law as the state makes and interprets it. But when the state happens to be interested, it never hesitates to interfere, and if the law is in the way, it is promptly altered to suit the emergency. The state, as we have more than once intimated, is unmerciful. It would take the last shirt from a man's back, if he happened to be a little short in his taxes. The state totally neglects the suffering, starving, wronged multitudes under its eye, and yet it affects to have a tender regard for the Armenians, the people of India, the natives of Venezuela, and the pagans of Hawaii. If there are any suffering, oppressed people in Mars or Jupiter, our state would like to know it, so that sympathy might be extended to those remote and unknown inhabitants.

While we are on this subject of state interference, the reader should be reminded that men often allow themselves to be deluded by the way certain terms are used, and in no case is this delusion more striking than in the case of the free schools, the free text books, and, indeed, the free things of all kinds which the state is supposed to furnish people as a gratuity. As a rule, it will be found that *free things are simply what other people pay for*—and this is emphatically true in the case of free schools, free text books, and all such luxuries. A school to be really free

ought to be free to everybody, but as a matter of fact it is free only to those who have no taxes to pay. For the ordinary taxpayer, the free school is more expensive than any other, partly because he is apt to be called upon to pay more than his share, and partly because schools that other people pay for are uniformly higher priced every way than schools that people themselves pay for, for the reason that when people make bills for others to pay, they are not very particular how high the bills become. What we have said of free schools is true also of free text books. Instead of being free for every portion of the community, one portion will have to pay enough to buy their own text books and then contribute toward the purchase of books for others besides. And so it is with the free lunch in our saloons. The customer really imagines that he gets his lunch for nothing, and he usually eats accordingly, but he always pays for his lunch when he pays for his drinks, or in other words, he pays about two cents for his beer and three cents for the cheap stuff that he eats. Very few people get anything for nothing in this world, and when they do, somebody certainly has to pay for it.

As we have seen, the character that is generally assigned to the state is that of a champion or defender of the people, but would not just the opposite character be more appropriate? Is not its character, in most of the parts which it plays, that of a persecutor and oppressor? Is it not a professional disturber of the peace? Is it not continually on the watch for something wrong, something out of order or something against the law? Are we not overburdened with spies and informers? Are there not state agents or detectives in disguise continually peering around to see what is done or what is left undone? Have we not factory inspectors, butter inspectors, boiler inspectors, building inspectors, revenue inspectors, food inspectors and inspectors of all kinds? Has not the state its paid agents whose duty it is to see everything we do, and how we are doing it—where we fish and how we fish, how we observe Sunday and where we

keep it, where our children are employed and how old they are, how often we pay our help and how much? But we need not enumerate. We have only to add that if there is anything the state does not meddle with, it must be something that is not worth meddling with, something that does not bring with it either money or power. Is not the state, by the new laws it passes, constantly undermining the affairs of its citizens, and rendering business unsettled, unremunerative and uncertain? Everybody is obliged to wait and see what congress or the legislature will do, or whether it will do anything at all or not. This is the kind of protection that we get from the state.

But the most oppressive and unwarranted interference on the part of the state is to be found in the enforcing of contracts—not contracts in which the state is concerned, but contracts in which individuals alone are concerned—and I would ask: What propriety can there be in the state's coming forward and punishing a man, causing him pain and suffering, for no other reason than that he prefers not to fulfill his promise or keep his contract? What we call the state, it must be remembered, in this case as in all others, is only a few ordinary men who are acting in the name and under the protection of the state. The two individuals making the contract are strangers to the agents of the state, no doubt, and they have had no relations with them whatever. Why should such men interfere and use the powerful machinery of the state to enforce an ordinary contract between these two or any other two men? Again, if the state interferes in the case of one contract, and, indeed, in all the private affairs of life, why should it not interfere in all contracts in order to compel men to do what it is assumed by the state they ought to do? But it only interferes in special cases, while in other cases just as important it leaves the individuals to settle the question between themselves.

It is only under certain conditions, where certain prescribed forms and ceremonies have been observed—where, perhaps, there has been a writing, a signature, a seal—that the state in-

terposes and allies itself either with one side or the other. But why interpose at all? People should be left to their manhood and their own sense of propriety in all such cases. Let people do right not from fear, but because they desire to do right and feel that they ought to do right. If it is found that certain people do not keep their promises, no one will of course deal with them. That is the remedy always at command. If people know that they must depend solely on a man's honor, they will be careful to ascertain in the first place whether he has any or not.

It must be remembered that there are plenty of contracts that cannot be enforced, plenty of debts that cannot be collected, such as those made in dealing with minors, and hence it is that prudent men are careful how they deal with irresponsible people. If we had no contracts, we would have no debts, and how much better that would be for mankind! Few have any adequate idea how much misery is caused by tormenting men for no other reason than that they cannot or will not keep their contracts.

It should be observed that no man should make a promise or a contract. When he binds himself by a promise, he ceases to be a free man. He has no freedom of action and he is not really himself, because he has made himself subject to some other person's will. He has sold himself to some one, at least for the time being. A man ought to have some better reason for doing things than simply that he has made a promise. He may make a bad promise. How often does a man regret that he has bound himself by a promise and cannot do at the last moment what he feels ought to be done! Men should make no promises, but simply wait and do what seems proper when the time comes.

There is one more case of state interference that I would like to dwell on, but I will merely speak of it and pass it by. I refer to the matter of wills. I beg to ask, on what grounds of justice and propriety can the state step in and compel citizens

to carry out the wishes—often the crazy wishes—of a dead man? If there is anything quite so absurd and outrageous as such interference on the part of the state, I am not able to bring it to my mind.

THE FAILINGS OF THE STATE.

Who are the servants of the state, who are the managers and masters of the people? Are they the wise and good men that they are usually supposed to be? Are they above the average in intelligence, sagacity and business talent? Are they the men to whom a nation can entrust its fate—its homes, its property and its lives—with a feeling of security and reliance upon their judgment and skill? No, as a rule they are not such men. They are too often below the average in intellect and character—too often they are stupid, incompetent, unwise and unsafe men. That is the history of government employees the world over—they are as a rule *below the average*. They are too often merely somebody's favorite or somebody's friend, some one who has been unfortunate in business, and who is in need of a place, or perhaps some one who has amassed a fortune and wants to display his wealth and secure a position in society for himself and his family. This is the kind of stuff of which the public servants, our masters, are too often made. Really good men, really able and reliable men all the world over will have nothing to do with the business of government—and hence this work is left largely, though of course not exclusively, to knaves or fools. A person would suppose that governing would be the simplest, easiest thing in the world. But as a matter of fact it is so complicated, so mysterious in its operations, and so difficult to master in its details, that no man living has ever yet proved to be a great success as a master or manager of men while grouped in bodies of considerable size. It takes an uncommonly smart man to boss successfully even a hundred men, but when the number mounts up to thousands and even millions,

the problem is too deep, the undertaking too vast for any mortal being. Even the Creator himself could hardly be pronounced a success in this line, for it is a fact that is well known to all that the devil can tear down faster than the Almighty can build up. Herbert Spencer says: "Is it not manifest that a ruling body made up of many individuals, who differ in character, education, and aims, who belong to classes having antagonistic ideas and feelings, and who are severely swayed by the special opinions of the districts deputing them, must be a cumbersome apparatus for the management of public affairs?"

A small business, in any department, can be understood and mastered even by men of most ordinary capacity, but as the business enlarges, as it covers more territory and embraces more departments, it becomes too complicated, too extensive, for any common mind to master or understand, and the consequence is that the ablest men find it impossible, in most cases, to connect cause and effect so as to prevent misfortunes or to provide a remedy when trouble arises. To conduct the affairs of a big nation, is like the case of a man who undertakes to manage a farm that is ten times as large as he can successfully superintend. The inevitable result in government affairs, and in all similar cases where the work to be accomplished far exceeds the powers of those who have undertaken it, is that the waste is enormous, and the service rendered in most instances bears no sort of comparison with the amount of money required and expended. Under such circumstances too many things must be delayed, and where there are so many kinds of work to be done by so many different men, responsibility must be divided and neither credit nor blame can in all cases be placed where it properly belongs.

There are inherent weaknesses in all organizations, and this is especially the case when bodies of men take the form of companies, combinations, corporations, confederacies or states. The seeds of dissolution and decay are sown in the earlier periods of the formation of such bodies, and it is not possible

for them to flourish or succeed for any great length of time. The management of such organizations involves the most extravagant expenditures. People will save money which they themselves earn, but they will rarely make much effort to save the money some one else earns. Do we not see this fact exemplified every day in the affairs of state? Individuals thrive or succeed because they handle their own funds and attend personally to their own affairs. But in the case of organizations of all kinds, and especially in affairs of state, the management of the whole business is delegated to some one who is acting merely in a fiduciary or representative capacity. It is impossible for organizations to succeed for any great length of time—there are too many heads, and the responsibility of those who act is not sufficiently determined. No business is ever done well where there is more than one head.

Where do we find greater mistakes made, or money spent more lavishly or more foolishly, than in the management of the affairs of state? Every official of the state has the position merely of an agent, and he is constantly trammelled by the authority of some one who is over him. However competent, or even faithful himself, he never knows just how, or when to do anything. In the very necessities of the case, state work can never be done well as a whole, and it can never be done economically. Some parts of the work may be well done, but when a government job is completed, it is certain to have numerous defects. It is well known that the most expensive structures of the state are always faulty in construction. So, too, armies in the field are generally improperly clothed and insufficiently supplied with food—a fact which arises as often from the very necessities or circumstances of the case as it does from the corruption or incompetency of officials. As Herbert Spencer says: “Official regulation perpetually fails.” The government rarely succeeds, except in cases like our war of the Rebellion, where the number of lives lost and the amount of money squandered seemed to be a matter of little account. Why should not

a government succeed, when a nation is willing to sacrifice its last life and spend its last dollar for an idea? But when the means at command are limited, and but few are willing to sacrifice their property and their lives, a state never succeeds.

As a rule, the state is helped too much, and it derives its supplies from too great a number of sources. It rarely makes a proper use of the resources at its command. When a business man sees anything to be done, and observes how it ought to be done, he goes at it at once. He does not hesitate or maneuver one minute—*he strikes when the iron is hot, and he applies his blows where they are certain to count.* But the state never does business that way. The state indulges in long delays; it calls a council of war, and debates the matter. Everything must be done according to law and precedent. Red tape must not be neglected, and so it is that the state uniformly waits too long. When the house is burned down, it comes around, in a very formal and deliberate manner, with its ponderous fire extinguisher. When somebody has been killed, it starts its officials on the war-path and directs them to ascertain who committed the murder. If some one happens to apprehend the culprit, the government at once proceeds to lay violent hands on him, with the view of taking summary vengeance in his case. But the state never concerns itself about *preventing* houses from being burned nor about *saving* men from being killed. That does not come within the province or the line of duty of an ordinary state. The office of the state is very much like that of the doctor or undertaker, whose business it is not to keep people well or prevent them from being killed, but to give them medicine when they are sick and to aid in giving them a decent burial after they are dead. The state never thinks of preventing a burglary, but only of punishing the robber after he is caught.

As a protector, the state tolerates no rivals, and while acting in that capacity, it really believes that it is doing the work that was monopolized originally by the Almighty himself. The

state protects ! Yes, the state protects its favorites, while it uniformly leaves the rest of the people to care for themselves. The state protects the trusts, the corporations, the syndicates, the millionaires, the monopolists, and the capitalists generally, while, like the big bully that it is, *it will stand still and see the weak robbed by the strong every day*. There is no exaggeration or hyperbole about this—it is merely the gospel truth. If you are on the Lord's side—that is, if you have money and are on the side of law and the state—you can do as you please. Or is there really some wickedness yet undiscovered or unheard of that the government could not legitimatize by the enactment of a law ?

Protection ! As a matter of fact, the state cares nothing for the lives and property of individuals, as individuals. As we have already seen, the state has no sympathy, no feeling. The state from motives of the purest selfishness, will take from the citizen either his life or his property, without the slightest sign of contrition or concern. All it wants is either an opportunity or an occasion—that is sufficient. With some new law that it has had passed to meet the case, it will sweep over the land like a tornado, rendering thousands homeless and penniless, and sending scores, perhaps, to a premature grave, as the result of insufficient food or of exposure to the elements. All from the passage of a new law. These things are liable to happen, and do happen frequently, in every civilized, law-making and law-abiding country on the globe.

If the people could only be induced to think ! But, then, trying to make people think is like trying to wake the dead. *People will not think*—they will merely feel. They will not even try to think—the fact is, they do not and they will not care, until it is finally *too late*. After a man's hands are firmly tied, it does him very little good to either scream or kick. When it comes to that point, it is best to submit and be a good slave. That is the way people are generally doing to-day.

CRIMES OF THE STATE.

Can the state commit a crime? That question, in principle, is identical with this other question: Does the rank, station or occupation of an offender make any difference with the nature of the offence of which he is found to be guilty? To the latter question, the prevailing answer at the present day is that it does not. It must be remembered that the crimes committed by the state are merely crimes committed by men who are in the employ of the state. But no man, under our present code of morals, is allowed to defend himself or excuse himself for his wrong-doing on the plea that he had orders from higher authority to do as he had done. It is clear enough that no authority can be granted for the commission of crime, and it is impossible to have one code for ordinary men and another for the officers of the state. The acts of all men, without regard to power or position, must be judged solely upon their merits.

There is no doubt that the state is powerful, but there is one thing the state cannot do, it cannot make a wrong right. It cannot make black white, nor change darkness into light; it cannot wash out the sins of the criminal, nor can it take upon itself the burden of any one's wrongs. What should be impressed upon the minds of all, is the fact that the state with all its power cannot alter the character of iniquity. A bad act done by the command of the state is just as wicked and just as criminal as if done without any such order. No man can excuse himself for doing what he knows to be wrong on the plea that the state gives him its permission or orders the work done. Those who represent the state have the gifts only of common men, and they have no powers that other men do not have. If the state is guilty of murder, it is a crime just as much as if the deed had been done by some individual under ordinary circumstances. If the state takes money from the people by force, the

act is robbery just as certainly as if it were the work of some noted highwayman. If the state orders a man to steal, or authorizes him to do so, that does not compel him to steal, nor does it leave him guiltless if he does steal.

It is evident, however, that the state would like to reserve for itself the exclusive privilege of committing crimes. The Bible tells us not to kill; the laws of our government tell us not to kill, and yet the state does not hesitate to kill even hundreds at a time, if the occasion seems to render such a step either expedient or necessary. But it must be borne in mind that when the state executes a man, or has him shot down, it kills him; and the killing being done in the most deliberate manner imaginable, the state must be guilty of murder. The state takes a man's property whenever it likes, and seldom offers any return or any compensation, but when the state does that, it is clearly guilty of robbery. There is no other name that could properly apply to such a proceeding. For all its barbarous and villainous action, the state offers such pleas as that of "necessity," "self-protection," and "public good." But has not the criminal also just as valid an excuse for his conduct? He also finds crime necessary and expedient; if it is not for the public good, it is at least for his own private good, and that is better for him than public good. The only difference between the state and the individual in regard to the wrongs perpetrated, is that the former seeks to legalize its acts by going through certain forms and ceremonies which are supposed to render its conduct legitimate, while the latter does nothing of the kind. But as we have already intimated, it is impossible to alter the character of an act by resorting to any such expedient as that. If a deed is black, it will remain black, no matter how many kings or legislatures may attempt to ratify or legalize the crime. The leopard's spots cannot be changed, and if they could be, the leopard itself would cease to exist. A leopard without spots is not a leopard.

Men talk much about the legality of things, and especially

of the just and rightful claims of the constituted authorities. But upon what are these claims of the government based? How was the original, fundamental law established in the first place? Who were the first law-makers of which history gives us any account? It will be found, when this question is carefully and deliberately examined, that the original law-makers were uniformly bolters, rebels, insurgents, men who were opposed to the legal order of things existing at the time and were determined to have a new deal. Such are the men who found new governments and establish new constitutions for the people. Let us go back to the early history of the American government, now one of the most stable to be found on the globe. How did that begin? Who were the founders? The fact cannot be disputed that they were what the mother country always called them, simply rebels. They refused to pay the taxes or obey the laws of a government to which they certainly owed as much as any people ever did in this world. The rebellion became general throughout the colonies, and in union there proved to be strength. A few colonies started the ball rolling, and others eventually joined in the undertaking. Repeated successes gave them prestige and led finally to the recognition of the colonies by countries abroad. In the end, the rebels were triumphant, and the mother country submitted and withdrew from the contest in despair. It was success that legalized all that the rebels had done and placed the stamp of legitimacy upon everything that their descendants have done since. So it has been with all the governments that have been formed from time to time in France. The founders in all cases were rebels. All the authority they ever had came directly from the success of their undertaking. It must not be forgotten that every new government is essentially illegitimate, because it takes the place of the old one which of course is legitimate, if it is nothing else. And how are the royal families founded? Every one knows that a royal family is not materially different in character from any other family. Going back in history, perhaps a century or

more, we find that there was a contest. In this struggle the ancestors of the royal family were successful, and that made them legitimate, while their rivals having suffered defeat drop down into the ranks of common mortals and their names cease to be mentioned in history.

But the best illustration of legitimacy and its origin is perhaps to be found in the American caucus system. Everybody knows that the caucus is the foundation stone of our government. Without a caucus no man can be nominated, and without a nomination no man, in practice, can be elected. Of course if no man was elected, we should have no officers, no laws, no government. Without the caucus, everything would be chaos. If we had no caucus, under our present party system, our country would have nothing to stand on. The caucus is the prime source, in practice, of all legitimacy. But whence does the caucus derive its authority? Who started the first or original caucus, the caucus from which all succeeding caucuses date? It is evident that such a caucus must have been decidedly irregular, and its members must have been, in the fullest sense, self-constituted. We see plenty of instances even at the present day, which go to show how the chain comes to be broken and a new order of things is started in place of the old. As long as things go along smoothly in the party, everything is done according to law and precedent. But by and by there comes a time when a few individuals, from some cause or other, take it into their heads to bolt and have a caucus of their own. This is a very simple thing to do. No special qualifications are required, and everybody is admitted who desires to join in the movement. This is where one man is as good as another, and things are resolved into their elements. Here there is at least a semblance of liberty and equality. The original caucus of self-constituted members elects delegates which are sent on to the convention and are there recognized. That makes them regular, and from that simple starting point legality begins for that faction. In the beginning there is no test of legitimacy, and no

qualifications for voters are required. Then things go along pleasantly until some new trouble arises and a new outbreak occurs. In the case of such an uprising, the venture succeeds or it does not. If it succeeds, the proceedings of the seceders are recognized as legal. If it fails, it is pronounced rebellion or heresy, and it is treated accordingly. No legislature, no sovereign that the world has yet seen ever had a better foundation on which to stand than the simple one whose character has just been portrayed. Any set of men can start a party or a government, as any set of men can originate an ordinary caucus—if they only have the ability and the good fortune to succeed. What the people finally consent to or submit to is lawful. It is purely a question of recognition and submission. On such slender threads does the history of our great states hang.

It must be remembered that the members of the old English parliament were not chosen originally by any organized body or according to any legal forms. They were generally named, selected and summoned by the king either directly or indirectly, and were largely men of his choice, rather than the choice of the people. Yet such a parliament made laws for the realm. Even the peers of England to-day are not elected, and hence they are not representatives in any true sense. And if we examine the history of constitutions, we shall find it is with them as it is with caucuses. In the beginning they are irregular, and the men who take part in them cannot boast of the legitimacy of their action. They have subverted the old order of things and established one that is new. *But the old order is always legitimate, while the new can never be.* The men who form the first constitution of a nation are uniformly bolters, seceders, rebels. Hegel calls them “an automatic gathering of individuals.” They are an aggregation merely, a collection, without law, without authority, without character, and without the least semblance of legitimacy of any kind. It may not be amiss to remind the reader that parliaments have grown to be what they are through a slow process of development. Originally such bodies were

merely the king's councillors, and their duties were judicial rather than legislative. In no sense were they chosen representatives of the people. Legislation and representation are both phases of government that belong exclusively to modern times.

The foundation of all courts, legislatures, and even of all governments, being such as we have just indicated, can it be that a man who does a villainous act is any less a villain because he is an officer of the law, or because the law authorizes or permits him to do some wicked work which he finds to his advantage to have done? I should say that the flag or the title under which a work was performed could have little or no influence upon its real character. If law-makers choose to shield rogues and rascals, they may be able to protect them from the legal consequences of their action, but they can never place such people in the category of honest and fair men. If a man has the prestige of a conqueror and can do what he chooses, that fact certainly does not relieve him from any of the guilt which wrong-doing always implies. A man's position in society or his rank among men, cannot change the character of his conduct nor relieve him from the responsibility properly connected with his action.

Or is it possible that a trial in court and a decision of the judge can alter the nature of the crime or deprive the criminal of any rights or privileges that he had before? It is clear enough that no trial in court can create either rights or duties, and no state acquires rights through a trial that it did not possess in the first place. Cronin was tried and condemned by a secret tribunal in the city of Chicago. But that did not alter the nature of the crime of those who were commissioned to assassinate him. Every disinterested person calls it murder, precisely the same as if the act had been committed without the formality of a trial. So it is in the case of the state. A trial and a verdict do not affect the character of the crime committed in the name of the state, nor do they relieve the executioner from any of the odium that is naturally connected with

his deed. A trial is very often only the means by which a murderer accomplishes his object without rendering himself liable to punishment for his crime. Henry VIII. had his enemies beheaded by due process of law, but he was a murderer for all that. He did not differ very materially in his purposes from Blue Beard of old, only the latter had by far the most businesslike and most independent way of accomplishing what he wanted done. Getting men in the clutches of the law is only one way of readily disposing of them. Assassination is another way, a little more quiet and a little more expeditious perhaps, but it is just as honorable a method as that of charging a man with crime, bringing him into court, and finally having him found guilty and executed. There is no essential difference in the character of these two methods, the one private and the other public, and one is no more sinful than the other. I am not able to see that strangling a man in prison before he is found guilty is in any sense more criminal than having him strangled after the verdict is rendered. Both ways were followed in the Middle Ages, and no one pretends now that the legal way was in any sense more innocent than the private method. If it is right for a dozen men to kill one whom they want out of the way, it must be equally right for a single individual to do the same thing. It hurts a man just as badly to be killed by a sheriff, or by orders of a judge, as to meet death at the hands of an ordinary enemy. If a man is to be killed, what difference does it make in principle whether he is killed before conviction or afterwards, or whether he is killed by an officer or a citizen? The sole question is whether it is right to kill him at all, no matter what he may have done nor how much some people are afraid to have him around. In my opinion it will never do to kill people simply because we are afraid of them, or have some interest in getting them out of the way. We have no more right to use the law as an instrument of murder than we have to use a meat axe or carving knife for the same purpose.

If a man is ordered to do some wicked act, he need not necessarily do it, nor can he plead the order received as an excuse for what he does. Even if the state commands a man to do an act which is clearly immoral, unjust or inhuman, he is in no wise bound to obey, and if he decides to do as he is ordered, he should be held responsible precisely as if the deed had been done of his own free will. The fact must never be lost sight of that a man's being an officer in command, or an employee under orders, cannot change the nature of his conduct in any way. What a man does, he does of himself, and he cannot throw the burden of his evil doing upon the shoulders of some other person. That is something that cannot possibly be done. The reader must again be reminded that what we call the state is only a certain number of men who are just like those whom we meet in our walks every day. The orders of such men can never be taken as a justification for any criminal action which the citizens may choose to commit. If a man steals or robs in his capacity as an officer, he is just as culpable as if the deed had been done by any ordinary individual. To be able to characterize an act properly, we must inquire what a man does and ascertain his motive, not what his rank may be nor who is his principal. When a man kills another deliberately, it is always murder, no matter what may be the position which the murderer holds nor the capacity in which he acts. A man by being elected sheriff or judge acquires not a single right, privilege or qualification that he did not have before the election.

The broad ground should be taken that the state should never do what is known to be immoral or criminal, and no order that violates this principle can have any binding force on citizens. But the law does order many things that are manifestly wrong. The law commands a man to aid in securing one who is a fugitive from justice, just as some years since it held a man bound to aid in returning a fugitive slave to his master. But I deny the right of any state to enforce such an inhuman

order as that. I deny the right of any man to be either the judge or the executioner of his fellow man, and if that claim proves to be well founded, it cannot be any man's duty to aid in sending another man either to prison or the gallows. Why should we raise our hand against a man who never has harmed us, or who perhaps may have been our most trusted friend?

It must be evident that if the claim that one has a right to exercise authority over another fails, then the claim that men have the right to arrest, convict and imprison their fellow men, must also fail. I repeat again, that trials, convictions and punishments are things that are found only in a country where men are held in bondage. No free man can be tried, because he denies the right of anybody to exercise authority over him. A slave is the only man who allows himself to be brought into court, and finally after some delay and ceremony, taken out and punished. A free man would fight till he died sooner than allow himself to be treated like a dog.

And, finally, there comes another question. May a master or a father command the one who is under him to do wrong? May he compel him to commit a crime? If he has any authority over him at all, it cannot be limited to just commands. But could such an order be accepted as a justification or an excuse, if the man chooses to obey the order and commit a crime? Does it excuse the servant or slave for committing a crime that he did so to avoid punishment from his master? I should say not. There can be no valid excuse of any kind for committing a crime, and if there were an excuse for it, it would be no crime. A crime is committed only where something wrong is done. The cause or occasion of a crime cannot be taken as its excuse, or otherwise we should have no crime. Every criminal has some reason for what he does. It is clear that every wrong must stand by itself and be judged entirely on its own account. What preceded it, or followed it, cannot affect the question of guilt in any respect.

The state subsists chiefly upon crimes, immoralities and

wrongs of various kinds. Crimes and offences are the main sources of revenue for the state outside of the taxes. Indeed, if there were no criminals, no crimes, no misdemeanors, no violations of law, the state would speedily go out of business, since it would in that case have nothing at all to do. Every fine levied according to law is partial confiscation for the benefit of the state. The state has every inducement to multiply offences and crimes, so as to create more business and enlarge its revenues. That has been the history of the state for centuries. The state—we mean the officers of the state—has every inducement to have the accused in all cases convicted, because convictions lead to more costs, in most cases, and hence to large returns for the court officers and attendants. If a man is fined, there is so much more money to go into the treasury; if the criminal is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he has to be conducted to prison, and if he is sentenced to death, he has to be executed, and all these things put money into the pockets of certain officers. As a matter of fact, the state makes every effort to convict the prisoner, because convictions give evidence of state power, state wisdom, state goodness and justice.

The most expensive machinery connected with government is that of the courts, and what makes it worse is that the courts are kept pretty generally in operation. The most striking fact in this connexion is that the state defines crime according to its own notions solely, leaves all the bars down and offers every inducement for the commission of crime, and then punishes the unlucky offender if he happens to get caught. This reminds us of the way the Lord treated Adam and Eve. Placed just as those two people were, *it was impossible for them not to sin*, and the Lord must have been aware of the fact before he laid down his famous ordinance. Precisely so it is with criminals and the state at the present day. Like the spider, the state spreads its net artfully, and then watches to see who is the first victim to be caught.

The state is not at all particular how it secures its money,

nor from what source it comes, and in that respect it sets a very bad example for the ordinary citizen. It will receive stolen goods, or any other goods, if there is money in the business. It assumes that liquor selling, for example, is wrong, but it licenses the traffic, and in the state of New York draws over \$10,000,000 annually from that source alone. It condemns prostitution, especially in the cities, but in many cases it condescends to "regulate" the business, for pay, and for its worthy representatives, the police and the court officers, prostitution becomes a fruitful source of revenue! By the way, what models those policemen are, and the soldiers also in places where a standing army is maintained! How much credit they reflect upon the state which they represent, by their conduct, particularly in their relations with criminals and prostitutes! Both classes will be permitted to ply their trade if they will only consent to a fair division of the profits. The purity of the court and its officers, in many cases, the purity of our statesmen, the purity of those who pose as the watchful and dutiful shepherds of the people! For shame! for shame! What hypocrites there be in this world—in all countries where the population is divided into two classes, those who rule and those who are ruled!

But of all the detestable and barbaric institutions that have come down to this generation from feudal times, the town constable is one! Always an ordinary man, and sometimes a very ordinary man, drest in a little brief authority, with a pair of shackles in his hands, and a revolver in his pocket, and with the whole able-bodied force of the town at his command, he imagines that he is commissioned to keep the peace of the community and carry out his own will without let, hindrance or interference from anybody. That is the kind of institution a town constable really is. His name appears on the tail end of the ticket, when the nominations are made. He is just as apt to be a bad man as a good man, he is just as apt to be a half-witted fellow as a man possessed of forbearance, judgment and sense, and yet such a kind of person takes the place of complainant, judge, jury and

executioner all in one, and in the name of the people he preserves the peace ! That is, if he feels like it, and as he feels like it. If the victim is a poor, harmless individual who is supposed to have no friends, he is very liable to attack from such a source as this, while the bold, bad man who is generally understood to be a troublesome fellow to handle is allowed, usually, to go his way, and do what he pleases with impunity. Woe unto the poor luckless individual who happens some time or other to have offended the town constable or the potent policeman ! He might better not have been born.

I have said before, and I would like to say it loud enough now that the world might hear it, that it is a serious, a dreadful thing to be placed under arrest under any circumstances, and especially so if it happens before conviction of crime. If a man were taken out, tied up to a post and horsewhipped by the town constable or policeman, whenever he took it into his head to do such a job, the whole community would rise in rebellion at once, but any man, possessed of the ordinary feelings of a man, would rather endure such treatment than to be bound in chains and thrown into a dark and filthy cell at the mere option of some officer of the peace. People some day or other will open their eyes and see what such an institution means, and they will then understand what a monstrous proceeding an arrest is, and when that time comes, all such laws as these, relics as they are of days of bondage and barbarism, will be banished from our statute books forever. In this day and generation, we do not need a town constable nor any other officer to keep the peace. In nine cases out of ten where we have such officers, they merely break the peace themselves and violate the rights of free-born American citizens. The town constable ought to be voted a back number. If the people had it to say, this conceited, consequential and captious autocrat would be deprived of his powers and privileges at once, and he would be allowed to drop to the ground from the ordinary force of gravity. People have imagined all along that such an institution

was indispensable. Vain thought! It must not be forgotten that not long since people thought the same of slavery and the whipping post—to say nothing of hanging for stealing and for other small crimes. Within less than a hundred years, people, English speaking people, believed that the world would go to pieces, if it did not have such things.

What is the use of having a judge or a jury, when the constable or policeman tries the case on the spot, without the advice or help of anybody? He comes up to a man and says he is drunk, though, as often happens, the man is not drunk at all. However, the officer says he is drunk, and off the man goes towards the lock-up, dirty, filthy and forbidding as that institution usually is. If the man hesitates, the officer curses him and uses slang terms of the most offensive character—and if the fellow still hesitates, the officer probably gives him a punch in the face, or he thumps him in the ribs, or perhaps he merely bruises his bottom with the toe of his boot. And yet if you talk with people about dispensing with the services of such a creature, they open their eyes and give one such a look of amazement that it almost gives a person the chills. How could this world wag at all, if it did not have the town constable and policeman to keep things in order?—they say. There is no use of trying to talk with such folks. The only way is to let them go on and grow. They may get wiser as they get older, and by and by they may see that in an age like this we do not need such a creature as a policeman, nor even a town constable.

It is quite unnecessary to dwell upon the wickedness of the state and the corruptness and rascality of many of those who pose as the representatives of the state. That is an old story, and every person who reads the papers must be familiar with the details of legislative, judicial and executive scandals—of men who buy and of men who are bought, of men who sacrifice honor, decency and manhood for the money they expect to find in a job. That is an every day occurrence, and it is useless to go through the rehearsal again at this time. It is evident enough

that men in office average just about like men out of office. Originally, demagogues and designing men generally did business in the name of the Lord. They now find it more profitable to appear in the livery of the state.

THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENCE.

In many cases we allow a man to proceed independently of law, as the natives do in savage lands. If a man can substantiate in any way the claim that he acts in defence of his person, his home, or his family, he can do anything he chooses, even to the extent of committing murder, and the law in its ordinary application cannot affect him. The individual in such a case is left entirely to his own judgment as to what he should do, how far he should go and where he should stop. He is a law unto himself ; he tries his own case on the spot, and is judge, jury and executioner all in one. But why should he not be permitted to go quite as far in the same direction where the question involved is one of far less importance and only refers to some ordinary matter ? It is a curious fact that when a man falls into serious difficulty and really needs help, he gets none at all from the government or the state. After the trouble is all over, and the man gets killed, or perhaps he kills somebody, the state, with its officers, steps in and takes a hand in the affair. Is that not the way that the state usually protects its citizens ? People who want protection which can be depended on must protect themselves—and they must, besides, pay the bills of those who ought to protect them, but who do not.

The state is like the dog in the manger, it will neither protect us nor permit us to protect ourselves. In reality self-protection is illegal and against the theory of the state, because the state assumes to monopolize that business itself. When a man protects himself, he usually violates the law. However, the court or the jury generally winks at such violations, from

motives of expediency. It is a very common thing for the state to connive at what it would not openly approve.

A serious question in this connexion is this: How far may any man go in the way of wrong-doing, and still be allowed to excuse himself on the plea of necessity or self-defence? Can there ever be any necessity, or even any excuse, for a man's doing a wrong act at any time? Or is an act that is wrong at one time not wrong at another time? Can a man properly kill his fellow man because he apprehends danger? The practice goes so far now that a man may be guilty of murder, in defence of his property, and still he shall not be deemed to have committed any offence. In all such instances, he sits upon his own case, and decides himself what ought to be done. He need not wait until he has suffered some harm to himself or his property. If he even feels himself in danger in any way, or merely says he felt in danger, he is held to be justified in committing murder, the worst crime known to our laws. The law itself may not read that way, but the practice does. If he happens to detect some one in the act of stealing, or acting as if he meditated a burglary, and he shoots him on sight, that usually ends the matter, while if the same thing were done under other circumstances, he would likely be hanged for his crime. So the state commits crime after crime, merely to protect itself—it murders, robs, imprisons, enslaves, kidnaps—and yet it offers no plea in justification, except its own comfort and protection! But deliberate killing or deliberate robbing is a crime, no matter by whom it is committed, nor under what circumstances the crime may be perpetrated. The power to forgive sins has not been granted by God even to the state. God does not deal in indulgences.

Consider for a moment the pleas made and the motives admitted by those acting in the name of the state. What motive has an officer of the state for imprisoning a man when he has done something that is pronounced wrong? Usually the motive is one merely of protection! But is that not carrying "personal

aid and comfort" rather too far? Putting a man in prison, not for what he has done, but what we are afraid he may do, and for no other reason than that we are afraid of him, is hardly the proper thing. But if government officers can put people in prison or hang them merely because they have done something that is called wrong, or because it is feared that they will do something wrong, why shall not individuals have the same privilege? It must not be forgotten that generally it is either cowardice or selfishness that prompts officers to do what they do in the name of the state. They fear that a man may kill somebody, or perhaps that he has killed somebody, and so they overpower him and finally knock him on the head or strangle him in some way—as if one murder could be made to cancel another murder that had been perpetrated. What can be more villainous than to punish a man, or in other words, to cause him pain and anguish in some way, simply because we are afraid of him? Yes, it is fear, slavish fear that fills our jails, our prisons, our madhouses. Usually it is nothing but cowardice that leads to the punishment of criminals after conviction. It is well known that the state, when some wrong has been committed, is in no better condition to furnish a remedy than any individual would be under the same circumstances, but it goes on to punish, ostensibly with a view to prevent what might happen in the future!

Another reason or excuse given by the state, or rather by men who act in the name of the state, for punishing people as it does, is that the state has been offended! But what a fiction, what a fraud that is! A man steals a coat. That offends the state, they say. But who is the state that it is so badly offended? Where does he live and what does he do! People delight to talk about the majesty of the state, as if the state was not made of poor, cheap clay like all the rest of us.

Another reason, and a stronger one, for the state's punishing people, is because it wants a victim, a sacrifice. The state is a regular Moloch and must have sacrifices made and cere-

monies performed in its honor. The state, like the gods of old, must be appeased in some way, when it is offended. The best illustration of how reasonably the law operates, is to be seen in the working of military law. A man deserts and is finally caught and shot. How does this mend matters? Surely no good is done to the deserter, because he is dead, and no good is done to the army, because it has one able-bodied soldier less. In such a case, where does the good come in? I really do not see. It is one of the many cases of deliberate murder by law, without the least sign of an excuse or justification for the deed after it is done.

Finally, if a man can commit a crime merely to save himself or his property, *he ought to be permitted to do the same thing in all cases where any advantage is to be gained by his taking such a course.* That principle is allowed in ordinary business affairs. A man in business avails himself of all the privileges at his command, whether they are just or unjust. Every man gets all he can, and he pays no attention to the self-evident fact that what he gets somebody else is prevented from getting. Men usually do not care how many other men become paupers, if they themselves only become rich. Our whole doctrine of riches and the practice we follow in securing them is based on the principles of robbery and conquest and on the violation of the rights of other men. It will be noticed that there is very much in common between the way riches are acquired and the way that affairs of state are managed.

CRIMES OF THE COURT.

A man on the bench, it must be remembered, is no better qualified in any way to sit in judgment on the conduct of other men than he would be just before being installed in office, or just after leaving it; and that is the same as saying that he has no qualifications or gifts that we would not expect to find in any ordinary citizen. In what single or what particular respect

does he differ from or surpass common men? It should not be forgotten that a judge on the bench can commit a sin just as readily and just as necessarily as any other man. On what ground, then, can he excuse himself for sending one of his fellow men to the gallows, whether that man be either innocent or guilty? Wherein does he differ in his conduct from an inquisitor, or a member of a vigilance committee or of a lynching party? It may be answered that before the judge acts, the culprit must have a trial and be convicted. Do not the lynchers, and the vigilance committees, and did not the holy inquisitors hold their trials also? What does a trial amount to usually? Simply a ceremony, a matter of form, a mere step taken to legitimatize iniquity that has already been resolved upon. By merely holding an office a man does not change his character, and he does not acquire any new rights or qualities. The question is, or should be, what does he do? Not what authority does he have or what office does he hold. *No man can hold a commission that will justify him in doing wrong.*

No, the judge, who, on the bench or off, before trial and conviction or after, sends a human being to prison or the gallows on any pretence whatever, is simply a monster. He is not a bit better in any way than a pirate or a highwayman—except that his course is more generally approved than theirs by his fellow man. It will be claimed for him that he does not mean to do wrong, but just as good a plea as that could be made for the robber or the pirate. It is a rare thing that any man does wrong, according to the standard he compares with, or the standpoint from which he looks at things. Was there ever a criminal that did not have a good, valid excuse in his own mind for doing just what he did? It is inconceivable that a man should deliberately do what he knew he ought not to do. If he did, he would certainly be crazy, and hence he could not be held responsible for his acts.

How much better is the judge who sentences men than the public executioner, who in Europe is execrated above all men?

The judge is practically the executioner—or if there is any difference, it is decidedly in favor of the latter. There is no obligation, no law even, that demands that he shall find the prisoner guilty. It often happens that the judge tries the case on his own account and finds the prisoner guilty with little proof. It frequently occurs that he dominates the jury by the charge he gives.

When we come to study the matter and think it all over, considering the question in all its bearings, what kind word could we utter, or what extenuating circumstance could we mention in behalf of the man who, whether in an official capacity or not, in cold blood sentences other men to death, or perhaps to prison for life? And yet there are men who follow such business for pay, who assume a pious mien and give moralizing sermons to the poor devil who in a few days, or a few weeks at most, is to be hurled into eternity in accordance with the orders of these same self-sufficient, sermonizing judges! Such men are always Christians, so-called, and what they do is always done in the name of their Father in Heaven!

It must be remembered that the judge neither takes nor holds his office by compulsion; and he is no more compelled to sentence the prisoner to death under any such circumstances than is the father compelled to whip his son on any occasion. He does what he does, as the father does what he does, because he feels like doing it, delights to do it, and really believes it ought to be done, or must be done by somebody. I speak advisedly, when I say the judge on the bench generally delights to sentence men, because he really believes the prisoner is guilty and therefore gets what he deserves. And then it must be remembered that the court will not allow a condemned man to kill himself, because suicide would deprive the court officers of a tragedy that they long to take part in. That is really the strangest thing of all—that a man is not allowed to kill himself after he is condemned to death!

It must be remembered that the very best men this world

has ever had, certainly the most pious men, delighted above all things in seeing a witch or a heretic burn or suffer. Indeed, the savagery of mankind is not duly appreciated. There is no beast in the forest that so delights to kill and destroy, especially if the victims belong to its own species, as the highly Christianized and extremely civilized members of the human family. Men delight above all things in blood—not because of their thirst, but because they love to see blood flow! And woe to the poor prisoner if he happens to cross the judge in any way. The judge who says ten days can easily make it ten months or ten years, if he happens to feel out of sorts and if ten months or ten years happens to occur to him. On such slender threads as these do the sentences of great judges hang! It makes a big difference to the prisoner, but not the slightest to the judge, whether the sentence is for a short period or a long one. In either case the judge will enjoy his meals and his sleep as usual. He would sentence a man to death in the afternoon and attend a banquet the same evening. The wrath of a judge, especially of an English judge, is something terrible, and in that respect it resembles the wrath of the Almighty himself. Justice! Justice! What an awful thing Justice is, in this civilized land and in these Christian times of ours! Where justice is, there mercy is never found. I often think what a capital judge the devil must make! The devil is never troubled with compunctions, for the reason that he never has any. It is curious to notice what mild ideas we have of a hangman in this country. It will be remembered that we twice elected to the presidency a man who had at one time been the official hangman of the city in which he lived, he being the sheriff of his county.

Of course I am not speaking of any one judge, or of this or that man that I happen to know—I have nothing at all to do with men in this or in any other case, so far as this work is concerned. I am not considering the judge in the flesh as we know him in his daily walks, but I have in view that imaginary being, the judge in the spirit, who is the type of all judges in

all civilized lands on the globe at the present day. I have in mind that death-dealing or life-saving god who holds in his hands the fate of men and who decides by a mere nod or a mere word whether the victim before him shall be permitted to live or shall be hurled into eternity.

And, wonderful to tell, this business of condemning prisoners to misery or death is looked upon as honorable, and the place is uniformly sought after by men who are eminent in the legal profession ! It is also curious to note that while we have banished our wrathful, avenging God, from our minds at least, we still cling to the avenging judge, who is the one that is chosen to fill God's place for all work of this kind.

Again, think for a moment what a serious, what a dreadful thing it is to judge our fellow man—to decide upon his motives, of which we know absolutely nothing, to determine the merits or demerits of his conduct, over which we have no authority and on which we are not in condition to give a just or fair opinion. A man who takes upon himself such a fearful responsibility as that—judging of another man's reasons and motives—ought to be an extraordinary man indeed. He ought to be more than human—he ought to be at least half divine. But is he ? Why, even the justice of the peace, our next-door neighbor, a most ordinary sort of man generally—he is a judge, and so far as his province extends, he gives sentences deciding the fate of men or women just like any other judge.

On what does the judge base his decision ? On evidence. And what is evidence ? One of the most unstable, uncertain and unsatisfactory things in all this world. In this country, it is the mere word, the hearsay, the opinion of ordinary men, often unintelligent, incapable, ignorant or perhaps dishonest men. Quite generally the witnesses are interested either on one side or the other. It is a very common thing, we all know, for a witness to be paid well for testifying strongly on one particular side of the case. We do not have compurgators and wager of battle exactly as they had in old England many years

ago, but there is not so much difference really between their way and ours as many people suppose.

Everything lies in the bosom of the judge. He can regard the law or disregard it; or if the law does not happen to accord with his notions, he can declare the same unconstitutional. The judge is practically the king in this country. He is the *dernier* resort in all cases of question or dispute. The judge is above the president, above congress, above the people, above God. Who ever heard of a judge being held responsible for a verdict he had rendered or the harm it had occasioned? His judgment is reversed to-day, proving how fallible he is, but he keeps his place and goes on with the same kind of work to-morrow. In olden times people were satisfied to have one king at a time, but we, under our constitutional government at the present day, have as many kings as we have judges on the bench. Their name is legion, and the will, the mere will, of the humblest member of the guild is law! A favorite method of government with our Americans, is through the rulings of a judge—government by injunction, it is called. What is this but autocracy—autocracy in its most dangerous and most detestable form?

A judge's bad conduct while he is on the bench does not affect his standing in society after he leaves it. When he returns to private life again, he is rehabilitated and purified, and his character becomes as white as snow. If there is any sacred person in this country, it certainly is the judge.

In theory, a judge is a mere machine, a mechanical contrivance by which the laws are interpreted. He holds the same relation to the state now that the priest did to religion many years ago. But in practice it is found that the interpreter is a very important personage—he is the leading character in the play. An interpreter has the game wholly in his hands, and he can interpret as he likes. That is precisely what the priests do when they interpret the Bible. The man who interprets the Bible and decides upon what it means, makes the Bible. What

a Bible is for ourselves, or for any man, depends wholly upon how we interpret it. So the judge, in practice, generally makes the laws—and where any question arises in regard to it, he always does so. It is well known that just that thing is what is going on continually in this country. *Not the law as it is written, but the judge's decision is law.* And what a judge's opinion or decision will be, the Lord only can tell in advance. When the judge comes to a conclusion and renders his decision, he is not a machine. A machine is governed by laws, rules, conditions, *but a judge never is.* He is a man, an ordinary man, with all the feelings, frailties and failings that an ordinary man possesses. He uniformly loves his friends, his sect, and his party, and he hates his enemies and offenders generally with all the bitterness of a fanatic. He is a worldly man, and he deports himself on the bench precisely as we should expect that a worldly man would, and yet the office he fills is one that belongs alone to God. I would not deny that all judges are good men in their way—very good indeed, as men usually go—but not one of them is infallible, and that fact alone suffices to prove to me that not one of them is fit to be a judge for other men. I will not speak particularly of a jury, because a jury trial is known to be a farce, so far as justice is concerned.

It might be added by way of note that among the ancient Germans, a man was tried not only by his peers but by his neighbors and friends, by the community in which he himself, his family and his friends had always resided. There was very little law in those days, and consequently there was some justice. Lawyers were not known and the judge was merely a presiding officer who represented the king, the government, and indirectly God, the Almighty. He bore in his right hand a staff or scepter, like the kings and the priests. He knew no more of the law than common people did generally. He had nothing to do with rendering the decision; he merely pronounced the verdict after it was rendered by the jury or the assembly. In a judgment given under such circumstances,

there really was some sense and propriety. The only men who can with any semblance of right pronounce upon a man's conduct, *are the community in which a man lives.*

Men now must obey the law not as they understand it, but as the judge understands it; hence it is, they are always to obey, not the law itself, but the will of the judge. The judge is the real ruler or master in a constitutional government.

Much nonsense is talked concerning the "uncertainty of the law." The trouble, as a general thing, is not so much with the law as with the men who are the interpreters of law. It is the "glorious uncertainty" of the judges of the law that causes so much trouble in this country. It must not be forgotten that we never know what the law is until the court renders its decision—and then it is law only till another judge takes up the case. And yet men are compelled to obey the law, or at least suffer if they do not—the law that nobody understands, not even the lawyers or the judges themselves.

STATE EDUCATION.

There is very little difference between state education and state religion and, to say the least, one is quite as proper and justifiable as the other. But what can be more tyrannical and more oppressive than the laws under which public schools are established and supported? People in this, as well as in other countries, are doing very much as the Spartans did, placing their children wholly under the tutelage, management and direction of the state authorities—as if such officials know better what is wanted than the people do, and as if they are better able to train up the child and prepare it for future life than the mother is who bore and nursed the child! I beg to repudiate such a false and pernicious doctrine as this.

Does the state in undertaking to educate and develop the child do its work well? No, the state never does its work well, and it certainly does not in the department of education.

It does not make, it does not even strive or aim to make, good and virtuous men and women. It compels the child to do what it does not want to do, and what in many cases is exceedingly repulsive to its tastes. In the first place the state compels him to attend school, whether it has ascertained that that is the best place for the child or not. It does not seek to learn what the faculties and disposition of the child best fit him for doing, but it compels all pupils to run through the same curriculum without the slightest reference to what the pupil may expect to do or what it may be called upon to use in after life.

If there is any sacred right that a parent ought to have, it would seem to be that of training and educating his child in that manner which seems to him most proper and most desirable. But the state will not have things conducted in that way. It will allow a man to believe what he chooses and bring up his family in any religious faith that he prefers, but when it comes to the matter of ordinary school education, the state presumes to step in and dictate what school the pupil shall attend, what books he shall use, what subjects he shall study, and how much time he shall devote to such matters. It is true that a man may hire a tutor or private teacher, but he must do so wholly at his own expense, while at the same time he must pay a large tax annually to support schools and institutions in which other people's children, and not his, are educated. Public schools are not only supported by a tax upon the community in which they are located, but they are aided by annual appropriations that come immediately from the state, but which, like all other state funds, come from the masses of the people originally. The main objection to all state rule, as it works in practice, is that men must not only pay their own bills, but also, to a large extent, they must aid in paying the bills of other people. Somebody has said that all government is villainous. Certainly all government is wicked and unjust, for it is based upon wickedness and injustice in the first place.

The state, it is well known, does everything in the most ex-

pensive manner, and it is a rare thing that the best results are attained for the money invested. It is generally understood that what is everybody's business is nobody's business, and this is found to be the case where teachers are employed by the public. To have really good work in any business, the one who is employed should be held responsible for what he does, and for the way he does it, to the one who employs him and who is expected to pay him when the work is finished and accepted.

The objection I make to school laws is the objection I would make to all laws, namely, that they attempt to make every man and woman fit the same Procrustean bed ; they assume that every one is made after the same pattern, with the same wishes, interests, designs and capabilities—while it is well known to be a fact that no two people are exactly alike in all respects, and so a law that might be perfectly proper and desirable for one man, would be quite the opposite for some other man whose circumstances and temperament are entirely different.

As a rule, every man should be master of his own destiny ; he should be allowed to choose his own course of life and direct his own efforts to such ends as seem to him most desirable. He should not be shackled, hampered, or opposed by anybody or in any manner. Especially is this position true and sound in regard to what a man shall learn and what he shall have his children learn, when they happen to have reached the school-going age.

In this connexion I wish to make the criticism that our education as we have it to-day is to a large extent valueless, and to a certain extent actually harmful. We have altogether too much education, and what is usually furnished to the pupil is not of the right kind. It is not practical ; it is not in any proper sense useful as a whole. Pupils are sent to school too early and they continue there too long. There are too many fads and notions in teaching. There is altogether too much higher education, and it is too often the case that the elementary branches have not been mastered. The teacher should teach

what he knows, and he should make far less use of books than is now the common practice. A competent teacher should not be obliged to recognize any book as authority. If it is all contained in the books, what need is there of a master? Pupils are strengthening the mind, as they imagine, when it is the body that deserves the most attention. The great weakness in our schools, especially in our public schools, is that there are too many instructors who undertake to teach what they have never learned and what therefore they do not know. Teaching the young, and training them up for spheres of future usefulness to themselves and society, is not a boys' and girls' business. *It is a man's work*, and it is a work for which not every or any man is necessarily fitted. What fact is more lamentably evident than this, that even our best teachers know very little of true, practical life? And if they do not know it themselves, how shall they be able to teach either the old or young how to live and do?

The best way to educate people, beyond the elements, is to induce them *to educate themselves*, the same as the best way to govern people is to have them *govern themselves*. We cannot teach people, we cannot compel them to learn, but we can so shape things that they shall realize the importance of learning without being compelled.

Education, the most important of all the affairs of life, is something that ought not to be farmed out to strangers and incompetent persons. To be a teacher of men, or of those who are to become men, ought to be a sacred office, and not simply an employment by which a living is to be gained or a sum of money earned. The mother is the true teacher, and under the parental roof the most valuable and most important part of the child's education should be gained. Our children should be kept at home, at least during their tender years, and they should not be turned loose in the streets, nor even sent to the public school. As a rule, at the public school the children learn more vice than virtue, and in these institutions we find plenty of illus-

trations of the Bible saying, that "evil communications corrupt good manners."

Education is a good thing—if there is not too much nor too little of it, and if what is given is of the right kind. Another thing to be considered in this connexion is, whether the education that is obtained does not cost more than it is worth.

The greatest of all mistakes that is made, in considering this matter of education, is in assuming that learning is only to be obtained in schools and colleges, while in fact only a very small portion of what is properly called learning is obtained in such institutions. The best schools even do not make scholars—they simply put the pupil in condition to learn and they point out the road he is to follow. As a matter of fact pupils learn by their own efforts, rather than receive instruction by the efforts of others.

But education, I admit, even as we have it now, does have its effect upon character. It increases pride and develops conceit. It makes a man dogmatic and dictatorial. It makes him rebellious against authority and a lover of contentions and disputes. No one despises manual labor and steady employment more than the student just out of college. None are more inclined to revolts against the state, none are more treacherous or more savage, when the passions have full sway, than the students of universities.

Besides, our prisons and jails have among their inmates many highly educated gentlemen. The ranks of loafers, loungers swindlers, and cranks are being constantly recruited from among those who have enjoyed all the advantages afforded by our colleges and high schools. It is evident enough that education—such education as we have—does not save a man from ruin. It does not even furnish him with a living. Clearly enough, education does not lessen crime nor protect society. In a certain sense it increases crime and proves a continued menace to society. It is conceded that it develops a tendency to suicide.

We have seen what education, together with association, may do. Now let us see what it does not do. Thus, it does not make men careful of the feelings and rights of others. It does not make them kind, obliging and helpful. It does not make them generous or magnanimous. It does not make them honest or truthful, or just. It gives man neither a higher, a happier, nor a holier aim in life. A man who is educated is not necessarily either a Christian man, a good man or an honorable man. The education of the present day does not concern itself with such objects. Its purpose and aim is to give what is called culture. It disciplines the mind, and never concerns itself about the heart. It communicates a great many facts, but it is not particular as to the influence which will be exerted by those facts. Education stops with being simply an acquirement or an accomplishment. It is not education in the proper sense of the term. It is not even discipline. Discipline is the thing the learner needs, but he gets very little of it in school. Discipline would make of him a man as well as a scholar. It would give him correct principles, and so direct and inspire him that he would follow those principles in after life.

We have what are called "learned men." But learned in what? Learned in that which is practical and useful? Learned in the ways of truth and wisdom? Most assuredly not, as a general thing. Learning as it exists at the present day is too much a matter of show, a simple badge or sign by which those who are cultured are to be distinguished from those who are supposed to be ignorant. Like the thin coating of varnish, it merely covers the surface, and never touches the heart. It is astounding to think of the money and time expended simply to enable a man to call himself "educated." So much time is demanded for metaphysics, so much for Greek and Latin, and so much for mathematics, very little of which will be of service to the pupil in after life. All the time spent in trying to get down to the depths of philosophy is so much time wasted.

H. T. Peck, Professor of Latin in Columbia university, feels impelled to make the following remark as to what education as we have it is doing and what it is not doing for the masses at the present day: "The modified American of to-day is as formula-ridden as any German ever was." The educational formula for solving problems, it may be added, is, with us, like the legislative formula, altogether too prominent and too common. Education is expected to do everything—that is, education and legislation combined. As we legislate to make men happy and wise, so we educate men for the same purpose. People have come to believe, quite unfortunately, that education is not a matter of growth, but that it is something that can be transmitted from one to another; indeed, that it can be given to any one and to all, if they will only pay for it. But as Prof. Peck very well intimates, you cannot educate men into good habits and good principles—at least, it has never been done as yet.

Prof. Peck truly says: "It is just as true to-day as it was true 5,000 years ago, and as it will be true 5,000 years from now, that the vital and most important facts of life cannot be taught by academic tyranny."

"When we hear to-day that So-and-So is a university man, one never knows by reason of that fact alone whether this person is in reality a gentleman and a scholar, or whether he is only a sublimated type of tinker."

"The university," he says, "has been swamped by the mob." Nothing that has ever been said is more true. It is well known that thousands upon thousands who have gone to college might better have remained at home—better for themselves, better for their friends at home, better for the world, and better for the institution they attended.

"People," continues Prof Peck, universally believe "that education in itself, and for all human beings is a good and thoroughly desirable possession—but there is probably in our whole system to-day no principle so fundamentally untrue as

this." It is "an ill-considered system which forces a half education on all men whether they will or no."

As it is, the state wants to have sole charge of educational matters, when it ought to have nothing at all to do with them. The state even wants to edit the text books—the school histories especially. Our histories, such as we have had, are not satisfactory to the state. They do not teach patriotism according to the notions of our rulers. The pupil is not sufficiently impressed with the fact that we have "the best government in the world." But according to my ideas, this is nothing to boast of, for the best government in the world is burdened with many imperfections.

Indeed, where does tyranny manifest itself in a more oppressive form than it does in the laws which regulate our educational system? Has the teacher himself any liberty, to say nothing of the pupil or the parent? Is the teacher permitted to teach what he believes and knows to be true? He might try it and see. He would find the earth going out from under his feet as if it were suffering from the shock of an earthquake. He would soon find that his occupation was gone—or at least that his salary was gone. No, a teacher would be very foolish indeed to set up as an instructor on his own account, as the philosophers did in other days. *He must follow the authorities*—the text books. That is what he was hired for—and not to teach any of his own isms or ideas. To teach a new doctrine has always been heresy, and never more so than at the end of the nineteenth century. No man can belong to a party, unless he votes the ticket; no man can belong to a church, unless he subscribes to its tenets: no man can belong to a state, unless he obeys the laws. Even to-day people have to be very careful indeed as to what they believe, what they say, and *especially what they teach*. People will find that the state means business every time, and it will tolerate nothing that bears any semblance of nonsense—that is, nothing that is considered nonsense by the state.

Moreover, before the teacher can teach, he must have a licence. He must have the state stamp on him somewhere, or he cannot teach. He must have the government chalk mark on him, like the traveling bag that passes through the custom house. *No other teachers are genuine.* If they cannot pass muster, of course they cannot teach. Thousands are to-day laid up for repairs for that very reason—"can't get a certificate." If they only had a "certificate," they could teach as much as they liked. It is the certificate that makes the difference in persons. It does not matter whether a man deserves the document or not, *if he only has it.* That is the way it goes in all state matters. Everything is cut "bias" nowadays, and material that does not meet the conditions is cast aside as worthless. So the pupil must pass "Regents," or he is not anybody. But what is "Regents?" Answered in a few words, it is, in practice, a great piece of nonsense. It makes any amount of trouble and proves little. After the pupil has once "passed," he is redeemed forever. Everything belongs to the state; the parent belongs to the state, the pupil belongs to the state and the teacher of course belongs to the state. What would we poor people do, if we did not have a state to belong to?

No, there is no liberty in schools nor in teaching—*there is no liberty anywhere under the state.*

The leading criticism to be made against our present system of education is that it is largely machine work. Copy is furnished to the teacher by the authorities, and it is his duty to turn out "educated" pupils as nearly like sample as possible. *There is no opportunity for originality on the part of either the pupil or the instructor.* Nature has made boys and girls quite unlike other boys and girls, but the teacher runs them all through the same curriculum and endeavors to make one an exact duplicate of the other. The chief sin of education to-day lies in excessive classification—putting the young and the old, the stupid and the apt, all in the same class and compelling them to move at the same pace and pursue the same studies. Surely, slavery

manifests itself as strikingly in education as it does in any other branch of our civilization. What the modern state insists upon, above all things, is *uniformity and obedience*—more particularly obedience.

If men had freedom, and at the same time had wisdom and sense, they would see that every pupil should be educated with direct reference to what he proposes to do and what he hopes to become when he arrives at manhood. It is evident enough that he should not be compelled to spend years in acquiring what can be of no use to him when he comes to enter upon the important duties of life.

In our public schools there is too much time and effort misapplied, and in many cases absolutely wasted, through an excess of examinations and teachers' institutes. It might be added that, were it not for the fat jobs connected with this business, we would not have such things as teachers' institutes at this late day. There is no need of amplifying on this matter. If teachers understand their business, there will be no need of institutes, and if they do not understand their business, no institute can supply the deficiency.

There is altogether too much school supervision—in fact, no school supervision is needed. If a teacher is fully competent, how can superintendence assist him? Does the skilled artist need supervision? Did Rubens or Michael Angelo need a director or adviser? Did Christ or St. Paul, greatest of all teachers as they were, have any use for institutes or for conductors of any kind?

No, we have school supervision for three principal reasons only: first, to keep everybody subject to the state; second, to furnish indolent and impecunious people with an easy job at good prices, and third, to furnish needed assistance to incompetent teachers who are not qualified for their work.

Will the time ever come when men shall take upon themselves the business of teaching from some higher motive than simply to gain a livelihood? Will the time ever come when the

calling of an instructor shall be something higher and nobler than it is? It may, but not very soon—indeed, it never will come till the fashion changes. Most of our education is controlled by fashion, rather than by judgment and sense. Fashion controls everything in civilized life. Every man must follow his leader, or he is nobody at all.

In conclusion, I would add the following extracts in connexion with this subject of education :

Education can only unfold and form—it cannot create.—Niemeyer.

Education means ambition, and ambition means discontent.—Peck.

For in much wisdom is much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.—Bible.

In Sparta every man was a teacher of the boys; every youth had in every man, and especially in every old man, his instructor.

The highest object of education is a sound soul in a sound body.—Locke.

I complain of emulation in school, because it produces nothing but two-legged encyclopedias.—Meyer.

Ever only to know, ever only to heap up knowledge. Heavens, must all the youth be nothing but brains?—Schultze.

For what good generally is our much-knowing? Does it advance happiness in the world?—Spencer.

In our times, it seems to me the instruction-tree has its roots in the air, and its leaves and flowers in the earth, but I confess I would rather have this state of things reversed.—Huxley.

Not genus-rules, but nature-laws! not dead languages, but living bodies, not book-study, but observation and experiment! —Preyer.

We work to-day all too much.—Auerbach.

A simple, quiet, contented life is properly the highest that man can attain.—Humboldt.

It is not doctrine and command that has the greatest effect

upon society in connexion with morals, but models and examples.—Herder.

THE NATURE OF LAW.

What is law and what does it do ? Law is merely the say, the declared will or wish, of some ruler—it is his word and nothing more. Alone it effects nothing, it is nothing. It is men, it is those who put the laws into effect, that do the work—of itself, law is powerless. We have written laws and printed laws now, but they are not in the least stronger than unwritten laws were in olden times. Whether written or unwritten, laws that are not put in force by the action of men amount to nothing. The Bible is full of commands, and our statute books are loaded down with ordinances and decrees which are as powerless as the paper on which they are printed. What use shall be made of them, or whether any use at all shall be made of them, depends upon the will of men. The Bible tells us to obey God and love our neighbor, but we may or may not regard this command, according as we choose. It all depends upon how we feel about the matter.

Why should we make so many laws and have so much confusion, when it is all left to the will of individuals in the end? We are continually making laws, and then we leave the people to enforce them as they choose. If making a law enforced it, that would be another matter. Why not make laws as we need and when we need them, and not bother ourselves at all with general laws that we may never want? What does any community want of rules or laws that were made to meet the case of some other community perhaps a hundred years ago or a thousand miles away?

Law-making is comparatively a modern process, a sort of new discovery, not dating back much farther than the times of the Roman empire. Laws were made before that date, it is

true, but there were few of them and they usually served to meet some particular emergency. The laws, such as they were, in earlier times, were engraved on the hearts of the people. It is evident enough that, even in this advanced age, there are very few laws that we really need. Laws usually do no man any good—as a guide in life, they are worthless. The sole social problem for a man to solve in this life, is how to get along pleasantly and smoothly with the people among whom he may live, and that he can learn only by observation and experience. The law never determines a man's character. Whether he obeys the laws or disobeys them, does not make the slightest difference in his real worth. A man in state prison is precisely the same as he was outside of prison walls. Hence it is that no man, by what he may do, should ever lose any of his rights as a citizen.

Laws are first developed in the breasts of men; written law is nothing new in itself, it is merely an expression of what men have thought, and in that respect it differs not from any other writing. Laws are really made by men before they are brought out in the form of an enactment or proclamation.

The old Roman law came under three heads: *fas*, which men considered to be pleasing to the gods; *jus*, what was ordered or required by men, and *boni mores*, what accorded with the apparent will of the community. All true laws are expressions of the people's will or sentiments. Statutes are, or they ought to be, the demands of the people expressed in writing.

As we have seen, a law is a mere wish, an expression of will, by which certain things are permitted and others are forbidden. Sentient beings alone have wills; spirits have no will, a log has no will, nature has no will, and hence neither spirits nor nature can make laws. Organized bodies, or bodies made up of units or individuals, have no wills, and therefore such bodies cannot make laws. In all cases where bodies of men are supposed to make laws, it is merely some individual assuming to represent the whole mass who reveals, enacts or

publishes the law; the facts are precisely the same where laws are assumed to be made by spirits or by the Supreme Being. It is well known that the platform of a party convention, while it is given out as the platform of the convention, or of the whole party, is really the work of one or two men, to which the convention or the party finally gives its assent.

Moses was a law-giver who spoke in the name of the Lord and in behalf of his own people. It is evident that he published what he was impressed to publish, what he dreamed, what was revealed to him, what he saw as it were in a vision, as thousands of other students and thinkers have done since his day. He put into form the laws and ideas that prevailed at the time among his people, though perhaps they had existed in a crude and uncrystallized state for centuries.

God is only the people, the mass, posited out of itself; God is the people in the spirit, or in the abstract. God's laws are the people's laws—*vox populi, vox dei*—they are all moral laws and relate to customs of men; they all emanate unconsciously from the people and they are promulgated by individuals for the people. Mohammed was a law-giver in the same way. So was Christ. All the philosophers and holy men of the east were those who represented both God and the people in the flesh. They spoke for God and the people. In the east their God is not our God; he is a different God from ours; according to our conceptions, he is no God at all. All his work in the east, especially his law-giving, is done for him by ordinary men. But if God is not a law-giver and a ruler, he is nothing—nothing more than idea, an idea imperfectly expressed or presented, because imperfectly understood. So Solon and Draco and Lycurgus were merely law-givers. They were the interpreters, prophets, medicine-men for the masses of their nation. The laws they published were merely their wishes, their sentiments, and through them they made known what they considered to be for the best interests and the future good of their fellow men.

All the law-givers that the world has yet produced were just such men as these.

No law is any more binding upon ourselves than is the most ordinary thought or wish of other men. We are not bound by the law, except so far as we choose to be bound by it. The Bible says : "Thou shall not lie," or "thou shalt not steal"—thou must not—that is, the law-giver or the interpreter, or prophet, or medicine-man, or oracle, *does not wish to have it done*. That is all there is of law taken in its fullest extent and application and in view of its essential characteristics. All there is of the business is simply this : Somebody who has no authority over us in fact, wants us to do this or that, or does not want us to do this or that, and that is all.

It will be noticed that our state, with its state law and state government, is something that the world had never known, to any appreciable extent, up to within a century or so since. Up to that time no man-made law was known or recognized. The laws before that time came from God who was the head, the chief, the judge of the people. His laws were the people's laws. A man would have been crucified or stoned to death who should have been so presumptuous as to make laws for his fellow man in his own right and from his own finite essence. By so doing he would be making himself the equal of the Almighty God himself. Such a thing was never done, to any noticeable extent, before the coming of the nineteenth century. Before that time the greatest leader that man had known contented himself with being a leader, a general, or a conqueror and nothing more. He never presumed for a moment to be a law-giver. That was left for God, his prophets, his priests, his oracles and the medicine-men. Now, anybody can be a medicine-man or law-giver, if he has the faculty of getting people to follow him !

The laws that nature makes are not like the laws that men make or that God makes. In fact nature neither makes nor possesses any laws in the proper sense of the term. Nature does

not say “thou shalt not kill;” nature forbids nothing, commands nothing, says nothing. There is not a single one of the ten commandments that is in accordance with nature; nature knows no crimes, no wrongs; whatever man is inclined to do, must be natural, and therefore, so far as nature is concerned, it must be right. Laws, all laws, divine, moral and statute laws, emanate from the hearts or minds of men—there is no other source. Laws, true laws, as we have said before, are merely what the people want, and what they believe to be necessary and proper for them.

It must be evident enough, on reflexion, that the state, in these modern times of democracy and constitutional government, takes the place of God and dispenses entirely with his services as the ruler of the universe. In former ages, God did everything, and especially God made all laws, rules and regulations for the proper conduct of men in their relations with each other. God formerly was known by men in person, and was seen by them face to face. But later he was more retiring, more secretive in his habits, more mysterious in his ways. In former days his will was revealed only through priests, judges, prophets and oracles; now the case is quite different; there are no priests in the proper sense of the word, no man who claims to speak for God, no messenger coming from God, no oracles that are to be consulted in order to ascertain God's will, no birds whose flight is to be observed, no entrails of victims to be examined, as in old Roman times; there are no signs to be regarded, there are no sacrifices that are considered to be necessary, and there are no ceremonies to be performed for any purpose or in any manner whatever. Man is supreme and God has departed; man, the state, takes charge of the affairs of this world and God, formerly the Almighty, the omnipotent, the omnipresent, the Creator of us all, is now relegated to the shades. To use another figure of speech, God has gone out of business. A new dispensation has come. We have noticed this result in other parts of this work, and now we reach it again,

coming from a different direction. I am not telling what should be, but simply what is, and what has already come to pass, now about the close of the nineteenth century.

ASPECTS OF LAW.

It is the community in which a man lives that really makes the law in the end—all the law does is to endorse or ratify what men do, in that way giving them protection. If the community says "enforce the law," it is done, otherwise it is not. Even the officers of the law are not compelled to execute it; it is always a matter of will or choice with them whether they will or will not move in any matter. People get a mistaken idea that because a law has been enacted, it is always in force. There are thousands of laws, it is well known, that have never been repealed, and still they are as if they were not and had never been. The community has a veto power of its own that transcends even that of the governor or king.

Could not, or would not, the community do as well as it does now without written law? As it is now, even with the statute and scripture law that we have, all the best, the worthiest, wisest actions that are done are those which are done in every community without the sanction or interposition of law. Without law, and in total disregard of law, men do ten thousand things. They act from their own free will and judgment. Without the law people do good, they help their neighbors, and conduct the ordinary affairs of life. It is well known that as it is now law has but a slight influence upon conduct, and even that little is exerted very indirectly. The laws merely set the stakes and mark out lines within which men may do as they please. Beyond these lines they may still do as they please, but they must take the consequences of their action and must not ask for state protection. When people go beyond the law, the state refuses to protect them; it even allows the com-

munity to treat the transgressor in such cases as an outlaw and to pester and punish him as one would an outlaw,

People should get it out of their heads that laws are made for the whole mass of the people. This is a serious misapprehension as to the facts in the case. Laws are always made for a certain portion of the people—among the ancients they were for the arms-bearing portion alone. With us there are no laws for slaves and those who are in the position of slaves—wives, children, foreigners, criminals, the insane and even to a large extent the poor also. Wives begin to have some rights, but only so far as they cease to be wives in the true and ancient sense of the term. Even in Rome, practically the country of laws, a large portion of its citizens did not have the protection of the law. Even the Plebeians were outside of law. In Athens only a small portion of the citizens had the benefit of the law. In Rome even, there were many families that were denied the privilege of religion—not because they were criminals, but because they were low in rank. They not only had no fixed laws, but they had no social position or privileges, and there were no magistrates to whom they could appeal for protection. The patron in Rome, in his relations with his client, was omnipotent. He was alike master and judge, and he could even without process of law condemn his client to death. The old barons in England had the same power over their vassals and villeins. A man who is omnipotent can sit in judgment any time, and he is held guiltless. But what else do our murderers or anarchists do but condemn a man to death and then execute him if they get a chance? Wherein do they differ from our officers of the law? And yet we excuse one and punish the other, if he is so unfortunate as to be apprehended.

Originally in old Rome the people did not know the law. Books were not then printed and read as they are now. How should the people know the laws, even few as they were? The masses themselves did not read; all knowledge and teaching came from the priests, who were the custodians of the law. So

it was in all countries before the invention of printing and for centuries after. The law was given out as a sort of revelation from God, or from his representative, the pope or the king. Laws then had some force, and men obeyed them willingly and implicitly. Everything in those days was done by God, or by the agents of God.

As we have seen, God disappears and legislation by men comes to the front. We still pretend to make laws in God's name—but it is only a shallow pretense after all. Law-making has become strictly a human affair. In old Grecian times the Athenians invested Solon with the authority to make laws for the people. He represented their will. In this case Solon and the people alike were above God, outside of and independent of God.

At first laws coming from God did not change. Now they come and go as the winds and the seasons do. We have one law to-day, and another to-morrow. Being made by men, they can be modified or unmade by other men. Laws of the new kind are made by votes—so many votes, such a law, and without votes, no law at all. Tradition, custom, ceases to play the part it did in days of old. The whole business is reversed and instead of tradition making law, it is now laws that make tradition. God's will is of no account—there is no God for this heaven-denying age of ours. The people themselves are God, or at least they imagine they are.

Law has really changed its nature; the transition from old to new law began with the time of the XII. Tables. New kinds of rights arose, and those began to have rights who had no rights before. Of course the only government known in those early times was city government, and the principle upon which this government came to be founded was public interest. Before that, it was not public interest, but religion alone that controlled the movements of men. Under the regime of religion there was one party to command and another to obey. The question whether such and such a thing was useful or not, was

not raised, but merely whether it was God's will. Under religious government, laws were inflexible, immutable. But Solon's laws, even stable as they were supposed to be, were only made for one hundred years.

God-made laws admitted of no criticism or discussion. But the man-made laws of Athens were different. The people made the laws, or the Assembly did, and for that purpose they met almost daily. Under the old dispensation the auspices and priests had much to do with the law; the opinion of the king, the priests, the sacred magistrate, had a powerful influence. There was but little voting under that regime. But under the new system, the Assembly voted on all questions. The evident desire was to ascertain the opinions of all. Voting settled everything. Hence government changed its character entirely—its functions came to be mere ceremonies. Government being of men for men became purely a human affair.

But can the people make itself equal to God, and especially can it be done by that small portion of the people by whom the whole body is controlled? Can the people by their vote, can the king by his nod make that right which is evidently and unmistakably wrong? Or is there no such thing as right or wrong outside of public will, or public opinion, and can wrong be measured or defined only by voting? Shall numbers alone decide what is just and proper to be done? It is clear enough that if things be right, they must be right before the law declares them to be such; so, how much stronger does the ratification by the law-making body make the case?

Is it through the medium of the law and the intercession of the state that advancements and improvements are made? No, rarely, if ever. Law in itself is always conservative in its nature; it is opposed to changes and to advancement of all kinds. All our great thinkers rebelled against law as it stood in their time. Where law is in force, and where doctrines, creeds, and constitutions prevail, there can be no improvement, no advancement. Christ, Luther, Galileo, Harvey, in fact, all

original thinkers were opposed to the law and the doctrines of their times. All great movements are made through the instrumentality of revolutions—*through rebellion against the laws*.

Men have ceased to worship the Bible, and to a large extent they have ceased to worship God, but for the law and the officers of the state, men still have that holy reverence which formerly they bestowed upon God and the scriptures. Moral law, statute law and the constitution are as much objects of worship to-day as God was in the Middle Ages. Formerly we did not dare to inquire whether the Bible was right, or really whether it was the Bible or not—the book had come down to us from the past and was held to be infallible. That answered all questions and cut-short the argument at once. *Scriptum est*—that was sufficient. Some such place the moral code and statute law holds among us to-day. If it is declared and known to be law, that ends the matter. To ask whether it is just or correct, is impertinent, and to repeat the question and raise objections, is treason. We are poor, humble, feeble creatures, and it is not proper for us to raise doubts over a matter that our superiors have already settled. All there is left for us is to obey—obey the law always, and thereby save pain, trouble and disgrace, and finally go to heaven. To disobey a law of the land, is not only illegal, but immoral. Men must obey the law—that is the customary plea of the coward and the slave. It may be right to obey the law, I am not going to dispute that—right as we understand the matter in this generation. But to obey is what any coward or any slave can do, and usually does do. To obey is no proof of any man's goodness or greatness—rather otherwise.

What a wonderful thing indeed is the *sanction of the law*—that is, to have the sanction and endorsement of men that we happen to know, and perhaps despise, men, no doubt, of just such flesh and blood as ourselves, and possibly not half so good—what do we, what does any man, want of the sanction of law? It is at best only a label, and it is worth no more than any ordinary label. When you emerge from the custom house with your

baggage after it has been examined by the inspector, this sanction of law is nothing but a chalk mark on your trunk or traveling bag. Indeed, what do we want the sanction of law for? We know our own business, or at least we ought to know. It is the height of impudence for the state, or a few common mortals acting in the name of the state, to insist upon their right to sanction what we happen to be found doing! If we make a mistake or commit a blunder, we are the ones to suffer from the effects of our own action. If we hurt somebody, we ought to settle the matter with him—but the state will not allow things to be done that way. That would be compounding a felony, which, in the eyes of the state, is one of the worst things that a man could possibly do.

And remember that in all these cases where complaint is made and the law is put in force, it is some ordinary or perhaps obscure individual who takes the initiative, sets himself up in judgment on our case, and finally puts the mysterious machinery of law in operation, and perhaps lands us in prison at last. These informers or complainants are, for the time being, and in that particular case, really the state itself. Suppose it is a case of Sabbath-breaking that we are charged with, and a complaint is made. In that case where is the state, who is the state? It will be noticed that the business is started by an individual who is no officer at all, one who really has nothing to do with the state, and the matter is finally adjudged and settled by six of our peers (six men possibly as good as we are, but no better) or by a justice of the peace, another ordinary person no better than ourselves. Such men are the state—the constable, the magistrate, the complainant, the witnesses, all ordinary people coming from the common walks of life. Away with such judges and such a bogus state as that! It is a clear case of imposition and nothing else. I am ready to submit to one who proves himself holier and better than myself, but unfortunately I have never came across such a man yet.

It will be remembered that any one of the three kinds of

law—moral, religious and statute law—is just as much a force-law as the other, and one is just as much a nullity as the other, so long as it is not enforced, and whether it is put into operation at all or not, depends entirely upon the temper of the people. It will be noticed, too, that when we punish people for not observing religious laws as we understand the obligations they impose, we persecute the offender precisely as men did in the Middle Ages. The complaint we make is that they do not observe the mandates of our God as we understand them, and that is precisely what the inquisitors did in the case of heretics some hundreds of years ago. And what more or less do we do with people who do not obey our statutes as we think they should be enforced? These people against whom we make our complaint may have had nothing to do with making the statute, and may have conscientious scruples about the propriety of doing what the statutes demand. Nevertheless, as we are the doctor and have the power, we insist upon having these people take our medicine or suffer the consequences of incurring our displeasure. Again we see that *there is no radical difference between persecution and prosecution*, and when we prosecute men, simply because they do not choose to do as we do and as we want them to do, we persecute them. In the days of the Inquisition they tortured the offender with the rack and machinery of that character; at the present time we put the enginery of law in operation and torment a man through that instrumentality. It did not require much evidence, in the times of the Inquisition, to have a man accused, and when a man was accused, it was about the same thing as to be found guilty of the offence charged. Is the experience materially different as matters go in cases at law at the present day? Let a man do what he chooses or let him not do at all, he is still liable to be accused, and as such to suffer all the torments that an accusation in law usually involves. But a man who views such matters in a fair light and a candid manner must be able to see that we have no more reason to interfere with a man's conduct than we

have with his belief. His conduct, it will be remembered, is the result of his belief. We are coming to be tolerant in regard to a man's religious belief, why should we not also be tolerant with regard to a man's conduct in the ordinary affairs of life? If we do not enforce religious law as laid down in our Bible, the highest authority known to civilized man, why should we seek to enforce the laws laid down in our statute books, which we know are the work of ordinary fallible men, and generally very selfish and designing men at that.

Moral law, as we have it now, is a later law than religious law and, so far as we are acquainted with it, dates back hardly beyond Israelitish times. The Greeks knew little of law of any kind, and their knowledge of moral law was certainly very limited. They did not have any such ideas as we have of right and wrong, of justice and injustice. Their court was continually in session, and it settled questions as they occurred. They knew little, if anything, of general laws, such as could be made applicable at all times and in all places.

But where do we get the right to enforce our ideas of propriety upon other people? If we have any right at all, we have an unlimited right; if we can determine what every man may do, we can also determine what every man should do; and if we have that right in one case, or in one department of life, we have it also in every other case and every other department. The result of such a theory as this would be that nobody would have anything to do but just what everybody besides himself wanted him to do. Everybody would be the master of everybody but himself; and he would also be the servant of everybody but himself. If the temperance man has a right to enforce the prohibitory law upon others, has not the liquor dealer an equal right to enforce his ideas of free indulgence in strong drink? Who is the man living since Christ was crucified who shall presume to say unto men: "This is right and this is wrong; this you must do, and that you must not do?" Who is the presuming fellow, we would like to know?

No, I am tired of hearing the changes rung upon the law ! the law !—and nineteen hundred years ago or less Christ was tired in the same way. He cared little about the law, and frequently transgressed it himself. He believed in good men and good deeds, and good men and good deeds are better a thousand times over than all the laws in the world. As we have seen over and over again, law in itself is powerless, valueless. Indirectly, it has some effect, but directly it has none. Indirectly, the law makes bad men, but it rarely makes good men. If we had not so many laws, it is certain we should not have so many transgressors of the law, and if we had no law, we should not have any transgressions. If we had no law, people would be as the savages are. They would know no wrong and hence would do no wrong. It is well known that we have a thousand times as many transgressions now as they had a few centuries ago, simply because we have a thousand times as many statutes and ordinances. The savages have no criminals, because such a thing as a crime among them is not known. Law, instead of serving to promote justice, is often an obstacle placed in the way of justice. Law trammels men and prevents them from doing what their own judgment and better feelings would prompt them to do, when the occasion comes that requires action.

No, let us cease to talk about law—let us rather talk about a good, honest and manly people, whose conduct originates in the sentiments of the heart and is not the forced production of law. It must be remembered that the culprit, the one whose ideas of what he wants to do differ from those of people who imagine they know what he ought to do, is usually as good as anybody, so long as the law does not come down upon him with its crushing, overwhelming force. Law never made, never will make, any man good. It has been tried and tried a thousand times, and in every case it has failed. Yet people will go on and deceive themselves with the absurd idea that by passing a great many good laws, we will have by that means alone a great many good people ! But is that the

fact? Look around you and see where it is and how it is that the laws passed last winter, or the winter before, or the laws passed ten years before that, ever made a single man better than he was. Indeed, I do not understand that our legislators claim to be either angels or evangelists; they do not pretend for a moment that their laws are reformatory in character. Laws are like our prisons and jails, not instituted to reform but to punish people. The laws have a tendency to make people worse rather than better. The whole world knows that the laws serve knaves much more effectually and more frequently than they do honest men. The laws set out landmarks and blaze a course inside of which rascals can do as they please. It must not be overlooked that scoundrels are the ones who chiefly enjoy the benefits of our laws! A man who behaves himself and never comes before the court has no occasion to ask for the protection of the law. Rascals are the ones who usually invoke the aid of the law to enable them to carry out their wicked schemes. It must not be forgotten that all the rascals are not in state prison. By far the largest share of them never get as far as that. They are careful observers of the requirements and forms of law. A man may be a first class villain and still maintain the reputation of being a clever and even a very respectable gentleman. Is there any wicked scheme that the law-makers are not ready to countenance or defend, either directly or indirectly? How would usurers, the trusts, the monopolists amass their riches, if it were not for the aid or protection of the state? Even the tyrant goes according to law, and if the law does not suit him, he has it made as he wants it, and that is precisely what influential rascals are doing to-day under every constitutional government in the world. They can well afford to observe the requirements of the law, when they take pains to have it made as they want it.

In my humble judgment, law is the most diabolical contrivance ever invented by man. Next to war, in its terrible efficacy for evil, is law. In thousands of cases, written law is

only an endorsement of the wicked designs of certain bad men who have sufficient influence to control legislation. Any crime that man could possibly conceive of can be legitimatized by securing the passage of a law. An act that would be wilful murder, if not sanctioned by law, becomes a perfectly harmless, if not meritorious, affair if it has the sanction of the legislature. What would be highway robbery if committed without the sanction of law, becomes an ordinary business transaction, if the perpetrator has the statute on his side. In nine cases out of ten, it is well known that a charter granted to a few men called a corporation, is merely a licence to them from the state to rob the people at will. And the law works both ways. If it makes good that which is bad, it also makes a crime of that which, without the law, would be considered perfectly innocent. Is there anything that our legislature could not make a misdemeanor? Is there any crime that it could not condone or, perhaps, ratify? It cannot be that people have forgotten what Tweed did some years ago. When the law did not suit him, he had it modified, and if there was no law to meet his requirements, he ordered one made to fit his particular case. Henry VIII. did precisely the same thing over and over again. If he could not legally divorce a woman that he had tired of, he had a law passed to meet the emergency. Nothing in this world is easier or more simple than to have a law passed, if you only have the "pull." The villains who ruled Paris during the Reign of Terror understood to perfection just how much could be done through the instrumentality of laws. In 1794 Robespierre got a law passed providing that the great committee should not be responsible for its action. In this way it could condemn without evidence any man that it chose, and the result was that in a little over two weeks 1,285 victims fell under the keen edge of the guillotine.

Good as the Bible is, and powerful as it is supposed to be, does it ever make people good, with all its laws and ordinances? Does printing the words "Be good" ever make a man good?

There is no record of any such result from any such cause. Men do good only because they are good, and if they were not good, they would not do good. If good laws make good people, with such a Bible as we have we should have nothing but good folks.

THE MAKERS OF LAW.

There is, in this country, a prevalent belief that the people make the laws, but in reality our people have no more to do with making the laws of their country, or of their state, than they have with making the laws of England or France. The fact is that laws are usually made in spite of the people, and instead of being what the people want, the laws are often the very thing that the people do not want. It is well known that what this or that man wants, what Mr. Brown or Mr. Smith wants, for instance, is never considered by legislators for a moment. The whole business is settled by some men, or perhaps by a set of men, in the legislature, or perhaps by a man or set of men out of the legislature. The whole matter is generally determined by the party leaders who happen to have the controlling power at the time.

What greater fallacy can be imagined than the one involved in the assertion that the laws in any sense, in a representative government, are made by the people! The fact is well known that laws are frequently made against the solemn protest of the people, or at least of a considerable portion of the people. Less and less, in this country, do the people retain any control in such matters. It is true the people occasionally have something to do with selecting men who may have something to do with legislation, but generally there their power ends, and with it their interest in the making of laws also ends.

For instance, how does a village or city get its charter, the fundamental law by which its affairs are to be governed? What have the common people to do with determining the provis-

ions which that charter is finally found to contain? We are all aware that no one save a favored or select few ever have the slightest idea of what the charter contains until it finally receives the signature of the governor, and, having become a law, is published in due and proper form.

Really and practically the legislature takes the matter entirely out of the hands of the people in all such cases. And who are the men that constitute the legislature and who make the laws and rules by which we are to be governed in all the ordinary affairs of life? They are men who usually are entire strangers to us, and they have no more interest in our welfare and no more concern about our success in life than the same number of men would have had if they had been chosen from Canada or South America. We all know very well how it is in New York and other great cities. Politicians are constantly legislating at Albany, not only for cities but the country, in such a manner as seems to them most likely to serve their own interests and the interests of their party. What the wishes of the people at large would be, is a question that of itself gives them no serious concern.

Let us consider the matter of charter-making still further. This document, with its multitudinous conditions, provisions and penalties, finally becomes a law. The whole business, as we well know, is managed in its inception by some one who has an axe of his own to grind. He wants some particular clause inserted, some new office created, or perhaps he wants some offensive clause removed from the old charter. It is all elaborated and worked over at home, and then it is sent to Albany, there to be placed in the hopper and eventually, if possible, run through the mill. If those who have charge of the business happen to have influence enough, if they are ingenious and politic, if they have sufficient means at their command and the requisite amount of tact and perseverance, the charter is certain in due time to become a law. Otherwise the project, no matter how well conceived nor how beneficial it might prove to humanity, is just as

certain to fail. This is the kind of self-government we have in America, and in this way and no other do the people make the laws.

Let us stop a moment further to enquire what sort of people our community sends to the legislature to make our laws. In ordinary affairs, if a man is sick and we want him cured, we send for a doctor, a man who understands the nature of remedies and the best method of applying them. If we have a case to try in court, we send for a lawyer, a man who is supposed to be learned in the law, a sharp practitioner who can make black appear white and crooked ways seem straight. If we want bread baked, we send for a baker, and not for a stone-cutter, and if we want a house built, we send for a carpenter, and not for a barber—and so on through the long list of trades, businesses and professions. But how do we do when it is good laws that we want made? Do we follow the foregoing wholesome rules in that case? Are we uniformly particular about the men we select for such a peculiar and important business? And do we ascertain in the first place whether they are precisely the men that we wish to represent us in the law-making line? No, it is just the opposite course that we pursue. We select for this delicate and peculiar task often the very crudest material that the country affords, or, to speak more accurately, we allow such men to choose themselves. They are too often men of simply a negative character—men with no remarkable gifts or special qualifications of any kind. Very often they are men who never had character enough to do anything positively good at home. Of course such men are uniformly popular men and, when they are put up for office, they generally run well. Those are the men that the country seems to hanker after, and if there is a nice office to bestow, and especially a seat in the legislature, these are the fortunate gentlemen that are pretty certain to be chosen. These are the men who are sent to the Capitol to settle the policy of a state and determine the destiny and direction of a people! Perhaps they are quite unable to man-

age their own private affairs with success, and yet they are called upon to make laws for millions. This is strange, passing strange, is it not?

Perhaps not one legislator out of ten, especially in Congress, is familiar with the history of peoples, or has a thorough appreciation of the probable effect upon the country of the legislation which is contemplated. Too often legislatures go on from one mistake to another, sometimes voting according to the dictates of some party leader, and sometimes following their own particular interests or their own peculiar fancies. In all legislative bodies, farmers are called upon to legislate upon banking, of which they know absolutely nothing, and so lawyers lay down rules for the guidance of military men, doctors legislate upon commerce, and merchants are expected to fix rules by which tradesmen are to be governed. Each one of these men may be capable enough in his own particular sphere, but how shall they vote intelligently, not to say wisely, on matters of which they have no practical knowledge whatever?

It is a well known fact that judges in our courts are always supposed to base their decisions upon principle, and they never allow themselves to be governed in their utterances or actions either by personal interests or by partisan prejudice. To a large extent the same is true of officers in the executive branch of our government. But how is it with our makers of law? Do they legislate uniformly upon the basis of honor and principle? There is indeed no need of legislating in order to establish a principle, for this is already settled by a higher authority than any legislature. No body of this kind could invent or discover anything really new in the domain of justice and propriety. No, legislators do not busy themselves with discussions over the justness or fitness of things. The considerations which concern them are of an entirely different character. The questions that chiefly disturb them are those of party policy or personal aggrandizement. The leading object which they have in view is to serve themselves first and their friends and party afterward.

In other words, their principal business as legislators is to have their own axes ground.

Our laws are not founded on the eternal principles of truth and justice—if they were, there would be no need of changing them so frequently. No, laws, as a rule, are mere instrumentalities through which individual members, or the party in power, are enabled to carry out their schemes and accomplish their purposes. And just so long as law-makers continue to steer clear of everything which is manifestly just and right, so long must society be composed of two parties, unfeeling despots on one side, and miserable slaves on the other. We might add that in all Mohammedan countries, and eastern countries generally, the case is different. Their laws are founded upon their religion, and such a thing as statute law not based upon divine law may be said to be a thing unknown among these people. For Mohammedans the Koran is not only their Bible, but it is also their book of law by which their every-day life is supposed to be governed.

And here we might enquire, what laws ought to be enacted? That depends upon circumstances, but in any case they ought to be few in number. Besides, there should be a dividing line between what should be embraced under the head of the state law, and what under the head of law supposed to be peculiar to a community. In the community, law, no matter how made nor what its origin, may take cognizance of the habits and conduct of individuals, even without direct reference to the interests, needs or demands of community. But the state is an organized body, a sort of corporation formed for a specific purpose, and it has no right to go beyond its own peculiar province. The state resembles a ministry or a representative body, whose sole mission it is to do certain work and go no farther. It is not the mission of the state to make laws for the people, especially law as it is commonly understood. The people should make their own laws, so far as law may be found to be necessary. The state may make certain rules, by-laws or regulations that

will enable it to perform its duty and complete its task, but that is all. The state should concern itself with but few things, and these mostly such as come under the head of foreign affairs or commercial relations. Internal affairs and domestic matters should be settled entirely by the communities themselves. Where questions arise between two communities, they might be settled by some court, some council, or some arbitrating body.

As I have repeatedly said, men have neither place nor use for any governor or master. But in practice, the state is nothing if it does not play the part of a ruler. Its chief aspirations are toward centralization of power, and its favorite role is that of a conqueror. Like the true sovereign, it rules always from the stand-point of its own interest or from that of the party that happens to control its affairs. It rarely troubles itself about the best interests of the whole people. The state knows no people save those who favor its schemes and are ready to aid in carrying out its own selfish purposes.

Those laws which are to regulate the conduct of men we should not expect to find in our statute books, but rather in our scriptures or in the writings of our best men—books like those of Confucius or Mencius, or the Koran or the sacred books of India. The conduct of men is something that should not come under the rule of the state. It should rather be judged and decided upon by the community in which a man lives, where his character and worth are fully known. It is well understood that in old German times, and also among the Franks, they had no regular law-making body, and hence they had but few laws, and those were not written. There were assemblies of free men, and later on Councillors of the King. These held court and settled questions as they arose, reserving nothing to themselves for experiment or speculation. There was a German common law which was very much the same as German common sense or German ideas of propriety and right, and with them this was the law that regulated the conduct of men. Their

law was merely the crystallized form of German notions of right and wrong. Of policy they knew little, and for it still less did they care. English common law, the highest and best of law, in every sense, was a development of precisely the same character as the German. It embodied the wisdom of past ages, and gave evidence of what the men of that time believed to be just and good.

WRITTEN LAWS.

It is agreed on all sides and by all authors that countries uniformly have too many laws. Laws everywhere are greatly in excess of the wants of the people. Too many things are ordered and too many things are forbidden. The laws ought to be a plain expression or simple embodiment of the sentiments of the people, but instead of that it is the aim of our law-makers to control or nullify public sentiment. Laws, as a matter of fact, are not made for the people or by the people as a whole. Laws have long since become merely an instrument through which dishonest and intriguing politicians carry out their base designs. Law as it is at the present time is an engine of evil; it is the fruitful source of alarm, the medium through which a vast amount of misery and suffering is brought into this world. All law, whether it is moral, religious or statute law, implies slavery. Law is always a fetter, a chain that binds men and deprives them of freedom.

In the infancy of a community or of a republic, when the people are few in numbers and they are not rich and strong, they assemble in bodies to express their wishes and declare their views. So it is still done to a limited extent, in the town meetings of this country, and so it was done to a much greater extent in the town assemblies of New England in early days. In those times, there could be found something that bore the semblance of democracy. Then the people, or some of them at least, did have something to say, and what they said had a

perceptible effect upon the result. But such days have mostly gone by, and the practices that prevailed then have mostly disappeared now. Legislation is now in the hands of a few, and a very few at that. The wants and wishes of the people are things that cause very little concern to their rulers. Public sentiment is defied, and those whose duty it is to represent the people usually represent no one but themselves.

It cannot be too often repeated that all laws should be local. The laws that might well apply to one people or one community might not, and probably would not, apply equally well to any other. Laws should be made for people simply and solely to meet their special case, and it is unjust that they should be hampered with laws and rules that could with propriety apply only in some other community. Neither should they bear any of the expenses caused by the making or executing of such laws.

Let us take a closer view of the situation in some particular community. Of what use will written laws be found to be in any such group? Do they make the path of duty any plainer or the obligations any stronger by being written and published? Certainly not. The only true law after all is the will of the community, and the man who is born and brought up in such a community knows as a part of his early education just what is deemed to be right and what is wrong. And the stranger when he is admitted as a member will soon learn the same thing in some way. The law ought to permit every man to do just that thing which his teachings have led him to believe to be right. He ought not to be troubled to enquire what is written and what is published, for that can have nothing at all to do with the right and wrong of the case. People in their early history never have written laws, and it is well known that they get along better with the ordinary affairs of life than their more civilized brethren. The troubles that come from written laws are the exclusive inheritance of cultured people. Their difficulties arise mainly from the effort that is continually

made by people who wish to ascertain just how far the law will permit them to go in a direction which they know to be wrong.

It is to be observed that we first make bad laws, and then we get up various counter-irritants and remedies to prevent these laws from doing too much harm. We pass laws to make a few men rich, and then we pass other laws to provide for the many who are made poor by such unfair means. We make laws that are certain to develop criminals, and then we make poor-houses, asylums, prisons, and jails in order to furnish quarters more or less comfortable for those that we have occasion to send there. Then, too, we have "Industrial Aid" societies to furnish clothing for the naked, and "Legal Aid" societies designed to defend the poor and helpless who are wronged through the instrumentality of the wicked laws that have been enacted. This kind of compensation, this building up in one place what we have torn down in another, is going on among us continually. There is an indefinite amount of quackery in legislation.

Really, what useful purpose do written laws serve? Are written laws found to be necessary in schools, in families, in churches, in societies, in manufacturing establishments, in large corporations of any kind? The answer must be, no. Even in this highly cultivated and very progressive age, written laws have not yet put in their appearance in these places. On the other hand there is an unwritten code which every man and woman understands, and which enables him or her to decide in any case just what must and what must not be done. Even the child at a very early age learns the plain provisions of that simple code.

And what does legislation do for us, this legislation which receives so much of our attention and which costs the country so much hard-earned money yearly? Does legislation suppress crime? No, it rather develops crime and multiplies the number of our criminals. Does it feed the hungry? No, it turns a deaf ear to the entreaties of all such people, and demands their

last dollar, should it happen to be due to the state for taxes. Does it protect the weak and aid the friendless? No, it lets the weak and friendless take care of themselves, and the only single inducement that it holds out to such unfortunate creatures is a good bill of costs, should they decide to go to law in order to find out what they can obtain through the medium of courts. But it is pretty well known that there is no great amount of satisfaction to be obtained by any one, especially the poor, through the medium of a common every-day lawsuit.

In business life, in our homes, in our societies, in all of our ordinary relations with each other, we never need any new law, any new rule of action or method of procedure. What is recognized as right and just this year, will hardly be considered to be just the opposite one or ten years hence. Why should not the same principle apply in the case of our legislators? I have only to repeat that it is not in their power to convert darkness into light, nor can they by any sort of manipulation change a dishonest act into a worthy one. That is one of the ten thousand things that even a legislature cannot do. Legislatures cannot change anything; in this respect they are as helpless as the babe in the cradle. The laws of nature and of nature's God are unalterable. A thousand legislators could not possibly change one of them. Then why should they attempt it? It should be borne in mind that legislators do not really change or amend laws; they simply make new laws to replace old ones. Every new law is revolutionary, because it tears down what had been built up before. To change or amend a law, or anything else, is to destroy it. To change a number is to get an entirely new number.

It must be evident enough that in the domain of reason, right and justice, legislatures have absolutely no power to change anything. But I am willing to concede that if you throw reason and justice to the winds, and let brute force alone rule, then legislatures, which have the armed power of the country at their command, can do a great many things. Let there be no question on this point: Legislatures are absolutely powerless

to establish what is right and what is wrong, and knowing their weakness, they never make any attempt in that direction. Their work lies wholly in the domain of what they are able to do through power; and what they ought to do, and what they ought not to do, are questions that do not concern them. This is the phase that legislation presents to the world in every civilized country on the globe. Again, legislation is merely an expression of the wishes of men who decide to do what they want done, rather than what they know ought to be done. Legislators change laws this year that they made last year, not because last year's laws were bad or inapplicable, or because this year's laws are wiser or better, but simply because there is more profit to them in the change. Is not that about all there is of legislation in practice, here or elsewhere?

The case is precisely identical with a change in fashion. Last year's hat may be, and no doubt is, just as good a hat as this year's hat in every sense—but unfortunately it is last year's hat. If last year's hat were in fashion this year, there would not be so many hats sold, since many old hats would be worn. The change is made simply because there is money in it, and so it is in legislation. Changes are made there, as in fashion, merely because there is *money in it*. A new law takes the place of an old law simply because those who have an interest in the change have the power to repeal the one and enact another in its place.

There is such potency in laws, and they are so exceedingly convenient for those who happen to be in the ascendancy, that we have laws and by-laws for every trifling action or operation in which a man may engage. There is scarcely anything that a man is allowed to do, unless it is done at a time and in a manner prescribed by law. He must keep time in all he does, like a soldier who is marching in the ranks. If he steps at all, he must be sure that he steps in accord with his comrades. He must have authority for every movement that he makes; no man must do anything without permission. Really, there is in this country no freedom for any one. Every man is labeled.

He is either this thing or that, and he belongs either in this place or that. A man in this world, in this highly enlightened age, has little or nothing with which to bother himself—except the taxes. The state does everything for him—only it forgets to pay his taxes. But is this all right, is it the best thing for the individual or the state? There can be but one answer to this question, and that is emphatically, *no*. When the time comes that men have no further occasion to care for themselves, they soon get out of practice and become feeble and helpless. The best way is to have everybody make a business of looking out for himself. Every man should learn to stand upon his own foundation and depend chiefly on his own wisdom and strength. In that, and in that alone, lies true manhood and independence. Every man should be at the same time his own servant and his own master. The aim of the state should be to do as little as possible, rather than as much as possible, for the people. The very last thing that this world will ever want, or should ever want, is communism. Communism means slavery, inevitable and everlasting slavery, for all but the favored few who are so fortunate as to be at the head. *State help is the most expensive of all kinds of help, and generally it is the most dangerous in its tendencies and influences.* Let there be no mistake on this point, and when the beggar cries “help!” “help!” let the prompt answer be: “work!” “work!” There are altogether too many tramps in this country—too many people who proceed upon the theory that “the world owes them a living, and they will have it.”

EXCESS OF LAW.

Here it might properly be added that it is a bad policy to make a law or rule that is to apply in a case that has not yet come to pass. No two cases are ever exactly alike, and no *a priori* law could possibly be enacted that would apply with justice to both at the same time. Instead of having general

laws, after the manner of a Procrustean bed which everything is made to fit, we should have no such laws at all. Originally, men did not have general laws, but those that they had were made to apply to some particular case. Of course there ought to be certain well-known principles, certain established and unquestioned truths which are not necessarily put in print, but are implanted in the hearts of all, and when some new case comes up, those who are known to understand these principles should apply them in accordance with the facts and circumstances of the case. The fundamental question in all cases should be, "What ought to be done?" How unjustly are general laws found to work in practice! How absurd it is that a man who steals must uniformly go to prison from two to seven years, as if all cases of stealing involved an equal amount of guilt, and as if a rule that would be just in one case of stealing would be equally just in every other. It is a well-known fact that no two cases are alike, and therefore no two men should be punished alike. In some cases, theft, so far from deserving punishment, is really excusable. We all steal in one way or another, as opportunity offers. Again, it must be remembered that a year in prison for one man is a very different thing from a year in prison for some other man, perhaps a man with much finer feelings.

No general rule or law can be made to harmonize with justice. Suppose a rule is made in school that there shall be no whispering. That is a rule that cannot be carried out with any sort of propriety or success. Children must frequently whisper, or communicate together in some way. It is far better not to make a law than to endeavor to establish one that is certain to be broken. It is to be observed again that nature has no general laws to which there are not many exceptions. In fact nature has no laws at all in the proper sense of the term. It is not a law, for instance, that everything gravitates to the earth. The atmosphere is a part of the earth, and yet in it things move freely in all directions, upward quite as well as downward. So

is the water a part of the earth, but it is a well-known fact that things move upward as well as downward, in the water, as in the air. No law of any kind can be more than partially or qualifiedly true. There are always exceptions. But what is qualifiedly or partially true, is not true at all in any just sense.

Many people get along well without any formulated laws, and there are many more who get along without anything that bears the semblance of a legislature. It is evident enough that no people need laws. Nature has no laws—in its operations nothing is uniform, nothing perfectly regular. Even the two ears on a man's head, or his two hands or feet are never exactly alike, though usually they resemble each other. So it is with the paths or motions of planets—they are all similar and yet they all differ. In vegetation nothing is ever duplicated ; everything, even the smallest in nature, has its own particular place and office, and its own peculiar form. Again, nothing is single or elementary, though it may appear so. A ray of light is known to be a bundle of rays ; the simplest sound is a combination of sounds, and every force is merely the resultant of many smaller, simpler, forces : a stream of water that appears like a thread is made up of other streams, like the strands of a cord. It is very far from the truth to say that nature follows laws.

Legislation, as we have it to-day, is comparatively a modern invention. Originally in governments which are the most thoroughly organized, the king was the law-maker, as well as the supreme ruler. But then he did not follow law-making as a business or amusement, and the people of those days were not burdened with the hundredth part of the laws that we are cursed with now. Men did not need so many laws then, nor do we need so many laws now. What is wanted by men above all things in this world, is that the state should let them alone.

We have seen already that the people do not make the laws. It is equally true that representatives, certainly as a body, do not make the laws. As legislation is practiced now, not only in this country, but in all the constitutional monarchies of Europe,

the laws are made by committees of the legislature. They put the bill in shape, they consider it, they add to it, or they take away from it. Without their consent, it can never move, and can never become a law. Often it is "killed" in committee. The party, the machine, controls the committee, and the committee controls legislation, especially in its earlier stages. No greater delusion ever prevailed than the one that the people, in any country or under any form of government, make the laws. They have a little, a very little to do with selecting law-makers and that so flatters them and turns their heads that they do not hesitate to surrender everything else.

A legislature is an absolutely useless body. What pertains to conduct is for the community to consider and decide upon, and such a thing can never come properly within the province of a legislature. The chief injury that legislatures do to society lies in the uncertainty which their action produces. No one can decide in advance what a legislature will do. If it passes a law this year, there is often reason to fear that it will be repealed by the legislature of the following year. No man can form any idea what may happen in the way of legislation at any time. If a man buys property to-day at a good price he never can feel sure that the legislature will not take a notion to destroy its value by enacting some new law. And it must be borne in mind that the state rarely or never pays for the damages which are occasioned by its own wrong-doing. The state is infallible, and a state that is infallible can do no wrong. Hence it is not responsible for its action.

Is it not possible for us to get along without written laws? Most certainly, and better without them than with them. Laws give occasion for trouble and turmoil. Suppose two men, or twenty or a hundred men, meet for the first time in a desert or in a wilderness. They are not there subject to any law and of course they are not subject to any state control. Would they not be able to get along in some way? Would they not, by common consent, adapt themselves to the situation in which

they happened to find themselves? They would certainly have no need of laws, and if they had they would either be worthless or injurious to them. Laws are needed only where there is a state to be maintained. Do we get along any better with our thousand or more of new laws every year than we did when we only had two hundred? *Laws multiply our evils and add to our daily miseries and sorrows.* The happiest people in the world are those that have the fewest laws. The vilest acts ever perpetrated are those that have been done in the name and under the sanction of law! We need not furnish examples—they must occur to every reader.

To make human laws that are consistent with justice, must be ranked among the impossibilities of this life. In practice most of our laws are finally settled and determined by the courts. Indeed, a law is really not a law until the matter has been brought into the courts, and the judges have rendered their decision. But it will be conceded that neither the court nor the legislators consider it to be within their province to settle questions of justice or propriety. In the legislature, as we have seen, the main endeavor is to find the means by which members can attain their ends. The inquiry that concerns them most is what they can do, not what they ought to do. In the courts the case is somewhat different. In the courts they affect to simply interpret the law, but the judges cannot help being swayed in their interpretations, more or less, by their prejudices or their interests. Judges are never moralists, never theorists. They decide uniformly what must be done—*never what ought to be done.* Is that not a strange thing? They never let their sympathies or feelings interfere with what they consider to be their duty—that is the theory at least. In fact a judge is never presumed to have either feelings or sympathies. He has nothing but wisdom and intelligence. Judges make no pretensions to rendering honest and just decisions. All they claim is, that they follow the law. And even if they desired to be just, they would, in most cases, find it quite impossible to do

so. A true judge must have no feelings ; in that respect he is like the executioner. Indeed, in a strict sense, he is the executioner. The executioner commonly so called is merely his agent. No, it is utter nonsense to talk about justice in connexion with court decisions. Social prejudices, personal antipathies, human weaknesses, defective knowledge, and many other important circumstances that cannot be made to appear on the records, all these conspire to render the pretense that law is even remotely connected with such a thing as fairness and right simply a delusion and a snare. And yet men are continually asserting, and they really believe, such is their blindness and infatuation, that without law we should have no justice, and that without law men would be continually wronging each other. As if it were not a well ascertained fact that the more laws there are, the more injustice and transgression there must be !

And again, we are continually told how much the laws are doing for ourselves and everybody else. But what does the law do for us ? It is at best an incentive, a certain something that reminds us that this we can do, and nobody can harm or hinder us. The law permits many things, but it never compels the doing of any one of them. What good would a million of laws do, if they were not put in force ? Who puts them in force ? We must answer, men. It is men that protect men, it is men that aid men. It is men that govern men—it is not the law, *the law of itself does nothing*. The law does not even punish. No one should make the common mistake of supposing that to be a fact. *It is men that punish*—they only use the law as an excuse, or as a means for their own protection. Could not men do all the things that they now do without the aid or permission of the law ? If laws of themselves did the business, there would be nothing left for men to do. If laws in themselves were powerful, we would have no useless or worthless laws. Is it not clear to every thinking man, that in human law there is absolutely no strength, no binding force, and even no impelling or pro-

pelling power? These same conclusions, it will be remembered, we have reached in other parts of the work.

Finally, it matters not so much what laws are enacted as how they are executed. Laws are laid down with more or less precision, but the manner in which the law is to be executed is not clearly defined. That part is left to the feelings, tastes, interests and judgment of the one who happens to be in authority. The official can, as is often done, leave the law unexecuted.

TITHES AND TAXATION.

During all the ages of which history gives us any account, and among all the various peoples of the world, religious worship has presented substantially the same uniform characteristics. The leading points of this worship are found in sacrifice and suffering, in denying one's self things prized or longed for, and in giving to the gods a part of one's property in order to be secure in the possession of the remainder.

The relations between the people and their divinities have always been the same as those existing between slaves and their masters. But with all their power and ability, these divinities appear to have been entirely dependent upon common mortals for certain important services and attentions. Undoubtedly, the first deities of the human race were the ancestors of men, and these ancestors were wholly dependent upon their surviving children for burial ceremonies and other observances which were deemed to be absolutely essential. So it was with the gods; it would appear that they could hardly exist without a certain amount of sacrifice and ceremony, for which they were compelled to rely entirely upon members of the human race. All the troubles of the Jehovah of the Old Testament seem to have arisen from the faithlessness, disobedience and inattention of his chosen children of Israel. Nothing appears to have made

this God so indignant, and nothing to have so exasperated him, as to learn that his people were not giving him due reverence and were inclined to bow down before other gods. Over and over again Jehovah declares, "I am a jealous God"—and his whole history shows that to be his true character.

Up to a recent date, when the state first came into notice, men had no other duty of importance allotted to them than that of serving the Lord. Even agriculture was a devotional work. Men were not only the Lord's obedient servants, they were actually his slaves. The Lord owned their persons and held prior title to all their possessions; and under such circumstances, it is not at all strange that men were glad to give a tenth of all they produced or possessed, if they could only be sure of being allowed to retain the balance.

A two-fold tithe was required of the Jewish citizen. One tenth of the product of his fields, forests, herds and flocks went to maintain the Levites in their cities, and one tenth of the remaining nine-tenths was given to the tabernacle and was used in entertaining the Levites and others. It will be remembered also that the Levites studied law and were the judges of the country. Indeed, it is well known that all law, civil as well as religious law, came originally from the priests.

For many centuries the giving of tithes was simply a religious duty and no attempt was made to enforce such a payment by civil process. Indeed, there was, up to the later centuries, very little law of any kind except religious law, or law as it came from God. It was easily seen that tithes paid under compulsion would have no merit, so far as the individual himself was concerned. Of course the church, or the gods, have had to be supported and maintained throughout all time, and this was done originally by the voluntary contributions of men. But from about the time of Charlemagne matters began to assume a new phase, laws then began to be made by men without God's aid or intercession, and one of the uses of these laws was to compel men to divide their income with the state, the

most convenient way of doing which being through payments made under the name of taxes.

We have seen that the original purpose for which these tithes or taxes were collected was to ensure the support of the Lord and to declare his glory to the world. But for people at the present day who take nothing on trust without evidence and who bring everything down to the touchstone of reason, the question that naturally arises, is this: How much of these tithes and what particular portion or share of them does the Lord really get? Indeed, what use can a God who is a real God have for such observances? For such things at the present time, for a Supreme Being such as men believe in to-day, there can be no use whatever. There is no means by which the things sacrificed can be transported to heaven, or to any place where God may happen to reside, and there is no way of communicating with him directly in any manner. It was originally supposed that such communication was carried on through the medium of a certain class of common mortals called priests, but people now think perhaps there was a great deal of false pretense or delusion about this communicating with the Lord. The priests may have had the Lord's ear, but we have only their word for it, and in this case it is open to a great deal of question.

No, the God that delighted in tithes and sacrifices and such things was a different God entirely from ours of the present day. We do not know what has become of him—we have not heard from him in a long, long time. The God which the Old Testament tells about and which the Israelites believed in was certainly a very different God from ours. Their God dwelt among men, he lived as a man, and it was entirely natural that he should need to be fed and served and worshiped as a man. But how much of the sacrifices and the tithes devoted to the Lord does any one suppose that he actually got? A little of the lamb or kid sacrificed was burned and was supposed to go up to the Lord in the form of smoke. But the balance, and much the biggest and best part of the offering, was consumed by the priests

and the temple attendants. The worshiper himself also got a share for his trouble and the expense he had been put to. Is it not easy to see that the priests, not only among the Jews, but among all the people who worship gods, have a direct personal interest in having the feast days come as often as possible and having the sacrifices made as frequently as the circumstances of the case will allow? Is there any doubt at all that the people were deluded in those days, as people are deluded in various ways now? We know very well that the Lord does not need our help nor our devotion, nor our submission nor our sacrifices, and still we go on spending a great deal of time and wasting quite a little money in that direction week after week and year after year. Will some one be so kind as to indicate just what man could do for God in this advanced stage of thought and enlightenment, or what need God has of man's assistance in any way?

Until a comparatively recent date men never presumed to tax their fellow men to provide for their own support or to raise a fund so that they themselves could go on living in idleness at the expense of some one else. That is simply a modern conception. Originally, as we have seen, men were taxed for the benefit of the Lord—the Lord demanded the tithes and he really needed them, it was assumed. In a case like that, people would of course pay cheerfully and without compulsion. No one would be willing to see the Lord suffer. We have seen, and we understand full well that the Lord did not really get one particle of these contributions, not even "a smell" when the sacrifices were made—but people went on contributing just the same. They were deluded—they meant it all right enough. Indeed, people are always right in their intentions. It is their leaders who deceive them and they are the ones who are chiefly to blame.

Are not people being deluded in the same way to-day? The people, the farmers chiefly, have been paying taxes in some form ever since the world was made—and they are paying taxes

still. Originally, they paid taxes to the Lord, but the Lord has gone out of business and he has been removing himself farther and farther from men as time has been going on, until at last it has become almost impossible to locate him with any degree of certainty. Under such circumstances, it is not at all strange that men have found a new God to worship. This new God, who is called the state, is a great deal more exacting and despotic than the old God. Men are like the frogs; they wanted a king, and now they have one. The old God was content with a tenth, or even less, but the new God, the state, wants the half of a man's net income, and sometimes more! Mark the resemblance in every particular between the pretences made by the priests who claimed to speak for the Lord and the methods followed by those who pretend to be the oracles of the state. They never say, "we want so much money for our own use and enjoyment," but "the state wants it!" They never demand anything for their own private use and benefit—that would be quite out of character, and everybody would say so. No, they want it for the good of the "public," for the good of "the greatest number!" What a fraud and deception all such pretences are! There never was in all this world a tax levied and collected which was finally expended for the benefit of the whole state. There never was a tax collected and disbursed mainly for the good even of the greatest number. Think of the taxes paid every year by the people of any county! How much direct or tangible benefit do the taxpayers themselves get? How much of it ever returns to them in any form, I would like to know? Study it all over and see where the money lodges in the end—some goes to the teachers of the school, some to the town officers, some to the county officers, some to the state officers, some, a very large amount, to those whose bills have been audited, some goes to the tramps and some to the poor and needy, but where does the farmer come in, the taxpayer par excellence, and how much does he get out of the business? Let us hold our breath and calmly pause for a reply

to this question: Where does the taxpayer himself come in for his benefit? While we are waiting for the replies to these questions, I beg to add one more remark, that *only slaves pay taxes that they themselves have not levied or to which they have not given their consent.* The claim that there is such a consent is uniformly fraudulent.

Yes, man is now in a much worse plight than he was when he simply made sacrifices and paid tithes unto the Lord as "a ransom for his soul." It is true he never saw the Lord, dealing as he did exclusively with the Lord's agents, the priests, but in that respect his case is no better now, as he does not see the state, but deals entirely with its officials. Formerly he owed allegiance only to the Lord, but now the Lord is dispensed with and he owes allegiance wholly to the state. Man has changed masters, but I could not say that he has bettered his condition very much. Providence had to be fed and occasionally given a smell of sweet savor, but that was only occasionally. With the state the case is different: the state we have with us always, as we do the poor, and it has to be fed and served every day in the week and every week in the year. There is no end to the sacrifices that must be made under the dominion of the state. Our state is very much like the God of the Old Testament—very jealous, very exacting, much given to wrath and not easily appeased. That is the reason why people have to be saying something sweet and doing something handsome pretty much all the time—just to appease the state and keep it in good humor. If the wrath of the state should happen to wax hot, the subjects would have a very hard time of it. But our people are becoming quite well educated and trained, and they have learned what is best for themselves in dealing with the state. Just as our ancestors blessed the dear Lord and called him the best God the world ever saw, just so we go about day after day praising the goodness of the state and declaring that we have the best government under the sun. That is a way we have grown into, and it shows the efficacy and importance of early training. It

is no doubt a good thing for slaves to love their master, no matter whether he has a good or a bad way of doing business.

Until a very recent date, all men not absolutely held in bondage were very sensitive on the matter of taxation. As a rule, men denied the right of government to raise money by a system of direct taxation, and the money that was secured came from certain revenues, or was obtained in some indirect or underhanded way. The very thing that brought on the American Revolution was the claim put forth by the mother country that she had a right to tax the colonies. And even when the American government was formed and questions in connexion with that formation were being discussed, *the right of the government to tax citizens was generally denied*. Even so high and so late an authority as Blackstone says: "No subject of England can be constrained to pay any aids or taxes of the government, *but such as are imposed by his own consent, or that of his representative in parliament.*" But a new and a very strange principle prevails to-day; men are taxed for any and all purposes, and to any extent, without considering the wishes or willingness of the citizen for one moment. **GIVE THE GOVERNMENT THE RIGHT TO LEVY TAXES ON ITS OWN MOTION, AND THE LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE ARE GONE FOREVER.**

It is a curious fact that people of this state have thus far, as a general thing, paid very little attention to the subject of taxes and taxation. They are so intent upon accumulating property, or in getting what is commonly called their "bread and butter," that they leave the tax business entirely to politicians. This is precisely what the politicians want, and though a person would naturally suppose that the interests of the politicians would be diametrically opposed to the interests of the public, still these two sections of our state, the politicians and the people, seem to get along nicely together and, so far as all outward appearances are concerned, there is the best of understanding between them. The politicians simply want their way, and the people are willing that they should have it. So, where

is there any possible chance of difficulty between these two sections, at least so long as such an admirable state of things exists as we find at present? Neither seems to be inclined to anticipate trouble, thinking, I presume, that the proper time to cross a bridge is when you come to it. But I doubt very much whether this apparent feeling of happiness and contentment is destined to continue forever. There may not be any serious trouble in this generation, but there will be in the next. By and by the people will begin to wake up and understand that they have been robbed—shamefully and outrageously robbed. Then there will be a rattling among the dry bones that are now resting in high places, and the politicians and amateur statesmen will be called upon to render an account of their stewardship. How will these offenders be able to justify themselves? What will they say? How will they explain their extortions and excuse the tricks and deceptions through which this work has been accomplished? These are questions to which the future may possibly furnish the answers, when the time and opportunity arrive.

Perhaps I have intimated before, and if so I simply repeat it here, that the American people are the most patient tax-paying people to be found on the face of the earth. In that respect, neither the Turks, the Persians nor the Egyptians excel them. To this remark we must add that, with the exception of the English, there is no nation on the planet that has such an idolatrous reverence for laws as the Americans have. With them, whatever is lawful is right, though it does not happen always that whatever is right is also lawful. With Americans, taxes come from law, and as laws are necessarily right, it must follow that all taxes are also right. And that is the reason why Americans always pay their taxes, just as they eat their breakfast in the morning, without a murmur and as a matter of course.

But let us dwell a moment on the true nature and bearing of taxes, as they have been developed in this state. What must

a man pay taxes for? To support the government is the reply. But is it really necessary that the government should thus be supported? Perhaps it would be generally denied that we could get along without any government, but is it not a well ascertained fact that we could get along with a great deal less government than we have? Is it not in accordance with current public sentiment to believe that we have had all along altogether too much government in our families, in our schools, in communities and in the state? If a man is called upon to pay a certain sum as a tax, the only just claim upon him would be found in the benefits he had received or which he was expected to receive in the future. But how many of those who are compelled to go before the tax receiver every year have received any benefit, or at least any appreciable benefit for the sums they are obliged to pay? Certainly not many. In fact, if we trace the history of taxes far enough back, we shall find that their true nature is that of tithes and sacrifices, and men do not pay their taxes because they have received benefits or favors, but because they have the relations of serfs and they owe a certain sum to their God.

Still further in regard to taxes. What portion of all the taxes that the people of any town are called upon to pay really goes to support the government? Only an insignificant portion. Instead of paying our money to support the state, we are paying it simply to aid or gratify other people. All that we pay for the poor, for the soldiers, for the feeble-minded, for the insane, for the sick, for schools, for hospitals, for courts and court officers, etc., comes under this head. Nineteen out of every twenty tax-payers, or perhaps a larger fraction, receive no benefit whatever from what they are compelled to pay, and therefore the tax is in the fullest sense unjust and oppressive. Every man would be willing to contribute his share towards supporting and educating the poor and helpless, whether soldiers or not, but that is as far as reason and justice would carry us in that direction. In all countries and in all ages, the poor and feeble have been cared for by those who have

been more fortunate, but it has been reserved exclusively for the nineteenth century to build palaces and lay out pleasure grounds for the poor, the blind, the idiotic and insane, to afford a college education to the children of other folks, whether rich or poor, and to multiply laws, officers and bureaus, with an increase of expenses quite beyond any possible needs of the people. I repeat, that the history of the past three thousand years furnishes absolutely no parallel to this new departure—nothing that even approaches it. There was culture and civilization as high as ours thousands of years before our day. They had in past ages learned men, wise men, eminent men, even great men, but yet they got along without free education and free text books, without prisons built after the pattern of the castles of princes, without hospitals and asylums reared without regard to expense, and without state buildings furnished in a style rivaling the Alhambra in splendor.

No, matters have changed greatly within a hundred years, nay, even fifty years. Things are taking a decidedly communistic turn. It is coming to be the prevailing belief that the people are the children, and the state must take care of them. Everybody wants the state to do something for him, help him, "protect" him, or at least give him something to do. We are rapidly drifting to precisely the same state of things that existed in Rome less than two thousand years ago. Rome amused the people, took care of them, gave them free shows, and free corn, and at the same time it robbed them unmercifully. But whether everybody can succeed in getting under the wings of the state, as is now being contemplated, remains to be seen. All this time taxes go on increasing at a wonderful pace, and they must be paid by somebody. And really who does pay them? Is it the state? No, the state does not pay; its business is to receive, always. *The state is simply that portion of the people that levies, collects and disburses the taxes, which other people pay.* Surely our taxes are high enough. Even in our country towns, where living is supposed to be cheap, a man who is worth one thou-

and dollars, and is so assessed, has to pay every year at different times and in different ways over five per cent., or fifty dollars on the thousand. In some cities, the rate is even higher than that. But is that not really a pretty high figure? It must be remembered that that thousand dollars which he is assessed is not his income, but his capital. The five per cent. on capital, often unproductive, is enormous—it is outrageous. Even the old despotisms of the world did better than that. They waited until a man produced something, raised some crop or secured some stock, and then they divided with him, taking a tenth or possibly a fifth. But in our present highly civilized times, a man's income has nothing to do with the matter. The taxes must be paid if it takes the last piece of property that a man has, house, crops, stock and all. The *N. Y. World* says, and says truly, "The power to tax is the power to destroy."

It might be added that among our ancestors, the old Germans, there were no taxes. There was no legislature properly so called, and the king never pretended or presumed to tax his people. There were no public expenses. The king lived upon the income of his own property, though the people often sent him gifts which were received as honors, but they really aided in his support.

Who pays the taxes? We all know it is those who *can least afford it*. Those are the men the world over who do the work and pay the taxes. The rich pay only so much as they please; and what they please to pay is usually comparatively a small sum.

PUNISHMENT.

The subject of punishment is one that has been fully discussed in *Radical Wrongs*, and for that reason the matter will receive less attention in this work. However, I would impress upon the reader the fact that no subject deserves more careful and more serious consideration than this same matter of punish-

ment. If there be any case where men err and are most shamefully in the wrong, it is in their practice of punishing their fellow men—trying them first, then judging and convicting them—and finally administering such punishment as accords with their notions of justice and propriety. What arrogance, what presumption, and how villainous it is, when viewed in its true light! In this connexion, I am reminded of the answer given by the pirate to Alexander the Great. The latter demanded of the pirate, whom he had captured, by what right he infested the seas? “By the same right,” was the reply of the pirate, “that Alexander enslaves the world.” Just so it is to-day, the men who rule and enslave the world are no better in any essential respect than the criminals that they presume to persecute and punish.

Where do men get their right to apprehend, confine and try their fellow men? Who has made one man the judge over other men? Who has given him the privilege of deciding upon the merits or demerits of other men’s actions, and finally the right to inflict pain according to his will? To judge, to convict, to sentence, is the prerogative of God alone, but to man no such right or privilege was ever given. It is said that the law authorizes men to sit in judgment over their fellow men. But who authorized the men who made the law, and who gave them authority in the first place? I think I have shown over and over again, in the preceding pages of this work, that legality and legitimacy is a sham, a mere matter of fiction and false pretence used as a cloak for the sinful conduct of wicked men.

No, it should be borne in mind by every man that trying a person by process of law gives no new rights to any one connected with the affair. The man who sits on the bench and takes the place of God, and who generally conducts himself very much as if he were the Almighty himself—who is he? Do we not all know him? Isn’t he a very common sort of person boasting of a little brief authority? Sometimes he knows a good deal of law, and sometimes but very little, but whether he

knows much or little, what difference does that make with the character and privileges of the man himself? He was a very common sort of man when he was elected, and I am not able to see that an election can metamorphose him in any manner or to any extent. And the complainant, who is he? A common man with a grievance. And the lawyers? Very common men, indeed, we all know, aside from the little law that they are supposed to have learned from books. And the constable and sheriff, the hangman and his assistants, the man who takes men to prison or the gallows, what shall we say of such men? I prefer not to say anything, because I cannot say anything very complimentary of a man who consents to act in such a capacity simply for the compensation which that disgraceful service affords him. I trust no one will pretend that there is anything divine or anything out of the ordinary course of things in a common everyday trial in court. God, I am sure, would have nothing to do with such a fraudulent and outrageous proceeding as that. It is wholly a human affair, from beginning to end—or rather I ought to say, perhaps, an inhuman affair.

I wish to say right here, and I am only sorry that every man in the country cannot hear and appreciate the utterance: *that no trial in court ever changes in the slightest respect the status or character of the men who are engaged or involved in its proceedings. Such a trial demonstrates nothing*—it leaves the facts of the case and the character of the people involved just where they were before the trial began. A man who is guilty is no more guilty after the trial than he was before. No man gains or loses a single right or privilege by being tried in court—or at least he ought not. If he was a bad man before trial, he certainly could be no worse after trial, and yet look at the difference in treatment accorded to a man before conviction and a man after conviction!

When will people let the scales drop from their eyes and see that a trial in court is not a divine affair, but a most ordinary human affair, and hence that *it cannot give men new rights nor*

deprive them of rights which they already possess? What I claim, and what no just man will deny, is this, *that one man has as much right to try a man as any other man has.* A robber has just as good a right—when you come to the mere question of right—to try his victim and pass sentence on him as a supreme court judge has. What is the real difference between a man's sitting in judgment on a case before being elected to office and his doing the same thing a few days afterwards? Is he any wiser, better, more just and more divine in one case than in the other? So far as the mere question of right is concerned, and so far also as the ability to discover the truth is concerned, a Lynch jury is as good as any other jury. No, let us once for all, get rid of the ridiculous conception or belief that any one man is in better condition to judge his fellow men than some other man is.

Every trial is persecution. Every punishment, in any form, and for whatever purpose, is persecution. Inflicting pain on a man, and causing him anguish and sorrow, before conviction is, in principle and in fact, not in the least different from inflicting pain upon a man, or in other words punishing him, after conviction. The father who whips his child does not do so as a father, but as an ordinary man who acts from the impulse of anger or perhaps from a sense of duty. Wherein does his act differ, so far as wrong is concerned, from that of any other man who should whip the child? Officers of law excuse themselves for their misconduct by saying that they acted from a sense of duty—as if other men, or as if all men, did not act from a sense of duty also! A sense of duty can excuse no man, because any man may be mistaken in his sense of duty. The Inquisition, which tried and convicted men as our courts do, acted from a pure sense of duty. The greatest rascal in the world always acts according to his conception of duty. It would be far better if mankind would lay aside such terms as legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, and in treating of conduct merely consider whether it is proper or improper, just or not just.

Then, let us consider how men are proved guilty. What is evidence, what is proof, what does a verdict in any case establish? How very little it takes to prove a man guilty; and how very much it often requires to prove him innocent! There is no proof that amounts to demonstration—and even mathematical demonstration is open to criticism. The platform on which the proof is based is always taken for granted, and is itself never a matter that is capable of demonstration. Proof, at best, is what the word implies, merely what is probable. All evidence in court deals exclusively with probabilities and possibilities—never with certainties. Even where there are eye-witnesses, no two of them agree in their accounts. Yet men go on judging men, even their motives, of which nothing can be absolutely proven, and on their own judgment, their mere personal opinion, the best men of this world are sent to the gallows or to prison. It often happens that it is only necessary to have a man accused in order to have him found guilty. Judges, like other men, are uniformly controlled in their decisions by what seems to them either their interest or their duty.

Formerly, men proved their case by resorting to a duel called a wager of battle, and doubtless that was as good a proof as most of the methods that we follow nowadays. The strongest or luckiest man wins, and so the decision is looked upon as the work of the Almighty. This method was employed not only in Europe, but in the East. Two men fought to see which was right! The case is about the same as an average lawsuit—it is merely a struggle to see which man will win, and Providence has probably as much to do with the lawsuit as he had with the wager of battle. We have wager in many forms; our elections, for instance. Another proof was throwing the accused into the water to see whether he would float or not. If he floated, that was evidence of his guilt. It might be added that every battle is a wager of battle. Fighting by armies is like fighting by twos or threes. The armies always fight as the

proxies or representatives of their country. People at the present day never fight as a whole.

What does our hearsay amount to? It amounts to very little, but still the judge always decides upon what he hears others say. People have the absurd idea that swearing to a thing proves it, while the fact is that it is no proof at all. It is evidence only so far as it goes. It is a well-known fact that a man who is under oath, as we say, is just as liable to be mistaken as the same man would be, when not under oath. Again, the one who swears on the stand is just as willing and as ready to lie as he would be under any other circumstances. Swearing has absolutely nothing to do with a man's veracity, especially when he is sure of escaping detection. Originally, when people believed in God and the Bible, a man's being under oath made some difference, but now when people have so little faith in God, it does not. Calling for "the help of God," in taking the oath, is a mere trick or ceremony, and does not help matters in the least.

It is evident that the right to govern and the right to inflict punishment must stand or fall together. If men can govern, they can and will punish; indeed, the only way that government could manifest itself is by punishing. Without punishment, government ceases to be government; it becomes mere sentiment, a mere expression of will, without any power to enforce the will. If one man has no right to exercise control over another, then one man has no right to inflict punishment on another. No man would consent to be punished except by those who rightfully had authority over him. We have shown that no man has a right to control another, and hence it follows that no man has a right to punish another. Every punishment is not simply an offence—it is a *crime against man and against nature*.

Why shall men punish? Because it is legal? But I think it has already been shown that *legality justifies no crime*. Or, is it necessary? Who says it is necessary? The judge. But is not your

opinion and my opinion on that matter just as good as the opinion of any judge, when he passes sentence—for all that he gives is merely his opinion? I say it is not necessary, and no doubt you, after due consideration of the matter, would say the same thing. If punishment is necessary, crime is also necessary. So, where is the difference again? It should be borne in mind that no criminal ever does any act that he does not believe to be necessary and proper. It must not be forgotten that every man, even every criminal is a judge, *just like any other judge*. Every act of every individual, involves a matter of judgment in some way, that is, every voluntary, conscious act does so.

We have seen that the right to punish nowhere exists, or at least that a man acting in a public capacity has no better right to punish an offender than the same man would have when acting in a private capacity. The question of right and justice being disposed of, the next question to be considered is this: Is it expedient to punish? Who shall decide such a question as that? Is not one man's judgment as good as another man's judgment on that point? If you say it is expedient and necessary, may not I on the other hand be permitted to say it is not? It may be expedient for you, but not for me; and so far as all questions are concerned that affect me, I am the one, *and the only one* to decide what is right and what is wrong, and even what is expedient or necessary. I acknowledge no man as my master: I acknowledge no man as my judge. There is only one case where a man might be permitted with some propriety to act as judge, and that is where he has been chosen by all parties concerned to act as mediator—and then only because he has been thus chosen. But for even such a mediator, I deny all authority, all power or right to enforce what he decides to be just.

Again, if the public officer may be governed in his action by what he considers expedient, any private citizen should be permitted to do the same thing. The worst criminal in the

world does simply what he deems expedient, that is, expedient for himself. If he shoots the officer who pursues him, he does it from motives of expediency. We do not allow him to excuse himself on the ground of the assumed expediency in his case, but is the public officer, or is society, in any better condition when it pleads the same excuse? Oh, but society has the right and the authority! But I deny its right, I repudiate its authority, at least over me, and I defy any man living to show that it has the slightest vestige of either right or authority over me, except so far as it has the physical force, and that never gives right or authority to any party. The authority that comes from force is evanescent. It only lasts so long as it continues to be superior. But, heaven be thanked, the time is rapidly coming when men will have some other standard for the measurement of right besides force.

We have disposed of the question of right and the matter of expediency. The next that we must consider is this: Does punishment make things better, does it preserve order, does it protect citizens in their so-called rights? No, most certainly it does nothing of the kind. That has been one of the many delusions that men have been laboring under for some thousands of years, and now for the first they are just beginning to open their eyes and see that it really is a delusion, and a most unfortunate delusion at that. Men now begin to see that punishments produce disorder rather than concord; they enrage and demoralize men and make them worse rather than better. The best illustration of this fact is seen in the case of the boy who is perpetually scolded and whipped. That punishments do not prevent crime is shown by the fact that while prisons increase, even crimes, those of the most heinous character, likewise increase. With all our laws, and with all their severity, the United States has ten thousand murders in a year. That punishments do not protect citizens is shown by the fact that citizens are offended, insulted and injured every day without the slightest possibility of securing reparation in any way.

So far from punishment's producing order, it produces disorder. How is a riot quelled? By killing a lot of men and women, and producing a state of affairs infinitely more horrible than that which prevailed before the soldiers and the police interfered. How does society attempt to stop murders? Simply by committing the same crime itself. How does society prevent robbery? By punishing and torturing the criminal, if caught, and rendering all of his family sorrow-stricken and miserable. How does society collect rents? By distressing the tenants and turning the poor unfortunate creatures out of doors to freeze and starve. How does the state prevent war? By making war. How does it obtain peace? By fighting for it. How does it *protect* some people? By violating the rights of other people. How does it make some men rich? By making other men poor.

Alas! What a contemptible farce it is to talk about the good the state does! Why not talk about the wickedness and rascality of the state, the shameful crimes it commits daily, the men it murders, the families it renders homeless and supperless? Why not talk about the absolute heartlessness and villainy of the state? The goodness of the state—that arch deceiver, that pitiless tyrant, that selfish, conceited and arrogant master! Why talk about such matters? Why worship the state in this country or in any other? What difference does it make what form or name government assumes, or what pretence it makes, so long as it is government, and so long as it engages in the wicked practices that prevail in all cases where force is applied?

No, people are steadily getting light on this question and forming different opinions from those which were held and advocated no later than fifty years ago. The world moves, slowly it is true, but it moves, and where it stands to-day, even on questions of government and punishment, it did not stand a half century since. Within the memory of men now living, the time was when men never took the trouble to ask or con-

sider the question whether punishing people was either right or wrong. It was assumed as a matter of course that whipping was indispensable, and without it, the world would certainly go to ruin at once. Hence, husbands whipped their wives, the master whipped his servant or his apprentice, the teacher whipped his pupil and the officers of the court whipped their victims. No man stopped for a moment to raise any question about such practices, because from time immemorial men had always done business in that way. Everybody believed that whipping was good for people—for children especially—and if the master did not whip those under him, he would be remiss in the performance of his duty. But what a change, what an amazing change, has come over the minds of even the common people on this subject of corporal punishment! Most people look upon it with horror, and they consider that its application in any case is a piece of low brutality. However, they still believe in other kinds of punishment—they believe in imprisoning people, in fining them and making them pay large sums of money or sending them to jail; and finally, worse than all, they still believe in sacrificing the criminal, and in immolating a victim, in certain extreme cases, simply to propitiate the Lord and pacify an angry people. But they do it in a very kind, Christianlike way. Formerly, if they killed a man in this manner, they tortured him, they burned him, they caused him all the pain and anguish possible. Now people do not do business on that basis. They aim to hurt the offender just as little as possible; they feed him well while he lives, and finally when the day of execution comes, they dispatch him as quickly, as quietly and as politely as possible. I do not wonder that all who take part in such proceedings are heartily ashamed of it and want to finish the job as expeditiously and secretly as ever they can. But it must not be forgotten that it is a crime and a brutal piece of business in which such men are engaged, view it in any light we choose. They need not shrug their shoulders and look horror-stricken when they talk about cannibals, for the genuine

man-eater is a gentleman compared with those cultured officials who, at this late day, make a business of hurrying men on their way to eternity, merely for the money there is in the job. And then to think that such men will go to church and pray to the Lord, besides prating in public about their virtues and their patriotism! It is really surprising to see how far a refined and highly cultivated sense of duty will carry some men! However, it is some consolation to think that even in this connexion the world begins to move. Judicial murders with us are very rare things compared with the practice that prevailed in old English times, when there were about one hundred and seventy different crimes for which a man might be killed according to law, the usual method being hanging. In those days the life of a man was held at a very low figure. If some one in power wanted to rid himself of an enemy, he had him accused of some crime, and the unfortunate offender was soon on his way to kingdom come, without benefit of the clergy. The world still believes in both the necessity and propriety of capital punishment, but it must be confessed that it believes in this business far less than it did a few years ago. I am very confident that before the next century ends the killing of a man for any crime, according to law, will be a thing unheard of in any civilized land.

And then our jails, our prisons and penitentiaries, what shall we say of them? The first fact to which I would call the attention of the reader is this: they are not what they once were. Up to recent times when a man was sent to prison, it meant business, and if the poor wretch ever got out alive, he might consider himself remarkably fortunate. Now the case is just the other way. A jail is a place where a man is deprived of a few liberties, but he is sure of good board and little or nothing to do. Even the prisons and penitentiaries have become a sort of retreat for the homeless and friendless. A man is not sent to prison now to punish him, but to get him out of the way and keep him where he cannot bother his neighbors. If he behaves

himself, and especially if he has some money and is on good terms with his keepers, he will have anything but a hard time of it. All this shows that the world in recent years has made some progress, even on the subject of prison management. It is still deemed necessary to confine men in prison, because that has been the practice for centuries past, but in the performance of such a disagreeable task, the state aims to be as gentlemanly and dignified as the circumstances of the case will allow. But I repeat, the world continues to move. Before the coming century closes, we will either have less prisons and jails than we have now, or there will be an entire change in their character.

If it were a part of my plan to discuss this punishment question in full, I would dwell at length on the expensiveness of criminal proceedings and of punishments generally. But in this place I will only make this remark, that if criminal proceedings were dispensed with, and a tenth part of the money that goes to the officers of the law in criminal cases were given to the victim or his relatives, the public would derive a benefit which it fails to receive now, and society would be far happier than it is in every respect. As it is, and as it always has been, our criminal practice, with its methods and processes, instead of protecting people and relieving the distressed, is nothing more than a fruitful source of revenue to the easy-going gentlemen who happen to enjoy the favor and patronage of the state.

Before leaving this part of the subject, I wish to add a few words on the punishment of the young. It must be plain to all who are not too strongly prejudiced in favor of some other view of the case, that the bad conduct and misdoings of children are largely to be ascribed to the conduct and mismanagement of the parents. It is evident that even children cannot be forced or legislated into goodness. If they have inherited some, or perhaps many, of the bad qualities and propensities of their parents, the tendency in this direction may be checked or changed, but qualities cannot be destroyed. Children should be led—and not subdued or controlled. The only way to counteract evil ten-

dencies is by careful and judicious training and treatment. Kind words will do much; while scolding and fretful words will defeat the object which the scolder had in view. Blows irritate and enrage, and harsh language has a similar effect; the tendency of all these things is to destroy every tender or humane sentiment that is found in the heart. In the same manner, harsh, painful or offensive treatment operates when applied to adults. Severity is not a safe nor a certain remedy in any case.

But it will be asked, shall we let bad children and evildoers go on as they will? To a certain extent, yes; to a certain extent, no. Even children can and soon will learn that they have a direct personal interest in living on fair and friendly terms with all, and especially with their parents and friends. They will soon learn that they must adapt their course to the situation in which they find themselves, and particularly that they must have a constant regard for the feelings and wishes of those with whom they live or associate.

The young should be so reared and educated that they may not know what harshness, unkindness and cruelty are. Nothing should be said to the child about wrongs, injuries, faults, crimes. Things that should not exist should not receive recognition, and in most cases they never would exist if they were not nursed and developed by injudicious management. Where there is full confidence and a good understanding between parties, no controversies or complaints will arise, and such a thing as wrongs in the proper sense of the word will be unknown.

Some of the child's characteristics and propensities that have come down as an inheritance from savage ancestors occasionally make their appearance, but the effect of these things can easily be counteracted by some adroit turn or some happy arrangement, and we should proceed in that case precisely as we would in the case of a man who had partially lost his mind. After a few generations these savage traits or strains, these unmanlike features of character, will gradually disappear. It is

well-known that even at the present time, near as we are to the savage state, in many characteristics, there is little occasion for trouble or turmoil, when people exercise a little judgment and practice a little self-denial. Our effort should be to avoid every tendency that might lead to the development of selfishness and to suppress every desire for the gratification of self at the expense of others. If we could only succeed in dispensing with pride, vanity, covetousness, avarice, ambition, together with our high sense of honor, our thirst for power and a few other things, we would get along well enough in this world.

So long as we continue our present barbarous system of punishment, we should not think of bringing ourselves into comparison with savages, with the hope of finding results that would be in any way flattering to either our pride or our vanity. It is very true that the aborigines of this country, and the natives of southern and central Africa, have many savage, and even brutal customs. But have the cultivated people of Europe and America anything to boast of in that direction? How have the natives of the newly discovered countries been treated by Europeans in every instance? We answer for them, by saying that they have been treated in a most inhuman and shameful manner. They have been treated as if they were wild beasts, and not the slightest consideration has been given to those rights which should prevail under all circumstances between man and man. Europeans send missionaries out to the heathen ostensibly to christianize them and save their souls, but what do they really care either for the heathen or his soul? They are ready to shoot him down or cut his throat on the slightest pretext, and very often without any pretext at all. Those accomplished murderers, Pizarro and Cortez, were both Christians, and we presume they were very highly civilized.

The head and front of all the nations of the world in this nefarious business of civilizing the heathen, is the English. What a record of blood, crime and barbarity they have made in the last two hundred years in America, in India, in China, in

Africa, in Australia ! And they are pursuing the same wicked course to-day. Wherever there is a gold field to be found, or where money is to be made through the medium of what is called commerce, there you will find the English taking possession of the ground, and either driving the natives back or murdering them if they resist.

Recently the English were making war upon a feeble Ashantee chief or king who goes by the name of Prempeh. The complaint that the English made was that Prempeh was inhuman and that he sacrificed a great many Ashantee lives in following the customs and carrying out the laws of his country. That was indeed a queer excuse for England, or any other civilized country, to make for going to war with a lot of natives in some distant land. Sacrifices ! Are there no sacrifices made in civilized countries ? Thousands are made every day, in some form or for some purpose or other, and millions are made in a year, if we take into consideration the civilized world as a whole. Every soldier who is killed in battle and every one who dies from ill-treatment or exposure is a sacrifice—a needless, cruel sacrifice. The Ashantee king and the civilized ruler both delight in sacrifices, and the only point in which they differ is in the slim excuse which they give for the barbarities of which they are guilty. The uncultivated savage has his reasons for what he does, and the highly enlightened gentleman has his reasons also for what he does. Outside of the reason which each gives, their conduct is very much the same in character.

How many people have been sacrificed to the God of War by civilized nations within a comparatively short period of the world's history ! About two and a half millions have been sacrificed in that way within the last forty years. In the Crimean war 75,000 were killed ; in the Italian war of 1858, 45,000 ; in the Austro-Prussian war, 48,000 ; in the Franco-German war, 215,000 ; in the Turko-Russian war, 250,000 ; and in our late civil war 800,000 ! But we continue sacrificing every day in hundreds of ways. Every man that is lynched, or hung upon a

gallows, or killed in an electric chair, is a sacrifice which an angry people make to the God of Justice. Think also of the sacrifices made daily to the God of Fashion, God of Money, to the Locomotive God, to the Trolley Car God, and even to the Bicycle God. No, we need not go to Africa to find repulsive practices or barbarous sacrifices. All we have to do is to open our eyes and see things in their proper light, and we shall have all the object lessons we desire in that direction, without going to distant lands at all.

The native of Africa is sacrificed in one way, perhaps by orders of his king, and in this and other countries the citizen is driven to slaughter in another way. What difference does it make to the poor helpless victim how he is killed, if he is really dead when his masters are done with him? In fact, it hurts him more to be killed in the civilized way than it does in the more expeditious and less formal way of the African king. In barbaric lands the victim loses his head by the sword or battle axe; in civilized lands the conscript is driven up to the cannon's mouth, and is sacrificed in that manner. Which is the best, or which is the worst? Is it possible to give any excuse or furnish any justification for one man's killing another under any circumstances? Can murder be legalized in any way?

Here it may be added that the time must eventually come when motives will not be considered. It is very unjust to assume bad motives for our fellow man, when it is well-known that motives are something that are concealed in each man's bosom and they can never be known with certainty by the public. The damage to the one who is injured is equally great, no matter what may be the motive that led to the injury. Again, what a man really does he wills, and it is a matter of no moment to the public what arguments or reasoning may have led to the act. Every motive, for the offender himself, must be a just one, and all men are moved to do what they finally decide to do. There can be no excuse or palliation for a bad act, for if that were not so, an excuse or apology might be

made for every act of wrong-doing. There is only one safe and sound rule to follow, in the matter of responsibility, and that is to hold every man to account for what he knowingly and willingly does, without regard to motive. There can be no justification for wrong-doing; if there were any excuse, it would not be wrong-doing. A man's position or office, or his motives, certainly could not excuse him, otherwise every man would find some excuse.

Some people think there is a radical difference between an injury received by a man who happens to be hit upon the head by an icicle that drops from the eaves and an injury occasioned by being struck on the head with a club in the hands of some bandit. No one would blame the eaves for an injury of this kind, while almost every one would hold the bandit responsible for what he had done, the bandit being considered a free moral agent who willed and chose to do what he did, while the eaves had no will and therefore could not be held accountable for the harm they caused.

This position is fully in accordance with the theory that has prevailed for thousands of years, during all which time people have been talking and preaching about free will—and they have believed in it during all this time, and they believe in it to day. However, there are many thinking men at present that take a different view of this subject of free moral agency and moral accountability from the one just noticed. To all appearances men are constantly doing as they will and as they choose, but these appearances are deceiving and they come from a very superficial view of the whole matter. We see very clearly, when we come to reflect, that when men do what they will, they also do what they must. To believe in free moral agency, is practically to deny the existence of God, at least of such a God as Christians believe in. If God created the world, he made it undoubtedly as he wanted it, and if he did so, he alone is responsible for the world's being what it is. We have no reason to believe, and no record that would lead us to believe

that God made the good part of the creation, while some other being made the bad part. No, God made the whole world and everything in it, and there is no evidence that he himself looks upon any part of his work as a failure, or as being incomplete or wicked in any sense.

It is a well-known fact that many of our best thinkers begin to doubt the responsibility of men for their conduct to a large extent. It begins to be better understood than ever before that men never make themselves; they come into the world as they are, the product of forces entirely outside of their own control. If a man is bad, it is because he was born bad, because his ancestors were bad, or because he was made bad afterwards through influences and agencies for which he is not in any sense responsible. The same laws and agencies that produced the eaves also produced the bandit, and the one should not be punished for what is done any more than the other should. We would not think of punishing a stone that happened to be in our way and over which we had stumbled and fallen. We would hardly be so foolish as to whip a horse that had carelessly stepped upon our toes, or even one that had willfully harmed us in some other way. What better reason would we have for punishing a boy for some wrong he had done, either willfully or otherwise? He is simply a bad boy, and if he were not so, he would not be doing bad things. But we know very well that the bad boy is not to be blamed for being bad. The ones to be blamed, and the only ones that are really responsible are his parents and ancestors, together with those who taught him, who influenced him, who helped make him what he is. They are clearly the offending party in such cases. To illustrate farther, we ask, is a stubborn or a timid horse to be blamed for being such, and does whipping do him the slightest good? Every sensible man knows that every blow makes matters worse. A man might as well whip a log as a stubborn horse, for one has just as much free will as the other. It is absolutely impossible for such a horse to move before he does

move. What is true of bad horses is equally true of bad men. No man is his own creator or designer ; he simply is what he is, and as he is, and that he is so, is not any fault of his own. Society and government are more to blame for a man's being what he is and for doing what he does than he is himself.

The point I make, finally, is that all punishments are worthless and wrong—and above all things that they do not harmonize with the religion that Christ has taught and which so many people profess to accept and believe. I am glad to notice that people are coming to have much less use for punishments and revenge than people had some centuries since. I am glad to notice also that the God described in the Old Testament is not the Supreme Being that intelligent men believe in to-day. Let us banish from our minds forever that antiquated notion that we must have government, that we must have punishment, and that without these things there would be no peace or comfort for the living.

But admitting that the culprit should be punished, by whom shall the punishment be administered ? Who has the authority under God or man that makes him the master, the judge and the executioner of the culprit ? It may be replied, that it is any one who happens to be the representative of the state or of the law. But where does such a representative get his right to punish and inflict pain, to bring sorrow or distress upon a fellow mortal who no doubt is in every sense as good and as great a man as his tormentor ? I again call attention to the fact that no man can excuse himself for the crimes he commits merely because he happens to be an officer of the state. That does not lessen his guilt in the slightest. A man's position in society cannot change the nature of his offence, otherwise a man supposed to have a good character would never be punished for his crimes. Whether a man is either in office or out, he is precisely the same man, and in all cases he ought to be held equally responsible for what he does. The law has no power to change anything. *What an officer may rightfully do, any other*

man not an officer might rightfully do under the same circumstances—there is no possible way of getting around that. If it is to be done, and if it is well done when it is done, it matters not in the least who does it, and the sooner it is done the better. If the culprit is to be killed, what difference does it make whether the deed is done by an officer or some one else? It is the killing that the law seeks, and there is no especial virtue in an officer's doing the job.

Finally, it must be evident that with the disappearance of punishments for evil-doing, rewards for goodness must also fall. If we cease to punish men simply because they have done wrong—or rather have done what does not please us—we should also cease to reward men simply because they have done something that strikes us as being done properly or well. No man should be hired to do right, nor should he be rewarded because he has done simply his duty. Giving rewards for goodness is taking a step towards corruption. No man should be hired or induced to do anything merely by the hope of receiving a reward. *Goodness should be its own reward, and evil should bring, and will bring, its own penalty.*

We have thus far been discussing the relations between men and men, and we have been considering the claims of those who seek to exercise authority over other men. It would give the author pleasure also to dwell at length upon the relations between man and the lower animals, and to enquire whether there is any substantial foundation for the prevailing belief that these creatures are made solely for the comfort, amusement, and sustenance of the human race, or whether their right to existence, and even enjoyment, is not in the fullest sense as great as that of the noblest or rarest of human beings. But this is neither the time nor the place to discuss this matter. Suffice it to say, for the present, that, in the author's opinion, the humblest creature that God ever placed upon this planet has all the rights and privileges that were ever granted to any member of the human family; and further, if the same persistent efforts were put forth to train and educate

the young of the lower animals that are put forth in educating our children, the improvement and progress made by the lower orders of creation in the way of intelligence would in a short time surpass all belief.

OUR GERMAN ANCESTORS.

The old Germans, our remote ancestors, who lived two thousand years ago and dwelt in the swamps, forests and fields of central Europe, were not untutored savages in the ordinary sense of the word. They were doubtless in that transition state which we uniformly find in passing from the barbarous to the civilized stage of life. Undoubtedly their mode of living and doing was of a primitive character, and it belonged to the same type as that of all early peoples who have as yet made no extensive conquests and no great progress either in art or science, or in the acquisition of wealth. Their history in that stage of their development is important chiefly because it shows how people live and do before they have become corrupted through the demoralizing influences of what is known as the arts of civilization. It is merely because of the instruction that we may receive from such lessons as these that we dwell briefly at this time upon the character, methods and beliefs which prevailed among the early Germans about the time of the invasion of Julius Cæsar.

These Germans lived, thrived and enjoyed life, and yet their belief, their methods of business and their manner of doing things generally were just the opposite of ours. The most striking fact in connexion with their organization as a people was their love of freedom and a very noticeable absence of everything in the nature of what is usually known as force-laws. They really had no laws—that is, no laws such as men have in civilized lands at the present day. They knew no masters and therefore they acknowledged the binding force of no man-made laws. There were no prisons, no executioners; indeed, they

knew of no such thing as crime. As I have already reminded the reader, where there are no laws, there can be no crimes. A crime is something which is done against the express terms of the law. Every man in those days did as seemed to him proper. He did not ignore the convictions, tastes, wishes, feelings and sentiments of those with whom he lived; he was far more careful about such matters than we are to-day. He did not consult the law to see what he would be permitted to do—as I have stated, there were no laws to consult. There were no judges, no trials, no lawyers, no bailiffs in those days. No man had to consult some higher authority to ascertain what he would be permitted to do. *Every man did that which seemed good in his own eyes.* He did as he had been educated to do and as he felt inspired to do. He did not follow somebody's lead, nor did he concern himself about fashions. He had a character and an individuality all his own. He was a full-grown, able-bodied, independent, upright man—such a man, unfortunately, as is not readily found in our enlightened times. Men had honor then, and manhood and magnanimity, but they never thought of boasting of such things, nor even of offering their services for a price. Then men trusted each other, because men then had proved themselves worthy of confidence. Every man was his own judge, and such a thing as some one man passing sentence on the conduct or merits of some other man had at that time never been heard of. If a man was accused or complained of, he did not hire a lot of witnesses to prove that he was not guilty. No, nothing of that kind was ever dreamed of in the good old times of our noble progenitors, the Germans. All a man did under such circumstances, critical as the case would be in our days, was to call God to witness or, in other words, to make oath, that he was not guilty. That was the end of the business—no one dared to dispute his word. In those days there was no policeman nor militia company to send for to help out one side or the other. One man's word was as good as any other man's word. Why should it not be so, not only then but

now? It would be so if every man were known to be, as he was in old German times, a man of honor and a gentleman. With us, the moment a man is accused his word passes for nothing—a most absurd doctrine at best. Among the Germans no man lost caste, character or position in any such way. No such thing as disgraceful conduct was known. Men in those days were very careful what they did and how they did, for their standing in community depended entirely upon their conduct and their reputation. There was no state or officer to aid them when they got into trouble—they defended themselves, with the aid of their relatives and friends. Men in those days had true and devoted friends, and they so conducted themselves as to show to their fellow men that they were deserving of true friendship and devotion. That was an age when principle prevailed, and good words went farther than fair words.

They had kings in those days, many kings, but they had no master. The king himself was more of a servant of the people than a master of any individual. He presided in council, but he never presumed to dictate. He gave advice, information and instruction, as a father would—that was as far as he was ever allowed to go. They had those who presided at trials or investigations by the people, a kind of judge, but those who served in that capacity merely declared the verdict of the council, and had no power or authority on their own account. The officers of those days, no matter in what capacity they acted, were really servants of the public, as all officers should be. The people thus assembled in council merely gave their opinion; they never undertook to enforce it, and they had no means of doing so, if they had so desired. But in those times men respected public opinion as men never think of doing in these degenerate days of ours. One who disregarded the feelings of those with whom he resided, found, like Cain, that his sufferings were greater than he could bear.

Disputes were settled mostly by compromise and arbitration—there were no law-trials as we have them in these days.

They had one good way that prevailed all over central and northern Europe for many centuries, and that was paying a man a certain sum when they had injured or wronged either him or his family—"composition" it was called. If a man found it necessary and proper to kill or maim his neighbor, he gave a good reason for it, and then was ready to pay to the one injured or his family the sum that had been established as the price in such cases. Our way is radically different. We make the offender pay a fine, as the Germans did, but instead of its going to the party injured or his family it goes to the state! All the complainant gets out of the business is a bill of expense and a great deal of vexation of spirit. The practice in later times of letting seven or twelve men, called "schöffen" or jurors, decide the case, was common for many centuries, and our jury is only a modification of this old German institution. Trials, or battles as they were called, came later and had features much like those of our trials. The object of these trials was to prevent men who had been offended from taking the case into their own hands and settling their own matter in their own way, as had been the case with the Germans in earlier times.

The old Germans knew nothing of appeals; if a case was decided, it was never brought up for review in any other tribunal, and there was no delay in having the verdict carried out. Whatever was done, was done at once, or in a few hours. As there was no man lower in rank than another man, so there was no tribunal that was subordinate to some other tribunal. They had no trials long drawn out. They aimed at nothing but justice. Our aim is usually something entirely different. Our trials are ordinarily conducted with a view of allowing one party or the other to escape justice. That is the principal object for which lawyers are hired, and that is the kind of work they are expected to perform. We prate much about justice, but it is something so rarely found that our people have lost all idea of what justice really is. We have the delays and expense of

suits, and have come to think it would be impossible to live without them. Such is civilization !

In matters of vengeance, the individual was his own judge, and he did his own work and took the whole responsibility upon himself. And why is not this a good way? Why should not any one man make as good a judge as any other man ?

The features we have dwelt upon were mostly those that prevailed before the time that Tacitus wrote—one hundred years or less after the birth of Christ. In later times great changes had taken place, mainly through the influence of association with the Romans. The priests at that time had become a powerful institution. They accompanied the hosts when they went out to battle; they made the sacrifices and they explained the oracles and interpreted the messages from God. They became the executioners in case of punishment, where offences had been committed. They presided over councils, either with or without the king, in times of peace. People obeyed the priests, when they would have felt humiliated if compelled to obey an ordinary man. They believed they were simply obeying God by obeying his messengers or interpreters. This shows clearly how concentration of power has arisen among men. Priests were our first rulers; during the Middle Ages at least, they were the real sovereigns of Europe. Even kings and emperors obeyed them, simply to be able thereby to secure their assistance in carrying out political schemes of their own. All this is further proof that all modern government is but a development of theocracy. *A belief in God has been studiously and persistently cultivated, in order to profit by the delusions which such a belief generates.*

The Germans abhorred above all things a sneaking way and an underhanded method of doing business. They were all brave men; what they did they did openly and manfully. They feared none but God. Men who have no fears are the last men to do wrong. Most of our wickedness has its origin in fear. Men kill their enemies because they are afraid of them and

wish to get them out of the way. Even the kings could do nothing contrary to the will of the people, for in those days the will of the people was law, *and nothing else was law.*

The Germans knew little or nothing of contracts—there were no contracts properly called, no obligations, nothing binding, because there was no one with power to enforce a contract, there being nothing like state power then in existence. A German, being a freeman, would never consent to be bound by any such thing as a promise or contract. He always reserved the right to do what he felt ought to be done when the time for action came—a very good idea, and one that it would be well for the people of the present century to adopt.

In those days there were none very rich and none very poor. Loungers were not tolerated in the community. There was no state or public treasury, and no taxes. Every man paid his own bills, if he had any to pay, and asked for no assistance from any source.

We have gone over this brief history to show how people have lived together in the past, and how they might live at present if they chose. In the days of which we have been speaking men lived for the sake of living, and they lived as a sensible man would say that sensible men should. Now the plans and purposes, and of course the methods, are entirely different. Then one man was as good as another; now we have ranks, and cliques and castes, and a few men imagine that they are better than others. Then men followed the scriptural injunction, or one that was perhaps older than the scriptures, that men should judge not; now every man, so far as he is able, is continually passing his opinion upon the conduct of other men and marking out a straight and narrow way which he would like to have all men follow except himself. Then every man was expected to make his own living; now people, so far as practicable, seek to live by the labors of other people.

In comparing our method of government with that of our ancestors, which shall we call the more perfect of the two?

Can it be said that we have progressed, and that our method is really an improvement on the methods followed by the Germans of other days? I should say not.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

Having gone thus far in ascertaining certain facts in connexion with the affairs of every-day life, we begin to realize that many things which we had all along believed to be proper and useful are decidedly the opposite; we find that government, which we had been taught to regard as something of divine origin, is really a human contrivance, designed to aid one portion of the race in subjugating another portion, and we have ascertained that what we formerly believed to be God's work, or the doings of God's chosen representative, the state, is merely the work of common mortals like ourselves in every instance. Now, having learned these and a great many other things in the same direction, the question that naturally arises is this: What are we going to do about it? What can we do about it, or what should we do about it? If things are confessedly wrong, and known to be wrong, must we consent to their continuance for an indefinite period in the future, merely because we have always done so in the past? The answer to this question will of course vary according to the character and make-up of the individual from whom the reply is expected. If a man is a coward or a slave, and is content to remain a coward and a slave, his reply will be something like this: "Better let well enough alone; things are going along badly enough, it is true, but they might be worse; what we want is peace, we must have peace, even if we die by it." On the other hand, one who feels himself to be a man and who is bound to maintain the dignity and attitude that belongs to a man under all circumstances, no matter how adverse, would take an entirely different view of the matter. He would say: "I will neither countenance nor endorse what I know to be wrong.

I may not rebel, but still I will not submit—I will not lick the hand that smites me. I will at least protest, if I do no more. No one, not even God in heaven, can deprive me of that privilege." If there is any divine right that man has, it is the right of protesting when he knows he has been wronged. To petition is the privilege sometimes conceded to slaves, but *to protest is the inalienable right of every freeborn man, woman and child.*

Those who have read the foregoing pages of this work, and who have considered well the statements which the author has made, must certainly agree with him in saying that many things as they are found at present in civilized life are palpably and positively wrong. But suppose they are so, what is to be done? I have already indicated one thing that every man living can always do, and that is to protest. Protesting is a sort of negative resistance, but it is a powerful element in the end. It is not so swift or so terrible as vengeance, but it is always more certain and more effective in producing results. All the remedies for evils in social life, thus far, have uniformly been the result of the protests of men in the first place. A few protests perhaps avail little—but a few always lead to additional protests, and when the protesters come to be in the majority, a change is pretty sure to follow. People can and will change anything, they can and will remove any burden, they can and will suppress any wrong, when they come to realize that it is a burden and a wrong, and naturally decide that it must be removed.

I very well understand that the disease under consideration is constitutional, or in other words, it is national, and it cannot be cured by swallowing a few doses of some popular pain-killer. This disease has been slowly developing, not for a few years simply, but for centuries; and it will take as many centuries more, no doubt, to remove the causes of the decline and finally bring the patient back to a normally sound and healthy state.

But if we decide that a change in our manner of living and doing should be made, when is a good time to begin? In my humble judgment, the best time that we shall ever find is now. There is no use of promulgating new ideas unless they are applied and put into practice.

Of course, so long as the general condition of things remains as it is, our laws and our system of government must remain substantially unchanged. It is impossible, by any effort, to destroy the harmony which prevails in all the operations both of nature and man. But it is not a fact, as many suppose, that one thing was made to match some other thing. Things develop together, but they never lose their individuality or independence. There is no such thing as one thing following or preceding another, or being made for another. But while it is true that no one thing is made for another, or because of another's existence, it is true, nevertheless, that it very often happens that one state of facts implies another state of facts. It follows, for instance, that so long as men have property, and an extravagant desire to get property, there must be laws and government, with soldiers and policemen to secure people in the so-called peaceable enjoyment of that property. If we had no laws and no government, we could not have any such thing as property. Men would have no title, no defensible claim to property, since titles and valid claims are founded solely upon the authority of the state. If we had no property, we certainly could have no wealth, and if wealth were wanting, many institutions that have their origin in the demands of wealth would be entirely unknown. With the disappearance of wealth, all desire for wealth, all selfishness, which arises chiefly from the struggle for riches, would also cease to exist. And if wealth were unknown, one of the chief causes of crime would be removed, since most of our crimes are connected in some way with violations of the rights of property. Even domestic troubles, and all offences connected with domestic ties and obligations, arise mainly from our ideas of ownership. The father

imagines that he owns his children and the husband that he owns his wife, and hence the sensitiveness of both the father and the husband in regard to anything that is supposed to be an infringement upon their sacred rights. If men did not believe that they owned their wives, we would have no such crime as adultery, and we would not hear of the murders, suicides and other tragedies that arise either directly or remotely from what men consider their legal and moral rights in such cases. With wealth, poverty likewise would disappear, and if poverty ceased to exist another fruitful source of many of our crimes and miseries would be removed.

Again, as we have seen, if we had no laws and no government, crime, with all its accompaniments, would be unknown. Crimes are the creations of law; what the laws do not forbid cannot be a crime in the eyes of the people.

Every nation which has reached such an advanced stage of civilization as we have now reached will have just such a civilization as prevails in Europe and America at present. To have civilization, men must have laws and government in the first place. There must be power, subjugation, slavery. What is earned by the many must be grasped and appropriated by the few. There must be interest, profits, rents and taxes, and these can only be collected when the power exists somewhere with which to enforce their collection. No man pays any of these charges unless under compulsion, and compulsion implies the application of law and force. No man makes a practice of parting with his earnings for the benefit solely of others, unless he feels the *necessity* of doing so. He pays only under coercion.

It cannot be too well borne in mind that every feature that we find in our present state of enlightenment and so-called culture belongs where we find it, and it must be looked upon as indispensable, so long as that state continues to exist. We find law, government, police, jails, prisons, gibbets, wealth, luxury, penury, misery, crime, turmoil, and troubles of

all kinds. All these things are found at one and the same time, and they are necessarily the complements of each other. No one is the cause of the other, no one either precedes or follows the other; all things are subject to the law of development—they grow, they come forward, just as the organs of the human body make their appearance together. The hands of any individual are as old as the ears, and the liver and lungs are as old as the heart. I know it is claimed by comparative physiologists that some organs are wanting in the earliest stage of individualized existence, but I apprehend that this means simply that they are not able to perceive or recognize such organs. I find no reason to believe that any part of the complete man is any older than some other part. It may not be amiss to add that no one thing ever becomes another thing; there never was a time when any creature or any thing began to exist, nor will there ever come a time when it will cease to exist. There never was a time when men belonged to a species that they do not belong to now, or, in other words, when they were what they are not. There may have been a time when men were nearer to apes than they are at present, but there never could have been a time when they actually were apes. As a species, men must be at least as old as the apes.

Civilization also implies just what we find still further, namely: that large bodies of men must congregate and associate together in an organized form. Without large cities the world could not possibly afford such a state of things as we have at present. We could not even have a state, with its laws, its rules and its governors, unless we had large cities. Indeed, the origin of the state is to be found in the city. While the German people had no cities, they had no state properly so-called. People must have a fixed abode and they must concentrate in some manner, before they can be said to constitute a state in the ordinary sense of the term. People in the wandering or pastoral stage never accumulate great wealth or acquire great power. Strength only comes from the combining of

forces, and where there is no such combination, there can be no accumulation of power. Even a people whose main pursuit is agriculture never develops any remarkable energies or any particular concentration of force. The power and influence of man in this world has always been concentrated in the cities—such as Babylon, Nineveh, Troy, Carthage, Rome, Athens, Venice, Paris, and even London.

So, the first step towards improvement in the affairs of men would be to induce them to live more in the country and less in cities than they do at present. Small villages or country communities are easily governed—in fact, they need no government at all. Everything done might be and should be a matter of agreement on the part of those interested, and no coercion or compulsion should be used under any conditions or any circumstances. But large bodies of men, on the other hand, need to have numerous rules and regulations to keep them in order, and there must be power lodged somewhere to enforce such rules. Uprisings and revolutions, it must be remembered, uniformly begin in the cities. If people lived in small communities, each one having his own sphere of action, with the necessity of earning his own livelihood without any aid from the state or any other outside source, there could be very little occasion or opportunity for troubles or violations of any kind. The troubles come when people seek to make slaves of their fellows and live upon the product of other people's earnings ; these things come also when men are anxious to become rich and gain power over others ; when it is fashionable to make a display, and when it is the custom for one class of men to make laws and rules of conduct for other men to observe.

I can very well see that so long as society is constituted as it is, and while the aims and ambitions of men remain as they are in all civilized countries at the present time, it is useless to make new laws or to seek to better the condition of men through the medium of any change in some one or more departments of government. As a rule men will have such laws and

such government as they want and deserve. There is no use of trying to doctor a case like this, until a radical change is made in the patient's manner of living and doing.

Men must first be regenerated, through some means or some agency, before they can have a better conception of things, and before they can be brought to consent to a radical improvement in their conduct and action. Through all time, thus far, going back as far as history furnishes any account, the main troubles of this world have arisen from the desire of a certain portion of the people *to live and thrive at the expense of their fellows*. When men come to believe that they ought to earn their own living and that they have no right under any terms or conditions to live at the expense of others, or to depend on the assistance of others, then we shall have peace and happiness, *and not till then*.

But while we could not effect a radical cure of the patient whose case we have under consideration until a complete regeneration was accomplished, a great improvement might be secured by making only a comparatively few changes in the present methods of doing business.

The first thing is to abolish the legislature, and let every community hereafter make its own rules and regulations. There should be no such thing as state power, state laws and state interference. We have seen in the preceding pages what state rule is—it is the control of a few designing and selfish men who manage everything with the sole aim of advancing their own interests or, in other words, with the view of feathering their own nests and the nests of their friends. What few regulations may be deemed necessary in any community could be made as occasion requires and *by the agreement of all*. No man should be punished in any manner for what he refuses to do; neither should the community be made to suffer from his wrong-doing. When a man does not like the society in which he finds himself, he should depart; and if the community does not like any one of its members, after a fair trial has been made

to ascertain what manner of man he is, he should be ostracised at once. By following some such system of elimination as this, the bad men in time would all disappear and those who remained would find themselves congenial, and therefore all would live together in peace and harmony.

If the state protects no one, if it defends no titles and assumes to give none, if it allows and permits every one to conduct his own business and manage his own affairs as he pleases, if it does not pretend to compel the observance of any contract or agreement, if it does not aid the strong in enforcing hard bargains made with the weak, if it does not aid in collecting debts, either honest or otherwise, if each man is compelled to collect his own interest, his own rent and secure his own pound of flesh by his own unaided exertions, then all the supports of wealth would tumble at once and an equilibrium, or something near an equilibrium, would be restored at once.

Without the aid and interposition of the state, no contract would be enforced, and therefore very few contracts would be made. Without the endorsement of the state, slavery could not exist for a moment, because the slave and his master would have equal rights and they would always stand upon even ground. We could hardly, without the power of the state, have such an institution as hired labor, for the laborer could not collect pay for his services and the employer could not depend upon the engagement made by the employee. Everything would be mutual and strictly a matter of agreement. There would be no coercion, no punishing for non-fulfilment of contract. Some compensation might be made for services rendered, but it would be made willingly and cheerfully. Above all things there would be no long-time contracts of any kind, and from that fact alone men would avoid a vast amount of misery.

One of the most important steps towards improvement would be to abolish *all titles to land*—certainly all claims to any land beyond that portion which the community might concede to each and every family for the sole purpose of its gaining a

living. All our titles to land to-day came originally from the state, and if the state falls or is dispensed with, as it *ought to be dispensed with, because it is an expensive, dangerous and worthless machine*, then all ownership of land would also fall as a matter of course. It should not be forgotten that the one who owns the land controls the laws and the destinies of men.

People ought to begin to see and understand that because things are as they are, they need not necessarily remain as they have been forever. What we ought to do is to apply our reason and exercise that judgment and common sense which God has given us, and see if the present way of doing things cannot be improved upon. We need not be afraid of inquiry nor of getting information that we cannot use. *The truth never injures any one.* Is it not a self-evident fact that the more light we have, the better we can see?

So, in regard to questions of government, crimes, discipline, punishment, methods of education, rules of conduct and matters of society generally, let us inquire, investigate and consider. Let us continue to inquire, let us agitate, let us seek for the light, and in a quiet, and yet earnest and determined way, let us move on. *Without agitation there is no progress.* Martin Luther was an agitator, so was John Knox—so was Paul the Apostle, and so was Christ himself, in a quiet, orderly way. To agitate does not necessarily mean to make war—certainly it does not mean so in any literal or sanguinary sense.

Let us see, finally, if we cannot dispense with some of our gods, as the Greeks and the Romans did with their gods many centuries ago. Let us dispense with our deities, for a time at least, and see if we do not find the change to be an improvement. Let us dismiss our god of Justice, our god of Vengeance and god of War; let us dispense with our national flag, our sense of honor, our state education and several other things in that direction—and above all, let us banish Mammon from our midst forever. So long as we fall prostrate, like the heathen devotee, and worship our rulers believing all the absurd things that they

endeavor to instil into our minds about flags, education, religion, laws, honor and our duty to our beloved country, we must expect to be trampled in the dust, and we must often be content either to feed upon husks or go to bed supperless.

In the first place, let us have higher, holier and better aims than we have had thus far. It may, and probably will, take centuries to accomplish what is desired, but the time to begin this great work is now. Let us determine what is desirable, and set about doing it at once. A little to-day, a little to-morrow—*it is the summing up of little things running through a long period of time* that brings forth the most astonishing results. By such slow and imperceptible processes the hills are reared and the rocks are formed. It may be true, as already said, that we cannot dispense with the state all at once, and probably not for a long time to come, but let us make it our purpose to give the state less and less to do and afford it less and less opportunity to acquire power. Let us circumscribe its action and prevent it from soaring aloft, as it has been doing for some centuries past. And as the state comes to have less and less to do, it will gradually decay, and finally it will disappear and be forgotten forever. For some things there ought to be resurrection—but for government, in any manner or form, *there ought to be none*. If there is any meeting of delegates for legislative purposes, let them meet on call, and then very rarely, as occasion may require. The work of legislation being done almost wholly by the communities, there would be very little indeed left for the state to be concerned about. Public expenses would be cut down to almost a nominal sum, and from that one source of improvement alone great good would certainly result.

Above all things I would remove the non-producing class entirely. I would have no drones in the hive; the two extremes in society, the drones and the slaves, those who do none of the work and those who do all of it, are out of place in any social organization that men may have yet had occasion to form.

Of course if the just principle should once more prevail that

each man should earn his own livelihood, the drones would soon become an extinct race simply for want of subsistence. Nearly all our burdens as citizens arise from the fact that we are constantly called upon to labor for other people, and without compensation; we are daily producing what others will consume.

If the doctrine I am advocating should ever be accepted and put into practice by the people, there would be an end to interest, rents, profits, and per cents. generally. The idea that money could produce money, or that property could generate property, would become obsolete. *The only possible way by which money can produce money is by one man's taking what another man earns*—as is the case with rents. If money can of itself produce money, how does it come that the labor and sweat of somebody is still a necessary factor? If money can produce money, by some feat of the alchemists, by some power of enchantment or by some mysterious process in public economy, how does it come that as a matter of fact *money has never done so*? If land produces money, even without the help of nature, what is the need of labor? The owner would not need to let his farm and be compelled to divide with some renter. He might have the whole of the proceeds. But what would the proceeds be? Trees, perhaps, or weeds. But it takes years to produce trees, and even then they are not money. Without the employment of labor, the trees would remain trees, and hence practically valueless. Labor alone is wealth—or rather without labor, wealth can never be made available. Nature lends a powerful helping hand, but even nature never produces available or practical wealth. It always leaves something for man to do. Even where it produces game and wild fruits and berries, the game has to be caught and the fruits have to be found and gathered before they can be eaten.

All that is needed to produce all the changes that have been mentioned, with all the blessings that will necessarily follow, is the adoption of this one fundamental law: *Thou shalt not*

be another man's master. That is the eleventh commandment that Moses, or the Lord, seems to have quite overlooked.

It is a very easy thing for a people to change their government or even to dispense with it entirely. Only convince a people that something really ought to be done, and they will go at it and do it directly. We have such a state of things in government as we find at present merely because people think it is all right as it is, and that admitting that some things are wrong, a remedy is impracticable. We have just such a state, just such laws, and just such burdens as the people think we ought to have ; and just such iniquities prevail as the people imagine that they necessarily must submit to. People like a strong government and a great state, and they believe it is absolutely necessary to have such things in order to ensure their own safety. Indeed, the patriotism of some people is astounding. They know it is terribly expensive, but they are willing to help pay the bill after all. They affect to complain of high taxes, but they like high taxes, so long as they can see big works going on. They are blinded or dazzled by the splendor they behold. They think that a great and powerful state is the only one that can be glorious. But people will wake up some day and change their minds, and then they will want an entirely new order of things—and rest assured, *what the people want, they will eventually obtain.* When the people decide to give the state less power, or no power at all, it will surely have less power or no power at all as the case may be. The people will not make this change by passing a law. The people are not accustomed to putting their will on paper—indeed, they have no power of doing so ; they have a way, however, of having their wishes understood and enforced without putting them on paper. It may be noticed that there is, as already said, a great deal less governing and punishing both in schools and families even to-day than there was a short time since. This change was not effected by the passage of a law, but by a revolution in the sentiments of the public on the subject of governing and punishing.

It is only a step farther to carry this change of sentiments into the management of state affairs, and when that change comes there will be far less governing and punishing in that direction also. It is these silent revolutions that are the most irresistible, and it is such revolutions alone that I would advocate and encourage.

Another way of improving affairs and the general condition of things is to dispense with certain institutions that with us are becoming far too common. If we have no jails and prisons, we will find that we shall soon have no one to put in them. On the other hand, while the state has these institutions at hand, it always finds plenty of people with which to fill them. So it is with almshouses, with insane asylums and retreats for the feeble-minded; it is well known that the faster these institutions multiply, the faster the number of their inmates increases. That is history the world over. Provide for paupers, and you will have paupers; provide for criminals, and you will have criminals; provide for war, and you are certain at last to have war.

But what would you do without government? That is what many would naturally ask. How would you get along without a ruler or master of some kind? That is something that people who trust entirely to old notions are not able to see or understand. That would be a question which a slave would naturally ask—one who had always been a slave and who never knew what it was to direct his own movements and follow the dictates of his own judgment. How would he be able to move through this world without the aid or interposition of some other human being? Such a man would very naturally say that he could not possibly get along without some one on whom he could lean for support, some one who would take the pains to direct him in his movements each succeeding day and hour. Such a man would very naturally believe that the world would resolve itself into its original elements, if there should be no such thing as slavery, with masters to govern and protect the slaves. Slaves

never know any other way, never imagine there could be any other way. Just so it is with us to-day. We are so accustomed to our condition of abject slavery and we feel so subdued and depressed by our constant submission to authority, that we could not possibly conceive how we could survive without support and protection from some outside source. It will be remembered that we had similar ideas about negro slavery and corporal punishment fifty years ago. We thought we must have slavery and that black folks were fitted only for bondage. We thought children *must* be whipped, both at home and at school, and that they could not exist for a moment without a master. In earlier times the wife came in for her share of punishment, and many really believed that she could not be a good wife unless she was given a whipping occasionally. People said of whipping then, as people say of government now, that there could be no living without it! So there was whipping in homes, whipping in schools, whipping in prisons, whipping in the army, whipping in the streets. But it now begins to dawn upon the minds of men that instead of having a master in all they do, it is better that they should learn to take care of themselves; they need no government, no master.

Of course we cannot make people see what they do not and will not see; we cannot prove anything for people that will not be convinced. The will has much to do with belief—it has all to do with it.

Men will say "you tear down and do not build up." Why, I have heard that story for fifty years, from the time when I first began thinking on my own responsibility. But if a man should ascertain that he was on the wrong road and could not possibly reach his destination in that way, is it wise to continue in that direction, although possibly he might not be able to discover the right way? He might do better by trying another route, but he could not possibly do worse than to continue on as he began. A wise man would stop at once, turn around and see if he could not find a better way. People cannot deny either my

premises or my conclusions ; but they are frightened at the results, because to them they are so new ! As a rule, the world does not take to new ideas—it never has had any fancy for such things. So far from that, it has always been ready to crucify the man, no matter how good nor how great he might be, who has the presumption to advance a new thought or advocate a new departure.

Nevertheless, I still hold the position I have taken, and feel able to defend it against any and all opposers. I still insist that the great want of this world is not charity, not assistance, not protection, not sympathy, not compassion, not government, not laws, not morals, but that training and instruction which renders men self-reliant and independent. If we help men at all, it should be merely in order to enable them to help themselves. God helps those who help themselves, and refuses to help all others.

People should be educated, trained, encouraged and accustomed to *help themselves*. The more help people get, as a rule, the more rapidly they will be hurried along the road that leads to the poorhouse. Help adds to the baneful influence which indolence exerts upon men, and it affords no remedy for any of the evils of which society complains. Nature evidently intended, if it ever intended anything, that every creature born into the world, after passing the period of infancy and immaturity, should help itself, and those that cannot meet that condition in life must ultimately go under. As a general thing, *all the help received by an able-bodied man is a damage to him in the end.*

There is a growing sentiment in this country that we are governed too much, and some have progressed so far in their discoveries in the domain of truth that they are able to perceive that we ought to have no government at all. Inquiry and investigation lead to new thoughts and to new conceptions of the rights and duties of men, and these again lead to discontent and dissatisfaction. So long as the Americans had no other ambition

than to get rich, and so long as the boundless plains of the west were open to every man who had surplus energies at his command, very little attention was paid to matters of government by the ordinary citizen. But now the far west belongs with things of the past, and ambitious men must remain where they are and make the most of life under the conditions by which they find themselves surrounded.

A great mistake is made by those who imagine that the history of America is to be unlike the history of other nations of the world, and that in a democracy like ours, remedies for all evils can be secured through the operations of the ballot box. As a nation we are only a little more than a hundred years old, and yet we have progressed far enough to see that the ballot box is the source of more evil than good. A very large proportion of those who vote are governed merely by considerations of party affiliation; many follow some leader, and many are controlled in their action by motives of fear or a feeling of dependence upon others. It has become a thing unknown in this country that any considerable number of voters should cast their ballots, at any election, simply according to the dictates of their own unbiased judgment.

Under these circumstances, we have just such a state of affairs as might naturally be expected. A few designing, sagacious and unscrupulous men control every election. They begin with the caucus, to which the people as a whole rarely give much attention. Through the machinery of the caucus the leaders secure the nomination of such candidates as they prefer, leaving the people on election day with nothing but a choice between two parties. Many voters are purchased, many are intimidated, and many are deceived in various ways. With such a state of affairs, is it not easy to see that wicked men, who have no scruples and who stop at nothing that will ensure a victory, have wholly the advantage? Cannot a Bill Tweed control a great city, or a great state even, whenever he chooses?

No, I see no promise of safety in the ballot box for any great length of time. When a people become corrupt or indolent, the ballot box affords no permanent remedy or relief. It will answer for a certain length of time—it is a temporary expedient and nothing more. The time must come, and at no distant day, when the patient, *a wronged, oppressed and enslaved people*, must experiment with some more drastic treatment than any that can be secured through the ballot box. We must have

revolution precisely as they have had it in every other country—the only question being how long can the catastrophe be postponed? When a nation begins to go down hill in its mad career, it is absolutely impossible that it should stop and turn back. No, nations always go about so far, and then there comes something different. People who imagine that human nature has changed in the slightest in a hundred, nay in a thousand years, greatly deceive themselves. All nations, like all individuals, pass through substantially the same stages of transition—there is the period of infancy, of maturity, of old age, and finally death! Nations last longer, much longer than individuals, *but none last forever.*

What happened in Paris at the close of the eighteenth century is liable to happen, I may say is certain to happen, in America some time during the twentieth. Wait till a large portion of our people become desperately hungry or desperately mad, and then see what can withstand their rage! The signs, omens and portents presaging coming evil are certainly numerous enough, if the people could only interpret their meaning. Every strike is ominous and is a revolution in embryo. Strikes seem as little things that are readily put down by the strong arm of the state, but eventually there is sure to come a strike of such dimensions that a few squads of Pinkerton's detectives or a few regiments of state militia will not be found equal to the emergency. The Chicago convention was a portent that should not be regarded lightly. Every crime that is committed is also an omen—a protest against the present trend of society and against the prevailing methods of doing business.

The plaintiff rests.

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The following books have been of service to the author in the preparation of this work. The titles of the German and French works are given in English for the convenience of readers—not always rendered fully and accurately, but sufficiently so to indicate the character of the work. In a few cases, as Mill's *Liberty*, the work which the author happened to possess was a translation from the original.

GERMAN.

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